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ABSTRACT 
Zimbabwe has a rich and diverse minerals resource base that could be an important 
contributor to sustainable growth and development. The sector has rebounded 
dramatically from the hyperinflation economic crisis (2006-8) and with “dollarisation” 
(2009) the value of mineral production has increased six-fold to about $3 billion in 2011. 
However, if this increased mining activity is to ultimately result in more than just “holes-
in-the-ground”, the crucial mineral linkages need to be realised whilst the resources 
are still extant. 
In order to optimise the economic linkages the current “colonial” minerals governance 
regime (“free mining”) needs to be fundamentally overhauled to both encourage the 
discovery of new mineral deposits and to maximise the developmental impact of known 
mineral assets through public tender against developmental outcomes. In this regard 
a Mineral Cadastre Information Management System (MCIMS) needs to be 
established as soon as possible. 
The current historically relatively high mineral prices (provoked by Asian demand) are 
likely to continue for the next couple of decades, so long as the major Asian economies 
(China and India) continue to display robust growth. Zimbabwe needs to take 
advantage of this widow of opportunity to use its finite mineral resources endowment 
to catalyse wider national economic growth and development through the maximisation 
of the seminal economic linkages. These are: 
Fiscal linkages- mineral resource rents must be captured, through the introduction of 
a resource rent tax, and reinvested into building long-term physical and human 
(knowledge) infrastructure, to underpin future national competitiveness, and into 
minerals development (exploration and technology development) to prolong the life of 
the minerals sector. 
Backward linkages – the minerals inputs sectors (capital goods, consumables, 
services) need to be grown, to take advantage of the expanding local demand, through 
measures to optimise the local content of mining purchases. The realisation of the 
backward linkages opportunities could seed wider industrialisation (capital goods) and 
economic transformation. 
Forward linkages – minerals could provide critical feedstocks into other job-creating 
sectors provided that they are beneficiated into appropriate intermediate products such 
as iron/steel, polymers and base metals for manufacturing; nitrogenous and 
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phosphatic fertilisers for agriculture; cement, steel and copper for infrastructure and 
fossil fuels for power. However, mineral beneficiation often requires state facilitation 
through incentives and disincentives, such as a small export tax if the next value 
addition step is clearly viable. The use of PGM producer power, together with South 
Africa, should be explored to stimulate local value addition. 
Knowledge linkages – the maximisation of the minerals HRD and R&D opportunities is 
essential for realising the back- and forward linkages. No resource-based state has 
industrialised without significant investment in human and technology development. 
Joint strategies with the private sector should be pursued (PPPs), including the 
reinvestment of resource rents into knowledge development.  
Spatial linkages – high rent minerals are often able to finance major infrastructure 
(transport, power and water) which could underpin the development of other sectors 
such as agriculture, forestry and manufacturing, provided that the mineral leases 
provide for excess capacity and third party access at non-discriminatory prices. The 
huge Mwanesi iron ore resource could possibly underpin a low-cost logistics corridor 
to the coast which could substantially reduce national costs of trade (imports/exports). 
All of the linkages would be greatly enhanced through access to larger markets and in 
this regard configurations for equitable regional integration should be investigated and 
pursued (e.g. SADC and SACU). 
Zimbabwe’s minerals endowment could catalyse wider economic development if the 
minerals regime is overhauled and effectively administered to maximise all of the 
developmental opportunities associated with their extraction. 
This study formed the basis for the Draft Zimbabwe Minerals Development Policy 
(Appendix 7: Draft Zimbabwe Minerals Development Policy, page 239) currently under 
finalisation (MMMD). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement: Develop a “Zimbabwe Minerals Development Policy” that will 
configure the governance of the extraction of minerals to maximise the development 
impact through the maximisation of the minerals linkages in order to use finite national 
mineral assets for sustainable growth and inter-generational equity. 
The objective of the study is to unpack the problem statement and shape a Minerals 
Development Policy using a methodology of exploring the optimisation of the mineral 
economic linkages to underpin long-term growth and development. Namely, the fiscal 
linkages (equitable revenue capture and reinvestment), the backward (upstream) 
linkages, the forward (downstream) linkages, the knowledge (side-stream) linkages 
and the spatial (side-stream minerals infrastructure) linkages.  
This study first looks at Zimbabwe’s mineral endowment, geology and mining history, 
before reviewing the Minerals Sector by mineral. The next section looks at mineral 
policy in terms of maximising the developmental impact of mining through an 
appropriate minerals administration regime, including artisanal and small-scale mining 
and the establishment of a mineral cadastre information management system 
(MCIMS). 
This is followed by an assessment of the current global crises and underlying 
commodities boom with a view to determining likely future demand for minerals and a 
discussion of a sustainable resource-based development strategy for Zimbabwe that 
maximises the seminal mineral sector linkages. 
The main part of the study looks at each of the mineral linkage sectors/clusters (the 
fiscal, backward, forward knowledge and spatial), with recommendations on how they 
might be optimised. The section on spatial linkages includes a case study on the 
potential establishment of all the linkages in the development of the Mwanesi Range 
iron ore resource. 
This is followed by a concluding discussion, recommendations and proposals for future 
research.  
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1.1 MINERAL ENDOWMENT 
1.1.1 GEOLOGY 
Zimbabwe predominantly consists of Achaean (Precambrian >600Ga) rocks, including: 
 the Achaean granite/greenstones, 
 the Achaean Limpopo mobile belt, 
 the Paleoproterozoic Magondi Supergroup (Umkondo and Lomagundi 
Groups), 
 the Neoproterozoic Makuti, Rushinga and Sijarira Groups. 
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Source: Thomas Schlüter 20081 
Figure 2: Geological Map of Zimbabwe 
 
The structural geology of Zimbabwe is dominated by the Zimbabwean Craton, cut by 
the Great Dyke and surrounded by rift valleys in the north and north-west (Zambezi 
Rift) and mobile belts in the north (Zambezi Belt), east (Mozambique Belt) and south 
(Limpopo Belt). See Figure 2. In fact the only geological border that does not coincide 
with a political border is in the south-west where the border with Botswana runs across 
the Zimbabwean Craton. The Craton is overlain in the north, north-west and east by 
Proterozoic and Phanerozoic sedimentary basins. This uncanny coincidence of 
political and geological divisions has sometimes been attributed to foreknowledge of 
the geology on the part of Cecil John Rhodes during the final delimitation of the region's 
frontiers in the 1880's and early 1890's, but it is more likely that the BSAC had a vague 
idea of the distribution of the fabled Munhumutapa gold fields, from explorers such as 
Karl Mauch, and that the settlers, who in many ways determined the land which they 
wanted to expropriate, preferred the malaria free, more temperate highlands of the 
Craton.  
The Craton was formed during the early Achaean (3.6 to 2.5 billion years ago) and 
consists of granites and gneisses which contain few economic minerals except for vein 
(pegmatite) deposits near contacts, but the Craton also contains the economically 
important schistbelts also known as the greenstone or gold belts which comprise a 
volcano-sedimentary sequence containing most of the mineral deposits currently 
exploited. These include, in order of current value of output, the vast majority of gold 
deposits, the nickel-copper-cobalt deposits (Trojan, Shangani and Epoch), the 
podiform chromite deposits (Shurugwi, Valley and Inyala), the iron ore deposits 
(Buchwa, Ripple Creek and Mwanezi), numerous limestone deposits (Sternblick, 
Cleveland, Zisco and Early Worm), the asbestos deposits (Shabanie, Gaths and King), 
the lithium pegmatite of Bikita, the Sandawana emeralds, pyrites (Iron Duke), the 
Barton Farm magnesite and numerous minor deposits of lead, zinc, antimony, 
tungsten, tin, barytes and corundum (Schlüter 2008). 
                                            
 
1 Thomas Schlüter 2008, “Geological Atlas of Africa”, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 
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The Limpopo Belt runs SSW-NNE in the south of the country, divides the Zimbabwean 
and Kaapvaal Cratons and consists of metamorphosed cratonic rocks containing gold 
deposits (Renco), corundum and magnesite occurrences. It has a complex polyphase 
history spanning the early Archaean (greater than 3.2 Ga) to the mid-Proterozoic. 
The Proterozoic is represented by two major sedimentary basins, in the north-west 
(Deweras, Lomagundi and Piriwiri Groups) and on the eastern margins of the Craton 
(Umkondo Group). The former consists of metasediments and volcanics and are 
economically important for their copper deposits (Miriam, Norah, ShackIeton and 
Angwa) and also contain important resources of copper-lead-zinc (Copper Queen and 
King), dolomite (Springbok), gold, tin (the Kamativi pegmatite), graphite (Lynx), 
kyanite, tantalum (tantalite pegmatites) and gemstones. The Umkondo Group on the 
eastern border is relatively unimportant economically, but has limestone and copper 
occurrences (Blenkinsop T. and Tromp P. 1995) 
By far the most spectacular igneous body is the Great Dyke, also of Proterozoic age 
(2.5 Ga), stretching over 500 km NNE to SSW in the centre of the country. This layered 
intrusive contains enormous reserves of stratiform chromite all along its length 
(Lalapanzi, Mutoroshanga, Great Dyke and Vanad) and also contains large reserves 
of platinum, palladium, nickel, copper and gold in the four norite complexes of 
Musengezi, Hartley, Shurugwi and Wedza.  
The other Proterozoic igneous event was the intrusion of the numerous Mashonaland 
dolerite sills and dykes about 1.9 Ga ago right across the craton, but with a 
concentration of sills in the northeast. These contain resources of nickel and copper 
(Madziwa) and are currently exploited for ornamental stone, the so-called "black 
granite" of Mutoko. The Proterozoic Mobile Belts flanking the Craton on its northern 
and eastern sides consist of metamorphic rocks in the Mozambique Belt (east) and the 
Zambezi Belt (north) with mineral occurrences of kyanite (Ky Mine) pegmatites with 
tungsten, tantalum, mica, beryllium and gemstones.  
The Karoo System sediments and volcanics of the Phanerozoic were laid down in three 
main basins, the middle and lower Zambezi basins in the west and north and the Save-
Limpopo basin in the south and south-east, and contain all of Zimbabwe's large coal 
resources, mainly in the sandstones and shales of the Ecca Series, and also has 
resources of fireclay, limestone, diaspore, and a significant uranium and vanadium 
sandstone deposit has recently been delineated at Kanyemba in the Zambezi Valley 
Wits MSC 
 
20  
(Blenkinsop T. and Tromp P. 1995). After the Karoo volcanics the post-Karoo Libombo, 
Limpopo and Botswana dolerite dyke swarms were emplaced, but contain no mineral 
occurrences. 
The Mesozoic intrusive alkali carbonate ring complexes of Dorowa, Shawa and 
Chishanya, in the centre-east of the country, are important for their resources of 
phosphate rock (apatite) and vermiculite. The intrusive kimberlite pipes north of 
Bulawayo and near Beitbridge are pre-Karoo while those near the start of Lake Kariba 
are post-Triassic (Sebungwe), but none of these are particularly rich in diamonds. 
However the diamondiferous kimberlite pipes in the SW of the country (River Ranch 
and the Murowa pipes) are mined for diamonds. 
The Mutandawhe granitic intrusion in the south-east is thought to be late Jurassic and 
contains a significant low grade molybdenum resource and tungsten deposits. During 
the late Jurassic to early Cretaceous, sandy sediments were deposited in various 
places and are of no economic importance, nor indeed are the Tertiary Kalahari aeolian 
sands covering the south-east of Zimbabwe, but a minor Tertiary-Quaternary 
diatomaceous earth deposit has been identified in the Zambezi Valley near Chirundu 
in the north-east. Both gold and diamonds occur in recent alluvial deposits (see Box 
below). 
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1.1.2 MINERAL RESOURCES OF ZIMBABWE 
Zimbabwe’s mineral resources are mainly found in the following geological formations 
and bodies: 
Box: The Zimbabwe Craton 
“The Archean Zimbabwe craton is made of a number of distinct tectonostratigraphic 
terranes assembled by plate tectonic processes. The central Tokwe terrane consists 
of 3.5–2.95 Ga gneissic rocks and structurally complex inliers of possibly older 
greenstone belts. These are overlain unconformably by a 2.9–2.8 Ga assemblage 
of mafic and felsic volcanic rocks and conglomerates, and a separate 3.0–2.7 Ga 
southeastward thickening platform sequence of sandstone, shale, and limestone. 
2.7 Ga greenstone belts form two distinctly different domains flanking the central 
terrane. Northwest of the ancient gneissic terrane, ca. 2.7 Ga greenstone belts 
comprise a series of calc-alkaline lavas and intercalated sedimentary rocks intruded 
by syn-volcanic plutons. Southeast of the ancient gneissic complex, 2.7 Ga 
greenstone belts consist of thick piles of tholeiitic basalts overlying ultramafic lavas, 
resting allochthonously over the shallow-water platform sequence and older 
gneissic terrane. This division of the Zimbabwe craton is interpreted to show that 
the central Tokwe terrane had a continental magmatic arc built on its northwestern 
edge, as its southeastern margin rifted from another fragment, forming the Sea of 
Umtali. A passive-margin sedimentary wedge formed on the rifted southeastern 
edge of this ancient continent, and prograded onto the craton during sedimentary 
and tectonic loading of the craton margin. The southeastern greenstone belts 
formed as thick oceanic crust (oceanic plateau) in this back-arc basin, and were 
later obducted on to the rift and passive margin sequence as the Sea of Umtali 
closed ca. 2.7 Ga. This was followed by intrusion of granitic plutons of the Chilimanzi 
suite ca. 2.6 Ga in a tectonic regime of intracontinental strike-slip faulting, 
representing a response to the Zimbabwe-Kaapvaal continent-continent collision. 
Crustal and lithospheric thickening during intrusion of these late granites may have 
played a role in stabilizing the Zimbabwe craton and forming the lithospheric root.” 
Kusky, T.M. 1998 “Tectonic Setting and Terrane Accretion of the Archean 
Zimbabwe Craton”, Geology, February, 1998, v. 26, p. 163-166. 
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 The Greenstone Belts: Gold and silver, as well as considerable resources of 
iron ore, nickel, copper, cobalt and podiform chromite, also chrysotile  asbestos 
(Mashaba Igneous Complex), limestone, pyrite and antimony; 
 The Great Dyke: PGMs2 & Au with associated copper, nickel and cobalt. Also, 
major chromium (chromite seams), as well as minor asbestos and magnesite; 
 The Magondi Supergroup: Copper & silver (Dewera Group); 
 The Karoo Basins: Considerable bituminous coal, coking coal, anthracite and 
CBM3 resources; 
 The Carbonatite Igneous Complexes:, phosphate (Dorowa, Showa); 
 Kimberlite pipes: diamonds (Morowa, River Ranch); 
 Pegmatites: Lithium minerals, columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, et al; 
 Recent alluvial and placer deposits: Gold and diamonds (possibly from 
reworked Umkondo conglomerates). 
Table 1: Zimbabwe’s Estimated Mineral Resources 
Mineral  Estimated Resource (Tons) Current Annual Extraction 
Rate (Tons) 
Gold 13 million 20 
Platinum 2.8 billion 2.4 million 
Chromite 930 million 700 000 
Nickel 4.5 million 9 000 
Coal 26 billion 4.8 million 
Diamonds ct 16.5 million ct Infancy 
Iron Ore 30 billion 300 000 
Copper 5.2 million None 
Coal Bed Methane 
(CBM) 
Largest known reserve in 
southern Africa 
None 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Monetary Policy statement (February 2009) 
Zimbabwe’s reported mineral resources are presented in Table 1. Almost all the known 
iron ore resources are in the massive low grade (40% Fe) Mwanesi Range resource. 
Worst (1962) estimates that resources, above the surrounding elevation (400 feet), at 
33Gt. This would imply that there could be similar resources amenable to opencast 
                                            
 
2  PGMs: Platinum Group Metals (Pt-platinum, Pd-palladium, Rh-rhodium, Ru-
ruthenium, Ir-iridium, Os-osmium) 
3 CBM: Coal Bed Methane 
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mining below the surrounding datum, giving a total possible resource in order of 70 
billion tons. The diamond resource estimation in Table 1: Zimbabwe’s Estimated 
Mineral Resources (16.5M ct) appears to be a massive under estimation, given that 
18M ct were produced in 2010/11! In 2012 David Matyanga put the national coal 
resource at 30Gt4. 
Unlike the Witwatersrand stratiform gold reefs (SA) where future reserves can be 
determined with some precision, the Zimbabwean greenstone belt gold resources are 
notoriously difficult to extrapolate with accuracy, without extensive drilling and 
assaying. Consequently the gold actual resources could be much higher than reported. 
1.1.3 RECENT MINING HISTORY5  
"The most important single element determining the nature of economic and political 
development in Southern Rhodesia was the British South African Company's 
overestimation at the end of the nineteenth century of its mineral resources, and the 
persistence of this overestimation for roughly fifteen years."6  
The enormous costs that were incurred by the BSAC in bringing the railway to 
Bulawayo and in colonising the country were not repaid by the expected mineral profits. 
This led the company to encourage the formation of a white rural bourgeoisie to 
develop the agricultural potential and thereby raise the value of the company's assets, 
particularly the land.  
In the early days the BSAC demanded a 50% free equity in any mining company set 
up to exploit the minerals. Rhodes' settler column travelled up to the Shona-speaking 
area in the north-east in 1890, carefully avoiding the Ndebele controlled part of the 
country in the south-west. After disappointing mineral discoveries in the Shona area, 
the colonialists invaded the Ndebele area in 1893 in the hope of discovering gold 
deposits there, but the much vaunted mineral riches of Zimbabwe continued to elude 
them.  
                                            
 
4 www.fossilfuel.co.za/David%20Matyanga.pdf 
5  A more comprehensive “History of Mining on Southern Africa” is presented in 
Appendix 8.1 
6 Arrighi 1973, p336. 
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In 1896 the settlers were nearly wiped out when the Shona and Ndebele rose up 
together in rebellion at being dispossessed of their land. The first "chimurenga" 
(liberation war) was finally put down in 1897.  
When the BSAC charter expired in 1923 there was a settler referendum to decide on 
whether or not to incorporate with the Union of South Africa which had been formed in 
1910. The result was a clear rejection and in that year the country was renamed 
Southern Rhodesia and it became a British Crown Colony with "Responsible 
Government" (settler voters only).  
From then on the country was effectively ruled by the settlers and in 1953, in an attempt 
to create an economic block to counter the Union of South Africa, the settler supported 
Central African Federation (CAF) of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland was created. 
This gave the Southern Rhodesian settlers access to the enormous copper mining 
revenues from Northern Rhodesia, plentiful labour from Nyasaland and the markets of 
both.  
The nationalist movements in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were clearly opposed 
to the Federation which they rightly saw as being settler dominated (the federal 
legislature had twenty-nine settler seats and six black seats) and were able to bring 
about its dissolution in 1963. Soon after, they both achieved independence as Zambia 
and Malawi.  
The main nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU, were banned in the early sixties 
and in 1965 the settler regime declared unilateral independence (UDI) from Britain and 
changed the name of the country to Rhodesia. The United Nations responded with 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia which were not particularly effective as they 
were never applied by its southern ally, apartheid South Africa.  
The nationalists in exile launched a guerrilla war in 1966 which escalated rapidly with 
the defeat of the Portuguese in neighbouring Mozambique in 1974. By 1979 most of 
the country was under martial law and late that year the settlers capitulated at the 
Lancaster House Conference to majority rule. Independence was gained in 1980 under 
the Shona-based ZANU party and in 1988 it merged with the Ndebele-based ZAPU 
party. 
As effective economic independence was gained from Britain as early as 1923, the 
country was able to proceed with a more balanced economic development in the 
thirties and forties than other African colonies, ruled from Britain. During this period a 
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substantial metallurgical and engineering capacity was installed which was further 
strengthened during Federation. It was this basic capacity that, with UDI and sanctions, 
enabled a wide ranging import substitution development program in the sixties and 
seventies.  
In 1987 Zimbabwe had the fourth highest GNP per capita of all sub-Saharan African 
countries with populations greater than two million (after South Africa, Cameroon and 
Ivory Coast) and in 1986 it had the highest manufacturing value-added per capita in 
the whole of independent Black Africa. Due to the global recession, particularly the fall 
in primary commodity prices, Zimbabwe's GDP hardly grew in real terms in the 1980's 
and GDP per capita actually shrunk over this period.  
During UDI/sanctions the Rhodesian economy became closely linked to that of its 
much larger ally, apartheid South Africa, via a series of trade and transport 
agreements. The main export market for Zimbabwe's expanding manufacturing sector 
was South Africa. In the 80s the government attempted to reduce this dependency and 
from 1981 to 1987, South Africa's proportion of total trade fell substantially, from 24% 
to 13%. This delinking with South Africa did not lead to an increase in trade with fellow 
members of the SADC, which stayed constant, but rather a shift to the developed 
countries.  
Before Mozambique applied sanctions against Rhodesia in 1976, the bulk of the 
country's foreign trade went via the ports of Beira and Maputo, but after 1976 almost 
all trade went via South Africa. After independence Zimbabwe attempted to shift its 
trade routes away from South Africa back to Beira and Maputo and to this end 
Zimbabwe maintained a large contingent of troops in Mozambique in the 80s to guard 
the Beira and Limpopo corridors from attacks by the South African sponsored MNR 
(Renamo) as the maintenance of alternative export routes was seen by government 
as being strategically essential. This threat disappeared with the liberation of South 
Africa in 1994 and the normalisation of relations between the two countries. By 2000 
trade between the two constituted their largest trading volumes in the southern African 
(SADC) region. 
Inflation started taking off in the late 90s due to massive government fiscal deficits 
caused by large pay-outs to war veterans and the war in the DRC. The land 
reclamations from 2000 further reduced revenues and also limited access to foreign 
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loans (financial sanctions 7 ) resulting in the acceleration of inflation and the final 
implosion of the Zimbabwe dollar in 2008 and dollarisation in early 2009. The 
contribution of the main sectors to GDP was unchanged from independence to 2000. 
Manufacturing was the largest of the productive sectors followed by agriculture and 
mining, though it should be noted that the smelting and refining of certain metals 
(ferrochrome, iron and steel) is classed as manufacturing rather than mining. However, 
hyperinflation and the contraction of manufacturing and agriculture have resulted in the 
mining becoming the lead productive sector since dollarisation (2009) following the 
signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 creating the 
“Inclusive Government”. 
  
                                            
 
7 “The sanctions include the enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001 by the United States of America (USA), sanctions by 
the European Union (EU) in 2002 as well as Canada and Australia and their allies.” 
WTO 2011, Trade Policy Review Report by Zimbabwe, WT/TPR/G/252. 
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1.2 THE MINING SECTOR 
PGM
PGM
PGM
PGM
 
Source: adapted from USGS 20128 
Figure 3: Mineral Deposits & Mines 
Zimbabwe’s mineral deposits and mines are concentrated on the centre of the country 
along the Great Dyke and Greenstone Belts (Figure 3). 
1.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1992 Ericsson and Gibbon observed that the “Zimbabwean mining is much 
diversified in terms of minerals produced, the number of operating mines and dispersal 
of control over the mine production. More than 40 minerals are mined; the number of 
operating mines is 800-900; the most important mining company, Anglo American, 
controls 25 per cent of the value of total mining output and state ownership is not 
dominant. This situation contrasts sharply with the situation in most African countries. 
Most mining countries in Africa depend on one single or possibly two or three minerals, 
there are usually only a few large-scale mines and only a handful, usually transnational, 
mining companies dominate the industry or there is a large state ownership. 
                                            
 
8 USGS 2012: “The Mineral Industry of Zimbabwe 2012”, 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/africa.html#zi 
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The main factors, which have led to this situation are:  
- general economic and political developments. 
- a favourable geology. The political boundaries of Zimbabwe coincide almost 
completely with the geological boundaries of the Zimbabwe Craton and is 
intersected by the Great Dyke. Both are geological phenomena with large 
reserves of several economically interesting minerals. 
- liberal and clearly defined mining legislation, which has been in force since long 
before independence. A licence to explore, the right to peg a claim and to mine 
a deposit are given to basically anybody with only limited exemptions. This is in 
contrast to most African countries where exploration and mining is only allowed 
with special permits.”9 
The period of settler government with the sanctions that were imposed by the UN in 
the seventies produced a mining industry that developed in an essentially different way 
to that of other colonies. Zimbabwe was not developed purely in the interests of the 
colonising country, as a source for raw materials and a market for manufactured goods, 
but was developed in the interests of a “national” bourgeoisie, albeit a minority settler 
one. The settlers had effective control of government from 1923 which resulted in a 
type of development more akin to that of South Africa than, say, Zambia or Zaire.  
The imposition of sanctions also had a profound effect on the mode of development by 
way of forcing national self-sufficiency in a large variety of products. These factors 
resulted in several strategies regarding the mining industry both in terms of upstream 
and downstream development. The shortage of foreign exchange, sanctions and the 
land-locked position of the country provoked a downstream development of the mining 
industry in the sixties and seventies in order to increase value and decrease 
weight/volume. Most of the major metals currently produced are reduced to their pure 
form, except for the precious metals (PGMs and gold). Examples are copper cathodes, 
nickel cathodes, ferrochrome, pure tin, iron and steel.  
                                            
 
9 Magnus Ericsson and Chris Gibbon 1992 “Mining Investment, Structural 
Adjustment and State-Mining Capital Relations in Zimbabwe”, in “Mining and 
Structural Adjustment: Studies on Zimbabwe and Tanzania” by C. S. L. Chachage, 
Magnus Ericsson, Peter Gibbon, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, http://www.ethz.ch 
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Processing and refining of minerals was also necessary for import substitution for the 
metal inputs to industry as a whole (eg. copper for wire and cables). Also, several 
minerals are mined purely as inputs for local industry (generally on a small scale) such 
as pyrites (for sulphur), apatite (for phosphates) and clay (for ceramics and 
refractories), but also on a large scale such as limestone (for cement and lime) and 
coal (for energy, metallurgy and agriculture).  
On the upstream side, a wide variety of inputs to the mining industry are manufactured 
locally. Mining equipment such as ball mills, conveyors, rail and rolling stock, pumps, 
headgear, ventilation ducting and electrical equipment are (or were) made in the 
country and a variety of mining chemicals and explosives are also locally 
manufactured.  
Another effect of sanctions was that during UDI the TNC's had difficulty in repatriating 
their profits which meant that surplus generated by the mining industry was often 
reinvested in the industry or other parts of the economy. This also had the effect of 
increasing the overall control of the TNC's over the economy as a whole. The major 
transnational mining houses had significant holdings in other sectors of the economy. 
For instance, Anglo American Corporation had interests in manufacturing, farming, 
services and finance, Lonrho also had holdings in vehicle manufacture, forestry and 
textiles, while RTZ plc had a local engineering subsidiary manufacturing agricultural 
equipment (Tinto Industries).  
The original capital generally came from abroad but later investment was mainly raised 
locally, except for RTZ's 1980 investment of 6 MGBP10 in Renco gold mine and the 
new PGM investments (last 20 years). Until 1995 the mining industry was largely in the 
hands of the transnational mining companies, the most important being Anglo 
American Corporation of South Africa (nickel, ferrochrome, phosphates and pyrite), 
Union Carbide (ferrochrome and gold), RTZ Plc (gold, nickel), Lonrho (gold) and Turner 
Newall (asbestos). However, since 1995 most of these have divested, except for 
Anglo’s return through its subsidiary, Anglo Platinum in 2003. 
Since independence state participation has been on the increase. The state has the 
largest shareholding in coal mining, the iron and steel industry (Bimco/Zisco), 
                                            
 
10 MGBP: millions of Great Britain Pounds 
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diamonds (Marange) and, in the past, copper and tin. In 1984 the newly formed state 
enterprise, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) bought out the 
ailing local mining interests of Messina of South Africa giving it control over most of the 
national copper and silver production, but these mines were near the end of their life 
and finally closed in 2004. ZMDC recently became the partner in the Marange diamond 
operations with four other JV foreign investors. The state also handles all mineral and 
metal trade (MMCZ) with the exception of gold which is marketed through Authorised 
Dealers (the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe used to be the sole Authorised Dealer) and 
PGMs under Special Mining Leases (SPLs). 
 
Note: Due to hyper-inflation figures for 2007/8 are estimates.  
Source: Source: Central Statistical Office, Harare and the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe 
Figure 4: Value of Mineral Production (1980-2011) 
 
Due to depressed real prices for most minerals in the 80s, there was little expansion 
in mineral production. In USD terms the total value of mineral production fell by 13% 
from 1980 to 1989 ($527M), excluding the value of ferrochrome, pig iron, steel, cement, 
ceramics and coke (Table 2). It then increased to $529M in 1998 and $776M in 2004 
before collapsing during the hyper-inflation crisis (Table 2). Due to robust prices (Asian 
demand) it has recovered dramatically since dollarisation (Figure 4) and is now at an 
all-time high of about $3 billion (2011). Most mines are located around the central N-S 
axis due to the Great Dyke and Greenstone Belts, as displayed in Figure 3: Mineral 
Deposits & Mines. 
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Table 2: Mineral Production and Value (US$m) 2010/11 
Mineral / Metal 2010 Value $ 2011 Value $ % Chg Vol %Chg $ 
Gold t 9.62 $380 20.8 $711 116% 87% 
PGM t 15.56 $510 20.84 $921 34% 81% 
Diamonds - Kimberlite k ct 178 $28 367 $64 106% 129% 
Diamond – Alluvial M ct 8 $320 9 $450 13% 41% 
Chromite kt 517 $115 609 $136 18% 18% 
Ferrochrome kt 154 $135 161 $303 5% 124% 
Coal Mt 2.4 $100 4.6 $274 92% 174% 
TOTAL - $1 588  $2 859  80% 
Source:  Gary McMahon 2012 (from Government of Zimbabwe, COMZ) 
PGM mining has become the largest sector (by value) followed by gold and diamonds 
(Table 3). Both nickel and asbestos production have collapsed though the former is 
expected to revive over the next few years. Asbestos may also revive if markets and 
capital can be secured. 
Table 3: Mineral Production, Exports, Taxes & Employment 2011 
 Production 
(000) 
Gross 
Revenues 
($m) 
% of Total 
Gross 
Revenues 
Exports 
($m) 
Fiscal 
Revenues 
($m) 
% of Total 
Fiscal 
Revenues 
Employment 
Gold oz 418 711 24 711 125 32 8600 
PGM oz 670 921 31 921 64 16 8115 
Diamonds, 
kimberlite, ct 
367 64 2 64 10 2 330 
Diamonds, 
alluvial ct 
9,000 450* 15 450* 118** 30 1000 
Coal  t 4,564 274 9 27 43 11 3400 
Chromite t 609 136 5 136 1 0  
Ferrochrome 
t 
161 403 14 403 28 7 2865***  
Total  2959 100 2712 390 100 24,310 
*Due to KPC delays production is often exported in subsequent years; ** includes $36m assumed from 
ZMDC’s profits;  
*** including chromite mining. Source: McMahon 2012, Table 3. 
In 2011 gold and diamonds (assuming transfers to the fiscus by ZMDC) were the 
largest contributors to fiscal revenues, followed by PGMs (Table 3: Mineral Production, 
Exports, Taxes & Employment 2011). The low PGM contribution, given that it has the 
largest revenues, is probably due to the fact that two of the three operators are under 
Special Mining Leases (SPLs) with a different fiscal regime (lower CIT and royalties, 
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but with an Additional Profits Tax – APT) which appears to have resulted in a lower 
relative tax take.  
Table 4: Output Volumes: Selected Years 
Mineral 1980 1990 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Gold t 11.4 16.9 22.1 15.5 21.3 11.4 7.0 3.6 5 9.6 20.8 
Asbestos kt 251 161 145 168 104 97 85 12 5 2 - 
Nickel 15.1 11.4 6.0 8.0 9.8 8.8 8.6 6.0 4.9 6.1 - 
Chromite kt 552 573 669 749 668 700 614 312 194 517 609 
FeCr kt n.a n.a. 250 258 193 202 190 148 73 154 161 
Coal kt 2589 4 978 3808 3721 3323 2107 2080 1510 1667 2670 4564 
PGMs t - - 0.90 4.46 8.38 9.29 9.97 10.70 13.18 16.84 20.84 
Iron ore Mt 0.80 1.26 0.98 0.27 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.09 0.09 - - 
Source: Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe 
Since 2000 the two growth minerals have been diamonds and PGMs, whilst the 
production of all other minerals have declined, almost to zero for copper, asbestos, 
iron ore and nickel, though gold has recovered and nickel is likely to rebound (Table 
4). Iron ore could either return to previous levels (~1.5Mtpa) for the local market (Zisco) 
or dramatically increase as an export mineral, depending on the current negotiations 
with Essar. The prognosis for asbestos is unclear due to market constraints. 
 
Source: Gary McMahon 2012 “Zimbabwe Growth Recovery Notes – the Mining Sector”, World Bank, 
Washington 
Figure 5: Mineral Exports (2000-2011) 
Given that virtually all metal and diamond production is exported, mineral exports have 
by and large tracked production, except for diamonds where, due to the KPC process, 
a stockpile has been built up, which will be put onto the market over the next few years. 
In USD terms, mineral exports have increased more than four-fold over the last decade 
(Figure 5). 
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Appendix 3: Mining & the Economy Compiled by Isaac Kwesu11, gives a more detailed 
discussion of the role of the minerals sector in the Zimbabwean economy, including 
the composition of the mining sector’s revenue (costs), its contribution to GDP, to 
exports, to forex earnings, to fiscal revenues, to employment and to investments, as 
well as mining CSR12 (CSI13) activities. 
1.2.2 GOLD         
In the 1,200 years preceding European colonisation, it is estimated that about 4000 
ancient mines produced between 600 and 800 tonnes of gold "...with a normal 
production during their heyday of about 20,000 oz. a year"14 and "the gold trade was 
directly responsible for the rise of the Zimbabwe state"15. 
Gold output peaked in 1916 at 29 tons and in the first one hundred years (1890-1989) 
of modern mining 1.54kt were produced. In 1979 gold replaced asbestos as 
Zimbabwe's most valuable mineral produced and it competed with ferrochromium as 
the premier mineral export until 2007 when platinum took over the lead. The 1916 
record was nearly surpassed in 1999 when 27 tons were produced, but thereafter there 
was a steady decline due to the economic meltdown to 3.6t in 2008. Since dollarisation, 
production has rapidly recovered, to 13t in 2011 (Figure 6). 
  
                                            
 
11 COMZ 2012 
12 CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility 
13 CSI: Corporate Social Investment 
14 Summers, 1969, p218 
15 Huffman 1974, p241 
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Source: COMZ 2012 and RMG 2012 
Figure 6: Gold Production 
Gold is still produced by numerous small mines, but the bulk of production comes from 
a few medium-sized mines. The state used to give comprehensive aid to the numerous 
small-scale gold mines by providing expertise, assaying, loans, hire of equipment, and 
by guaranteeing a fixed gold price (by the Reserve Bank). In addition the state roasting 
plant in Kwe Kwe used to custom treat refractory ores. In 1988 the state gold refinery 
was opened in Msasa with a capacity of 90 tpa, well above the foreseeable national 
needs, to cater for refining from other states in the region. However, it was shut in 2009 
when gold miners were authorised to market their own production (under the Gold 
Trade Act). 
One of the few post-Independence investors was Cluff Minerals of the UK who started 
out with a dump retreatment operation at the Royal Family mine (His Majesty) in the 
south-east near Filabuzi. In 1988 Cluff invested a further $5M for the the development 
of the large Freda-Rebecca (Dandadzi) operation near Bindura. By 1989 this was the 
largest producer in the country, with an output of 1.9 tonnes of gold from about 1Mt of 
ore and Zimbabwe was the main source of revenue for Cluff plc of the UK. It is now 
owned by Mwana Africa Holdings (Mwana Africa Plc and China International Mining 
Group) and in 2011 produced 1.3t of gold (largest producer). This was the first 
Zimbabwean operation treating large tonnages of low grade ore by heap leach. This 
type of opencast heap leach operation was the main source of new gold in Western 
Australia's spectacular ten-fold expansion during the eighties and it would appear that 
Zimbabwe could have substantial potential for many more of these operations. 
Lonrho Plc of the UK used to be the largest gold producer in Zimbabwe from eight 
mines (4.5 to 5tpa). Five of its mines were owned via its subsidiary in Zimbabwe, 
Independence Mining (Pvt) Ltd. (Athens, How, Shamva, Tiger Reef and Redwing/Old 
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West mines). It also owned another three gold mines via its holding company 
Willoughby's of the UK which in turn owned Corsyn Consolidated Mines Limited in 
Zimbabwe (Arcturus, Mazowe and Muriel mines). Lonrho Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd. 
(Lonzim) was the local holding company and Homestake Mining and Technical 
Services (Pvt) Ltd. provided financial and technical services to all of the mines. In 1999 
Lonrho relisted its mining assets under Lonmin Plc and in 2002 Metallon Gold (Metallon 
Corporation Plc, owned by Mzi Khumalo of SA) bought five of Lonrho’s mines - Red 
Wing, Shamva, Arcturus, How Mine and Mazowe - for $15,5 million. It also purchased 
the Motopa prospect from Oleaster Investments in 2003. The mines were all closed in 
2008 during the hyper-inflation and fixed gold price (below market price) crisis but have 
been reopened since dollarisation and the scrapping of the fixed gold price. Metallon 
reports resources of 8.7M oz grading 2.9g/t from all of its properties and a capacity to 
produce about 4tpa of gold.16 
Other larger gold producers include Blanket Mine (~1.1tpa, Caledonia), Renco Mine 
(~0.6tpa) and Turk Mine (~0.5tpa, New Dawn). In addition about 1.5tpa of by-product 
gold is produced by the PGM miners. The state mining holding company, the 
Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), owns the Jena, Sabi, and 
Elvington mines and the dormant Bar-20 mine. 
A comprehensive list of gold mines, their status, controlling company, and production 
from 1975 (5-yearly) and EBIT is given in Appendix 6: Zimbabwe- Gold Production by 
Mine & Company. 
All gold bullion used to be bought by the Reserve Bank and refined by the state 
refinery, Fidelity Printers and Refiners, built with assistance from the Perth Refinery in 
Australia, but the plant has been on care and maintenance since the hyper-inflation 
crisis. The outstanding Reserve Bank debt to the gold miners is apparently the main 
obstacle to its reactivation. During the meltdown years (high and hyperinflation) gold 
miners were forced to sell to the Reserve Bank at the “official” exchange rate, which 
was well below the purchasing power rate, causing many mines to close and a collapse 
in national output. 
                                            
 
16 Metallon Corp. 2012 (www.rair-dev.co.za/metallon/default.php) 
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The principal constraints to gold mining expansion taking advantage of the current high 
prices are access to capital (many are small operations), reliable power supply, 
economies-of-scale (consolidation of smaller producers) and availability of skills. In 
addition, the past ASM17 support structures (instruments) need to be rebuilt (finance, 
technical and marketing). A recent minerals scenarios study estimated that by 2018 
production could reach 28.5t, under the current investment regime, or an astounding 
82.4t “with more investment stability”18. The lower scenario would require investments 
of $450 million and the higher $2.5 billion! Employment in 2018 is projected at 15,200 
for the former and 27,600 for the latter. However, there would appear to be major 
resource constraints to achieve the higher scenario in six years, given that major 
exploration and reserves delineation would have to be undertaken which would push 
out the time horizon, if in fact the requisite resources exist. 
1.2.3 PLATINUM GROUP METALS (PGMS) 
The Great Dyke of Zimbabwe contains the second largest known deposits of platinum 
in the world. The Great Dyke resources are estimated at 1.68 Gt (billion tons) grading 
5.54 g/ton (grams per ton) PGM's (86%) and Au (14%) with 0.2% Ni and 0.15% Cu. 
There are currently three operating mines operating namely, Zimplats (Implats), 
Mimosa (Aquarius & Implats) and Unki Platinum (Anglo Platinum), Figure 7. Current 
platinum production is at 188 000 ounces per year. Five other platinum projects are at 
different stages of resource identification (e.g. ZMDC’s Bokai and Ngezi-Mhondoro). 
Besides gold, the platinum industry appears to have the greatest immediate prospect 
for rapid expansion. 
                                            
 
17 ASM: Artisanal & Small-scale Mining 
18 McMahon 2012, p5 
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Source: Implats 
Figure 7: The Great Dyke 
The development of Platinum Group Metal (PGMs) mining dates back to 1969 when 
Union Carbide undertook trial mining at Wedza, which was not viable at the prevailing 
PGM and Ni/Cu prices. In the 80s RTZim ran the pilot Zinca mine on the Hartley 
Complex which also proved to be non-viable.  In 1994 the Mimosa Mine started 
producing on a small scale and this was followed by the $500 million BHP/Utah - Delta 
Gold joint venture investment for the development of the Hartley Platinum mine which 
closed in 1999 and was taken over by Implats (Delta), who concentrated on the Ngezi 
opencast resource, and in 2002/3 it was bought by Impala Platinum of SA (Figure 8: 
PGM Production (1996-2011). The BHP-Delta base metals refinery19 (BMR) was put 
on care and maintenance in 1999, though current production volumes would appear 
to be sufficient for its reactivation. 
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Source COMZ: www.chamberofminesofzimbabwe.com 
Figure 8: PGM Production (1996-2011) 
The sector has huge potential especially for further expansion and greater value 
addition (all production is exported as concentrate or matte/leach alloy for refining in 
SA).  In 2011 PGM (Pt, Pd, Rh) production was 629,000 oz (ex Au)20, which is above 
the rough threshold of 500,000 oz/an for a basic (Pt, Pd, Rh & Au) PGM PMR21. A 
scenario study by the World Bank forecasts that by 2018, output could increase to 
29tpa and employment to over 10,000, at a cost of $1.8 billion in investments.22 Such 
volumes would appear to be sufficient for a full PMR (Pt, Pd, Rh, Ru, Os, Ir and Au). 
Small amounts of PGM concentrates are also contained in the residue of nickel-copper 
refining (BNR), when operational. 
1.2.4 COAL & CBM 
Coal production over the 20 years 1965 to 1985 remained fairly static between 3.0 and 
3.5 Mt, however, production was substantially expanded in 1986 with the 
commissioning of an opencast operation to supply the new Hwange Power Station, at 
about 5 Mt annually (Figure 9).  
                                            
 
20 McMahon 2012 
21 PMR: precious metals refinery 
22 McMahon 2012 
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Source: COMZ 2012 (www.chamberofminesofzimbabwe.com) 
Figure 9: Coal Production (1980-2011) 
Hwange Colliery Company Ltd. is a quoted company and is 40% owned by the state 
and 32% by the van Hoogstraten family (UK)23. Nearly all coal production is for the 
local market – power (Hwange), the cement industry, agriculture and in the past, for 
coke production for Zisco and exports (Zimbabwe used to also export about 100 ktpa 
of coke, mainly to Zambia and DRC). 
By-products from coke production are tar and benzole. A new distillation plant was 
constructed in Kwekwe in the 90s by Zimchem which takes all tar and benzole from 
both the Hwange and Zisco coking plants (when operational), for the production of a 
variety of chemical products. 
Coal-to-Liquids (CTL) projects have been considered on and off since the 1950's and 
are once again under investigation, as are possibilities for gasification of Zimbabwe's 
substantial coal reserves and the tapping of the CBM reserves for production of 
ammonia for fertilisers, as well as power (CCGT). 
RioZim owns the Sengwa coal deposit (>1.3Gt reserves) and have plans to build a 
2GW power station based on this resource within the next 5 to 10 year period.24 
The major coal resource areas are: 1) the Mid-Zambezi basin: Hwange (1900 
Mtonnes), Gwai River Valley (3675 Mtonnes), Binga (3604 Mtonnes), Gokwe (1150 
                                            
 
23 RMG 2012.  
24 RioZim 2012 (www.riozim.co.zw) 
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Mtonnes) and 2) the Sabi-Limpopo basin: Sabi-Lundi (379 ktonnes), Bubye (291 
ktonnes) and Tuli (127 ktonnes)25.  
In addition, the Coal-bed Methane (CBM) resources in the Hwange/Lupane basins are 
estimated at over 27-40 TCF (trillion cubic feet) of sulphur-free methane gas, which 
rank Zimbabwe’s resources at 11th globally, after SA (Table 5: World Coal Bed 
Methane (CBM) Resources, but other coal basins are also known to have substantial 
CBM resources (e.g. the Sengwa Basin) which still need to be delineated. 
Table 5: World Coal Bed Methane (CBM) Resources 
 
Source: Gupta 201026 
There are plans for a thermal power station based on the Lupane CBM resources and 
the reserves are currently being appraised for this. CBM could also provide the 
feedstock for nitrogenous fertilisers and other methanol chemicals and could be used 
for the reduction of iron ore to iron/steel (DRI27). 
The recent World Bank mineral production scenarios study forecasts a base-case of 
9.8Mt by 2018 (6Mt from Sengwa) and a optimistic case of 40Mt by 2018 (“investor 
friendly” case) which could subsequently expand to 82Mt 28 . However, beyond 
expansions to supply increased domestic power generation (base case), major exports 
will require huge investments into a new heavy-haul rail corridor to the Mozambican 
coast. A 40Mtpa railway will require between $3 and $4 billion in investment, but the 
                                            
 
25 Morrison 1985 
26 Pramod Gupta 2010,  Presentation to “Methane to Markets Partnership Expo 
2010”, New Delhi, India 
27 DRI: Direct Reduced Iron 
28 McMahon 2012  
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resulting tariff could be as low as 3.5USc/t-km during capex repayments and 1.3USc/t-
km once repaid. The latter would equate to a cost of around $13/t from Hwange to 
Maputo/Matola (about 1000km) or $14/t to the proposed new Port of Techobanine. 
Assuming a long-term international coal price of $70/t (currently $85/t FOB Richards 
Bay), mining plus concentration costs of around $15/t and a terminal cost of $3/t, such 
a project would appear to be viable even at the higher rail tariff of $38.5/t to 
Techobanine ($70-($15+$38.5+$3) = $13.5 = $540 million/an for 40Mtpa). See Table 
6. 
Table 6: Crude 40Mtpa heavy haul rail costs & tariffs 
 1000 km 40Mtpa 
Capex (G) G$ $3.6 
Capex interest rate % 3% 
Repayment  period Years 16 
Capex per ton $ $90 
Capex/t-km $ $9.9 
Tariff w/capex  USc/t-km 3.5 
Cost w/capex $ $32 
Tariff opex only USc/t-km 1.7 
1st year opex only Year 21 
Cost opex only $ $15 
Source: Jourdan 201229 
1.2.5 ASBESTOS 
Asbestos mining peaked in 1974 at 281kt and between 1965 and 1978 asbestos was 
the country's principal mineral in terms of the value of production but fell to second 
place behind gold from 1979 till the financial crisis when production collapsed and has 
not recovered with dollarisation (Figure 10).  
The main producer was Shabanie and Mashaba Mines (Pvt) Ltd. which has three 
mines in the south of the country (Shabanie, Gaths and King mines), near Masvingo, 
and was owned by Turner Newall Plc (UK), but is now owned by Zimbabwean 
investors. 
                                            
 
29 Jourdan 2012: “Export options for the Waterberg Coalfields”, confidential report for 
Genesis-Analytics, Joburg. 
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Sources: Jourdan 1992 and USGS 2012 
Figure 10: Asbestos Production (1970-2011) 
Asbestos is increasingly being substituted for due to its perception as a health hazard 
in the West, but over the last few years the long fibre chrysotile (white asbestos) has 
been recognised as being a much less dangerous variety and new markets are 
opening up in Asia. By 2010 asbestos production had fallen to about 2kt. However, 
reserves are sufficient to return to previous production levels (>250ktpa), provided that 
markets and capital can be secured. .A small proportion of production was consumed 
locally for the manufacture of asbestos cement products and the possibility of local 
asbestos spinning for the manufacture of fire-proof material was investigated in the 
90s but no plant was built. 
1.2.6 NICKEL 
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa (AAC of SA) had the majority share in 
Bindura Nickel Corporation (BNC) of Zimbabwe which was bought by Mwana Africa 
(SA) in 2003-5. BNC used to operate two nickel mines in the NE of the country, namely 
Trojan and Madziwa (now closed), and two in the SW, Shangani and Epoch (now 
closed). They also operate a nickel smelter and refinery, BSR, at Bindura. In addition, 
nickel and copper matte was toll refined from BCL Limited (Botswana) and other 
copper-nickel suppliers. In November 2008 Bindura Nickel Corporation was placed on 
care and maintenance, due to the hyper-inflation crisis. Mwana intends to reopen the 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Chrysotile Asbestos kt
Wits MSC 
 
43  
operations as soon as they have secured the requisite capital30. They also plan to bring 
the Hunters Road nickel deposit into production, which has resources of 36.4Mt 
grading 0.55% nickel. Overall, nickel output has been on a steady decline since 1980 
(Figure 11), though it could still recover to about 10ktpa. 
 
Source: COMZ 2012 
Figure 11: Nickel Production 
Until 1982 nickel was produced by Rio Tinto Zimbabwe Ltd., but in that year the 
Empress Nickel Mine was shut down due to a combination of falling grades, depleted 
reserves and depressed prices. The Empress nickel refinery at Eiffel Flats started 
processing Cu-Ni matte from BCL's Selebi Phikwe mine in Botswana in the second 
half of 1985 after having been closed for two years and has continued to toll-refine 
since (currently around 8kt/an of Ni). 
The World Bank scenario study forecasts a base-case production of 10.2ktpa nickel 
by 2018 and an optimistic scenario (assuming policy changes) of 20ktpa and 
employment of 1400, requiring investments of $186 million at a cost of $62 million.31   
1.2.7 COPPER 
                                            
 
30 They have had difficulty in raising offshore capital due to uncertainty surrounding 
the indigenisation policy. 
31 McMahon 2012.  
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Copper peaked in 1973 at 52 kt, but since then it has steadily declined to a low of 2.3kt 
in 2003 (Figure 12). The large majority used to be produced by companies under the 
parastatal ZMDC, namely, MCM (Mhangura Copper Mines, now closed) and 
Lomagundi Smelting & Mining (LSM, also closed), with smaller amounts produced as 
a by-product from the nickel mines (Bindura). The ZMDC took over the interests of the 
Messina group of South Africa in 1982. The main reason for this intervention on the 
part of the state appears to have been the depressed price of copper causing Messina 
to threaten to shut down some of the poorer mines or, failing that, to withdraw 
completely. All the mines used to be in the centre-north part of the country in the 
Lomagundi district near Chinhoyi. The Asian boom high copper prices did not trigger a 
reopening of operations due to the domestic economic crisis, but dollarisation is likely 
to lead to a reassessment of the remaining resources. 
ZMDC has also considered a new mine, Copper Queen, 90 km WSW of Alaska Mine. 
The ore grades at 1.3% Cu, 1% Pb and 3.4% Zn, with significant amounts of silver. 
Geological reserves stand at 8 million tonnes of sulphide ore, but the economic crisis 
pushed the project onto a back-burner. It could make the country self-sufficient in lead 
and zinc which are presently imported. The main problems with the project appear to 
be the complex mineralogy and in raising the capital. The World Bank scenario study 
(McMahon 2012) makes no forecasts for the reactivation of copper mining. 
 
Source: Jourdan 1992 & COMZ 2012 
Figure 12: Copper Production (1970-2003) 
Bindura Nickel Corporation, used to produce a small amount of copper (~1000tpa) at 
their refinery BSR at Bindura and from toll-refined matte from BCL in Botswana. The 
RioZim Empress Nickel Refinery at Eiffel Flats also used to toll-refine about 17.5ktpa 
of matte from BCL and Tati Mines in Botswana. About 3,000 tonnes/an. of cathode 
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copper used to be consumed locally by Cafca (wire and cables), Almin Industries, 
various copper alloy foundries and by a copper chemicals manufacturer (Cecon). 
1.2.8 CHROMITE 
Chromite ore was first mined in 1906 and first exported in 1907. Production peaked in 
1975 at 876kt before falling to a 20 year low of 431kt in 1983, a drop of 51%. Since 
then it recovered 780kt in 2001 and then collapsed to 194kt in 2009 (Figure 13). 
 
Source: COMZ 2012 
Figure 13: Chromite Ore Production (1980-2009) 
Exports of chromite ore fell off rapidly from 1968 zero by 1984, due to the increasing 
off-take by the ferrochrome smelters. Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company 
(Zimasco), is the main producer and has four mines (Shurugwe, Valley, Lalapanzi and 
Mutorashanga) and a smelter in Kwekwe. Forecast production for 2012 is at ~480kt of 
chromite ore and ~170kt of FeCr alloy (constrained by power shortages).  Ferroalloy 
production is presented in Figure 14. 
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Source: COMZ 2012 
Figure 14: Ferrochromium Production 
Zimbabwe Alloys (Zimalloys) Limited had four mines (Great Dyke, Caesar, Netherburn 
and Inyala), a quartz quarry (Broadside) and a smelter which was commissioned in 
1953 and is situated in Gweru. Ore was also purchased from cooperatives, tributors 
and contractors. All of the mines, except Inyala, used to exploit the thin seams of the 
stratiform deposits of the Great Dyke where mining is expensive and the friable 
chromite ore produced needs to be agglomerated before smelting, adding significantly 
to costs. A local company Benscore Investments, bought the company from Anglo 
American in 2005. Zimalloys raised $60 million in 2012 to reactivate production to 
250ktpa of alloy32. It reportedly controls 30% of the country’s chromite reserves. 
Zimbabwe has the world's largest reserves of high-chromium chromite ores estimated 
at between 580Mt and three billion tonnes, the large majority of which are the stratiform 
seams of the Great Dyke. The latter figure represents 84% of world high-chromium 
reserves. Due to technical advances in stainless steel making the Zimbabwean high-
chromium ores have lost their premium on the world market, but ferrochromium alloys 
made from it are still favoured by steelmakers. 
The World Bank scenarios study forecasts that by 2018 Zimasco will produce ~550kt 
of chromite and ~300kt of alloy (base-case) and ~450kt of alloy under an optimistic 
                                            
 
32 The Herald 7th June 2012. 
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scenario, requiring an investment of about $355 million33. If the Zimalloys reported 
figure is added then national alloy output could reach 550kt (base-case) and around 
800kt (optimistic case) by 2018. 
Although Zimbabwe produces all the constituents of stainless steel (ferrochrome, 
nickel and iron) there are no plans for the creation of a plant for its production. Small 
amounts of stainless, however, are produced on a "once-off' basis by the small 
foundries for stainless castings and Zimalloys had an embryonic plan for the production 
of high grade stainless precision castings in the early 90s, which came to naught.  The 
production of calcium carbide was investigated for the future supply of the domestic 
market for acetylene and, possibly, PVC's, and a pilot furnace was commissioned, but 
the project was abandoned in the 90s.  
1.2.9 IRON AND STEEL 
Iron ore production peaked in 1992 at 1.46 Mt, and then fell to zero in 2008 (Figure 
15). Exports of iron ore ceased in 1968 and since then, all ore has gone to Zisco. The 
Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (Zisco) is almost completely state owned and 
started operations in 1948 at Redcliff near Kwekwe in the centre of the country. Iron 
ore is produced by its 100% subsidiary Buchwa Iron Mining Company Ltd. (Bimco) 
from two mines (Buchwa and Ripple Creek) and is all destined for its iron and steel 
works. Overall grade at Buchwa is 61.6% Fe and 0.2% Mn. However, current ROM34 
reserves at Buchwa are almost exhausted and a sintering plant was established to 
handle the friable Ripple Creek ore, which became the principal feed from 1995. 
Reserves of limonite ore at Ripple Creek are around 40 Mt, grading 51.4% Fe and 
2.1% Mn. BIMCO also has claims over the huge Mwanesi Range low grade (40% Fe) 
BIF35 resource, estimated at over 30Gt36 
                                            
 
33 McMahon 2012, 
34 ROM: run-of-mine 
35 BIF: Banded Ironstone Formation 
36 Worst B. G. 1962 
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Source: RMG database 2012 
Figure 15: Iron Ore Production (Bimco) 
Roughly 80% of iron and steel production used to be exported when Zisco was 
operational. Zisco had a maximum capacity of one million tons and was the only 
integrated steelworks in the region outside South Africa, with much of its exports going 
to regional customers. 
There has been no ore or steel production since 2007 due to the economic meltdown 
and Zisco’s unserviceable debt burden. In March 2006, India’s Global Steel Holdings 
was given a 20 year management contract for the steel plant, but the deal fell through. 
In March 2011, Essar Africa Holdings (a member of the Essar Group of India) and the 
Government of Zimbabwe announced that they had reached an agreement for the 
revival of Zisco and in December 2011, Essar Group announced that two JVs had been 
set up between Essar Africa Holdings and the Government of Zimbabwe, which would 
acquire all steel and mining related assets of Zisco and its subsidiaries. The JVs are 
NewZim Steel Private Limited (tasked with developing ZISCO’s steel-making capacity) 
and NewZim Minerals Private Limited, which will acquire the Buchwa Iron Mining 
Company Ltd. and develop its assets. Essar Africa Holdings will have a 60 % stake in 
NewZim Steel and an 80 % stake in NewZim Minerals and Essar will reportedly invest 
$750M in the deal. However it has also been reported that Bimco will be transferred to 
the ZMDC which would then do a JV with Essar. 
It appears likely that Essar are really after the huge low-grade Mwanesi resource (33Gt 
of ore at 40% Fe) that could be upgraded and feasibly support a massive iron ore 
export project of 80Mtpa, via Mozambique (Table 7). This is discussed in greater detail 
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in the section titled “Case Study: The Putative Mwanesi Development Corridor (SDI)”, 
under the section on Spatial Linkages. 
If the Mwanesi Range resources are put out to tender against a massive iron ore export 
corridor to the Mozambican coast and iron/steel value-addition, then ore exports could 
reach 80Mtpa by 2018 and iron/steel exports 3-5Mtpa which could generate profits of 
around $3 billion per annum (see section on “Case Study: The Putative Mwanesi 
Development Corridor (SDI)”, later in this report). This could eventually contribute 
about $1.5 billion/annum to the fiscus, once the threshold ROI of the proposed 50% 
Resource Rent Tax is breached (see section on “Resource Rent Tax (RRT)” below). 
Table 7: Rough 80Mtpa heavy haul rail costs & tariffs 
Element Units 80Mtpa* 
Capex (G) G$ $7.5 
Capex interest rate % 3% 
Repayment  period Years 16 
Capex per ton $ $94 
Capex/t-km $ $10.3 
Tariff w/capex  USc/t-km 3.5 
Cost w/capex $ $32 
Tariff opex only USc/t-km 1.3 
1st year opex only Year 21 
Cost opex only $ $11 
*80Mtpa option is electrified dual line 
Source: Jourdan 201237 
1.2.10 DIAMONDS 
Kimberlites: There are numerous kimberlite pipes in Zimbabwe but most are not 
diamondiferous. The River Ranch kimberlite pipe was discovered by De Beers in 1974 
but went through several changes of ownership and is now caught up in disputes 
around the estate of the late General Mujuru. It was never a major producer but 
reportedly still has resources. In 1997 RTZim (Rio Tinto Group) discovered the Murowa 
pipes (~40km from Zvishavane) and mining started in 2004 (reserves are estimated at 
                                            
 
37 Jourdan 2012: “Export options for the Waterberg Coalfields”, confidential report for 
Genesis-Analytics, Joburg. 
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~20Mt of ore). In 2011 it produced 367,000 carats and 565,000 carats are forecast for 
2012. 
Alluvial: In 2006 alluvial diamonds were discovered in the Chiadzwa area of Marange 
District (~90km SW of Mutare), which led to a chaotic “diamond rush” until the state 
stepped in and regularised the workings through the creation of several JVs with 
ZMDC. In 2011 production from the four JVs was around 9M ct and 11M ct are forecast 
for 2012 (Figure 16: Diamond Production (Mct). Diamond production, exports and unit 
values from 2003 to 2010 are presented in Table 8. However, due to the secrecy 
surrounding the Marange operations the current production figures could be 
significantly higher. Unlike elsewhere in the world where alluvial deposits generally 
have a higher gem proportion and unit value than kimberlite deposits, the value of the 
Marange diamonds averages about 25% less than the Murowa ones.  
Table 8: Zimbabwe Diamond Production, Exports & unit value  
Year Production (ct) Exports (ct) Exports(MUSD) Export Price ($/ct) 
2003 26 870 26 870 2 219 82.58 
2004 44 454 18 481 3 582 80.58 
2005 248 264 261 538 39 429 158.82 
2006 1 046 026 264 585 30 057 28.73 
2007 695 015 489 170 23 377 33.64 
2008 797 198 327 834 26 693 33.48 
2009 963 502 1 349 172 28 901 30.00 
2010 8 435 224 8 424 384 320 237 37.96 
Total 12 256 553 9 812 862 474 495 38.71 
2011 (9 565 000) NA NA  
Total 24 513 106    
Sources: Kimberly Process 2012 (www.kimberleyprocess.com) 
The World Bank mineral scenarios study estimated that diamond output could increase 
to about 16M ct and employment to about 1500 by 2018. The study also notes that, 
due to the stockpile built up during the Kimberly Process Certification (KPC) there could 
be a backlog worth $1 billion to $5 billion which will be put on the market in the next 
few years which could result in a fiscal “windfall”.38 
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Source: KPC and USGS 2012 
Figure 16: Diamond Production (Mct) 
1.2.11 OTHER MINERALS 
The most important by value were: limestone, phosphates, silver, graphite, lithium 
minerals, tantalite concentrates, cobalt and rough emeralds. The most important of 
these in terms of world output, is lithium (petalite concentrate) which was approximately 
7.6% of world production in 1988 (Figure 17: World Lithium Resources). All lithium 
minerals were produced by Bikita Minerals (Pvt) Ltd., which used to be owned by RTZ 
plc (50.5%), but is now Zimbabwean owned. The Bikita Mine (60km east of Masvingo) 
is one of the richest lithium pegmatites in the world (1.4% Li). Reserves are estimated 
at 11 Mt of caesium-petalite (largest petalite deposit in the world) and production runs 
at about 60ktpa of Li/Cs ore. 
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Figure 17: World Lithium Resources 
Almost all limestone quarrying was for cement production at Cleveland (about 500 
kt/an), Sternblick (about 400 kt/an), Sino-Zim (about 300 kt/an), and for steel 
production at Zisco (about 430 kt/an), but these contracted during the economic crisis 
(Zisco has shut down) and are now returning to full capacity. Small amounts are also 
quarried for lime production (Early Worm Mine) and for agriculture (Springbok). There 
are also numerous other known deposits with large reserves, but none with the specific 
characteristics necessary for the Zimalloys ferrochrome plant which has to import low 
sulphur and phosphorus lumpy lime from South Africa. 
Virtually all silver production, is a by-product of other mining, mainly from copper and 
gold production. Antimony is also produced as a by-product of gold production 
(Indarama) and by some small mines such as Belingwe Star. Most of the country's 
graphite production is from Zimbabwe Germany Graphite Mines Ltd.'s Lynx mine in 
Hurungwe District, jointly owned by ZMDC (50%) and Grafitwerk Kropfmuhl AG (50%) 
of Germany. Tantalum concentrate production comes from small-scale pegmatite 
workings, but in the past as a by-product of tin mining (Kamativi). Small quantities of 
tungsten concentrates are also produced from pegmatites such as R.H.A. mine and 
Richardson Kop. 
Tin production peaked in 1985 at 1.5 kt but output declined due to depleting reserves 
and ceased in 1994 (Figure 18). Kamativi Tin Mines Limited (KTM) in the west of the 
country was responsible for almost all of the tin production. Small operations started 
on the pegmatite in 1936 and in 1970 the state Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) took a majority share (later transferred to ZMDC in 1986). The mine also used to 
produce small amounts of tantalite, spodumene (Li) and beryllium. ZMDC is 
reassessing the viability of reactivating the mine. 
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Source: USGS (various years) 
Figure 18: Tin Production 1970-1994 (kt) 
Phosphate rock (apatite) is produced by Dorowa Mining (Pvt) Ltd. in the Nyazura 
district, for their mother company, Zimphos, for fertilizer production. Zimphos produces 
single and triple phosphate after treating the ore with sulphuric acid. 
Zimphos is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Chemplex Corporation which was in turn 
owned by AECI of South Africa, (Anglo American), but the foreign (AECI) holding was 
bought out by the state Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Norsk Hydro of 
Norway (now Yara Zimbabwe) and local shareholders in 1990. The current structure 
is presented in Figure 19. 
 
ZFC: Zimbabwe Fertiliser Corporation; YZ: Yara Zimbabwe 
Source: Chemplex 2012 (www.chemplex.co.zw) 
Figure 19: Fertiliser and Explosives Industry Shareholdings 
Sulphur occurs in iron pyrite and is mined mined at the Iron Duke mine near Mazowe 
(ex Anglo American Corporation). Output used to be about 50ktpa and was all destined 
for the Zimphos sulphuric acid plant in Msasa for phosphatic fertiliser production 
(Zimphos). 
Bauxite production used to come from the Alumina mine belonging to E.C. Meikle Ltd., 
on the eastern border, but since 1987 all production has come from the other side of 
the border in Mozambique.  
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Magnesite production of is mainly destined for export to South Africa, except for a small 
amount which is used for the production of fertilizer. It is mined by Kadoma Magnesite 
at the Barton Farm Magnesite Mine. Several other deposits are also known (Mat Mine, 
Calac Deposit and Bukwa Magnesite). The possibility of producing magnesite refactory 
bricks was investigated by the ZMDC as a SADC regional project before the economic 
meltdown. 
Gem stones come from numerous small workings and include aquamarine, beryl, 
citrine, amethyst, garnet, iolite, tourmaline, chalcedony and emeralds. The only large 
scale production was from the Rio Tinto emerald mine, Sandawana (now ZMDC). 
Kyanite production is from ZMDC's Ky mine in the north-east. It is consumed locally by 
the ferrochrome smelters as a flux and is also used for the manufacture of fire assay 
crucibles. Talc is produced from several operations but most production comes from 
Manzonzo and Simon mines for the filler and cosmetics industries. 
Clay production was almost all from the Bemas and Corbut pit (for cement) and the 
Gwaai River Clay deposit (for ceramics) from the clay horizons in the lower Karoo coal 
measures at Wankie for the manufacture of refractory bricks by Clay Products Ltd. in 
Bulawayo, mainly for the steel industry. Production of kaolin is  mainly from the Athi pit 
for the ceramics industry and mica production started in 1919, peaked in the early fifties 
and was virtually dead by 1960. And the last producer was the Turning Point Mine. 
Most of the feldspar production was a byproduct of lithium production at Bikita. It was 
also produced by the Mistress Mine near Harare, mainly for the glass and ceramics 
industries. Vermiculite is produced for export from the James Mine. 
Although the total value of industrial mineral production is low in comparison to the 
major export minerals, they are in some ways more vital to an integrated resource-
based industrial development than the export minerals which are vertically integrated 
into the industrialised economies. 
1.2.12 FUTURE PROSPECTS 
A survey carried out by the Chamber of Mines estimates that the mining sector requires 
between $3-5 billion dollars investment to increase capacity to an average of over 80% 
within the next three to five years. Table 9 below shows funding requirements by 
mineral: 
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Table 9: Future Mining Investment Requirements to Grow Production by 80% 
Mineral Minimum Funding Requirement 
($G) 
Output Growth by 
2015 
Gold 1.00 455% 
PGMs 1.20 40% 
Ferrochrome 0.25 160% 
Nickel 0.11 400% 
Coal 0.28 218% 
Diamonds (Kimberlite 
only) 
0.30 100% 
 COMZ 201239  
According to Hawkins (2009) there are seven main constraints to increasing mineral 
production: 
1) “Policy uncertainty and unpredictability. 
2) The supply of skills. 
3) Physical infrastructure – most notably electricity, but also transport and water. 
4) Macroeconomic policy – specifically exchange rate and inflation management. 
5) The fiscal regime. 
6) Corporate and national governance – restrictions on foreign ownership, extent 
of compulsory state participation in ownership (if any), remittance of dividends 
and management fees, and official interference in operational decision-making. 
7) National sustainability strategy – government policies designed to influence the 
nature and pace of resource exploitation.”40 
The recent World Bank study on future mineral sector scenarios (McMahon 2012) 
asserts that once there is a good knowledge of mineral resources there “are three main 
factors that can enhance or constrain the development of a mine:  availability of 
transport infrastructure, access to power, and the policy and fiscal regime impacting 
the mining sector.”41  On skills constraints it claims that these can be imported, though 
it notes that there is also a global shortage. However, the import of skills should be a 
last resort as foreign professionals often constitute a “5th column” in terms of 
developing the back and forward ward linkages (mining inputs and beneficiation) as 
                                            
 
39 COMZ 2012, www.chamberofminesofzimbabwe.com/economics/industry-
development-a-outlook.html 
40 Hawkins 2009 (UNDP), p32. 
41 McMahon 2012, p15 
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they tend to favour familiar imports and off-shore processing options. The priority 
should always be on developing local skills and attracting the large Zimbabwean skilled 
diaspora to return home. 
 
Figure 20: Impact of Political Risk on Mineable Resources 
Although the policy environment is important for attracting investment into mining, 
geological prospectivity and known resources could be as important, as evidenced by 
major investments into risky jurisdictions such as the DRC and Guinea, but which have 
high prospectivity and known spectacular resources (see Figure 20 on the impact of 
risk on new mines or mineable reserves). Consequently the infrastructure (power, 
transport, water) is probably the bigger constraint for Zimbabwe, especially for bulk 
minerals such as iron ore and coal, though the indigenisation policy has already put on 
hold several lower return investments that were in the pipeline (see Figure 20). The 
general impact of “political risk” is similar to the impact of increasing royalties (Figure 
38: Conceptual Impact of Royalty on Exploitable Resources): It will increase the 
necessary investment hurdle rate and consequently increase the requisite cut-off 
grade to generate the higher hurdle rate (ROI), thereby sterilising resources on existing 
mines and rendering non-viable potential new mines (Figure 20). Higher infrastructure 
costs (power & transport) will have the same effect of rendering viable only the higher 
grade deposits or reserves. 
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The World Bank study base-case (current infrastructure and policies) predicts that by 
2018 mineral revenues could be nearly $5 billion, fiscal revenues over $700 million and 
employment at 33 thousand, but at an investment cost of $5 billion (Table 10). This 
excludes the reactivation of iron ore mining for Zisco and asbestos mining. 
Table 10: 2018 World Bank Base-case Projections (Current Infrastructure & Policies)  
Mineral / Metal Production  Gross 
Revenues 
($M)** 
Fiscal 
Revenues 
($M) 
Employment Investment 
(MUSD) 
Gold k oz 845 1,344 253 15,200 420 
PGM k oz 690 776 50 8,200 816 
Diamonds, 
kimberlite kct 
565 99 26 430 0 
Diamonds, 
alluvial M ct 
12 600 169 1,000 0 
Coal Mt 9.8 735 61 3,750 3,000 
Chromite ore kt 549 115 1 under FeCr 85 
Ferrochrome 
(FeCr) kt 
306 840 76 3500* 0 
Nickel kt 19 301 93 870 62 
TOTAL - 4,810 729 32,950 5,023 
*including chromite ore. ** 15 July 2012 prices. Source McMahon 2012 
 “In the base case most of the expansion is due to the revitalization of many gold 
operations (due to the continued very high prices), the recapitalization of Hwange, the 
reopening of the nickel mines, and the increase in diamond production at Marange.  In 
fact, it is likely that the majority of the difference in the base 2018 scenario and the 
optimistic or investor friendly scenario is due to the embedding of the indigenization 
policy in a general scenario of political instability”42. 
The optimistic (“investor friendly”) case estimates that by 2018 mineral revenues could 
be over $11 billion, fiscal revenues over $1.5 billion and employment above 56 
thousand, with investments $11.7 billion (Table 11). 
                                            
 
42 McMahon 2012, p18. 
Wits MSC 
 
58  
Table 11: 2018 World Bank Optimistic Projections (No Infrastructure or Policy 
Impediments) 
Mineral / Metal Production  Gross 
Revenues 
($M)** 
Fiscal 
Revenues 
($M) 
Employment Investment 
(MUSD) 
Gold k oz 2,510 3,991 759 27,600 2,500 
PGM k oz 995 1,119 81 10,300 815 
Diamonds, 
kimberlite kct 
1,000 175 45 800 100 
Diamonds, 
alluvial M ct 
15.2 760 214 1,000 150 
Coal Mt 40 3,000 242 6,000 7,000 
Chromite ore kt 539 113 1 (under FeCr) 0 
Ferrochrome 
(FeCr) kt 
447 1,229 99 7,100* 340 
Nickel kt 28 459 142 1,400 186 
Iron ore Mt 2.5 225 3 2,000 600 
TOTAL - 11,071 1,587 56,200 11,691 
*including chromite ore. ** 15 July 2012 prices. Source McMahon 2012 
However, these projections exclude major expansions for the export bulk minerals (iron 
ore and coal) and any reactivation of asbestos or copper mining. If the development of 
an iron ore export corridor for the huge Mwanesi iron ore resource goes ahead 
(80Mtpa), with expanded iron/steel exports, and a heavy-haul coal export rail link to 
Mozambique is established (40Mtpa), then the gross revenues could be more like $24 
billion and fiscal revenues over $3 billion, without the introduction of a Resource Rent 
Tax (RRT). The introduction of a RRT for all mining of 50% (once a “normal” ROI is 
achieved) could generate fiscal revenues in the order of $6 billion per annum, once the 
ROI threshold is surpassed, using the above expansions in production and current 
prices. 
However, even the World Bank report base-case is constrained by the current power 
shortages. The scenario presented in Table 10 would need an estimated 700MW of 
capacity (Table 12). Accordingly, power is arguably the greatest constraint to an 
expansion of the minerals sector and the planned generation rehabs and expansions 
should be urgently expedited with a parallel assessment of short to medium term import 
options. 
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Table 12: Additional Power for Potential Mining Expansion 
Mineral/Metal Production 
increase 
Power per unit 
(kWh) 
Additional Power Needs 
(M kWh) 
Gold 2.23M oz 1000 2,230 
Iron Ore 2.5Mt 120 (to pig iron) 300 
Steel 1.2Mt  700 840 
Nickel 28,5 kt 600 17 
Coal 35Mt 40 1,400 
PGM 325,000 oz 610 198 
Ferrochrome 285 kt 4000 1,140 
Diamonds 6.8m carats 8* 54 
Total   6179M kWh 
Additional capacity 
required 
  692 MW 
* assumes a grade of 1ct/t.. Source: McMahon 2012, Table 6. 
1.2.13 MINERALS MARKETING 
Before 1983 marketing was done by the companies, usually through agents in the 
OECD countries. Up until the beginning of 1980 sanctions were applied to the then 
Rhodesia, so the marketing methods tended to be devious and clandestine. Since 
1983 all mineral exports, except gold, have been controlled by the Minerals Marketing 
Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) which was set up by government in 1982 officially 
to rationalise selling arrangements, remove restraints on minerals trade and to reduce 
costs to producers, but unofficially to eliminate transfer pricing. 
It was initially received by the industry, especially the TNC's, with great foreboding and 
they fought unsuccessfully against its establishment. However in the 80s and 90s they 
appeared to have come to terms with it, particularly as, in some instances, higher 
prices have been obtained and middlemen have been eliminated and, more 
importantly, in many cases the old agents and channels are still being used. There 
have however been well-documented instances where the old agents have been 
receiving inflated commissions and have not always managed to obtain the optimal 
world market price for the minerals sold43. 
                                            
 
43 Confidential study by Peter Robbins (London Metals Trader) 
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Although the initial establishment of the MMCZ was seen as a victory of the 
government's "socialist" policies immediately after independence, there appears to be 
good evidence that the inefficiency of the MMCZ may be more expensive than the 
losses through transfer pricing. A confidential assessment of the MMCZ in the 90s 
concluded that millions of dollars were being lost, not only through inefficiency and the 
use of old TNC agents, but also possibly through corruption, but the issue was not 
taken up by the Attorney General's Office. The range of Zimbabwe's mineral exports 
and the generally small quantities of any one mineral make it difficult for the MMCZ to 
have people proficient in all aspects of all minerals traded. A minerals marketing 
monitoring commission might possibly be a more appropriate strategy given the skills 
constraints of the MMCZ, where spot checks were made on random deals, possibly 
using outside consultants, with heavy penalties for transfer pricing. 
1.2.14 LABOUR 
Workers committees were instituted shortly after independence in 1980. The principal 
workers union is the Associated Mine Workers Union of Zimbabwe (AMWUZ), which 
is affiliated to the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Minimum wages are 
set by government in consultation with the companies and the union, but from 1980 
until the “hyper-inflation” the minimum only barely kept pace with inflation. Since 
dollarisation wages have stabilised. There have been extremely few work stoppages 
or strikes and most that have occurred have been over specific mine related problems 
rather than the national minimum wage rates or rights of workers. 
A large proportion of mine labour used to be foreign (60% in 1965 and 47% in 197244), 
mainly Malawians and Mozambicans, but since independence most of them have been 
naturalised. The slump in metal prices in the mid-eighties had a severe effect on the 
union; membership fell from roughly 30,000 in 1980 to 20,000 in 1985 then grew to 
31,000 in 1989, representing over half of the workforce. Membership shrunk 
dramatically during the economic meltdown, but by 2011 AMWUZ membership had 
recovered to 25,000.45 
                                            
 
44 Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (COMZ) 1973, “Annual Report”, page 113.  
45 AMWUZ interview 2012. 
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The Labour Relations Act of 1985 got a mixed response from both workers and 
management. From the workers' point of view, the positive aspects of the Act are the 
right to join a union, protection from discrimination, protection of union officials from 
victimisation and that the employer will in future send union dues direct to the union 
and non-members maybe levied. Since 1980 permission from the Ministry of Labour 
has been necessary in order to fire or lay-off a worker. 
On the negative side are severe controls on the right to strike and the wide 
discretionary powers given to the Minister of Labour who can nullify union congress 
election results and control the use of union funds. In the opinion of the union the Act 
attempts to limit union struggle to economic objectives only thereby depoliticising union 
activity.46 
Other legislation affecting mine labour is the Emergency Powers Act, the 
Pneumoconiosis Act, the Workers Compensation Act and the Mines and Minerals Act 
which has Health and Sanitation Regulations47. 
Up till the recent economic crisis, the frequency of expatriates on foreign contracts was 
extremely low, but the number of professional and managerial staff from the "settler" 
section of the population was extremely high at over 60%. Very few indigenous 
professionals and managers were produced for the mining industry during the racist 
colonial/settler period. This improved over the ‘80s and ‘90s, especially through mining 
company in-house training, but there was a massive loss of indigenous skills during 
the first decade of the 20th century, due to the economic meltdown.48 
In the 1980's a Department of Mining Engineering and a Department of Metallurgical 
Engineering were opened at the University of Zimbabwe with West German aid. The 
University also has a long-standing Department of Geology, a geophysics section 
under the Physics Department, and an Institute of Mining Research (IMR). At a 
technical level, there is a School of Mines in Bulawayo for the training of mining and 
mineral processing technicians. However, all of these were devastated by the financial 
crises and have still not recovered since dollarisation (Hawkins 2009). 
                                            
 
46 AMWUZ interview 2012. 
47 Jourdan 1991. 
48 See Hawkins 2009 
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1.2.15 LEGISLATION 
The right of searching for and mining of all minerals is vested in the President, in terms 
of the Mines and Minerals Act. To prospect a prospecting licence or an Exclusive 
Prospecting Order (EPO) must be obtained by or with an Authorised Prospector. An 
EPO is valid over a defined area, for a limited time period and for the defined mineral/s 
only. From this right stems the right to peg a claim and dispose of the minerals won in 
perpetuity, so long as minimum work is done or retention fees are paid. Unlike other 
countries in the SADC no special mining licence is required. The land owner is 
recompensed for the loss of the land use at a nominal rate by government.  
In terms of tax, repatriation of profits and other fiscal matters, the mining companies 
fall under the general laws governing these aspects for the whole of the economy. 
However, in 1989, with the launching of the New Investment Code, it was announced 
that a new tax regime specifically for mining was to be formulated that would take into 
account the high risk nature of the mining industry. Corporate income tax (CIT) is 25% 
of the taxable income of the company. In terms of mining companies the following 
allowances apply: They can deduct the initial capital expenditure as it is incurred or 
over a number of years over the life of the mine up to a maximum of ten years; 
expenditure incurred in exploration can be deducted immediately or carried forward 
and allowed against subsequent mining income; a depletion allowance of 5% of the 
value of mineral production and a replacement allowance for later capital expenditure 
are both deductible. 
In the seventies legislation existed for the payment of royalties by mining companies 
at the rate of 4% of output value but was suspended in an arrangement to encourage 
the companies to install local beneficiation plants (the Alaska copper refinery was built 
under this scheme) and apparently was reapplied due to the depressed metal markets 
in the eighties. 
New foreign venture capital may be fully repatriated after two years after deducting 
amounts already remitted. The balance can then be remitted over six years in equal 
amounts with the interest accrued. Under the new Foreign Investment Code of 1989 
investments accorded Venture Capital status will have a minimum remittability of 50%, 
negotiable to 100%, of after tax profits as dividends which are then subjected to a non-
residents shareholders tax of 20%, unless there is a tax agreement with the country of 
origin of the investment. 
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Mining companies with more than 25% foreign ownership may not borrow locally more 
than 35% of the shareholders’ funds plus the ratio of the local share interest to the 
foreign share interest multiplied by the 35% of the shareholders’ funds, or they lose the 
right to repatriate profits (for other companies 25%). This formula is to encourage 
foreign concerns to bring new, foreign, capital into the country for new capital 
investment. It also encourages locally incorporated foreign companies to raise capital 
for local expansion by increasing the equity base locally, thereby diluting the foreign 
holding49. 
From independence to 1995 there was virtually no new foreign investment in mining 
other than RTZ plc (Renco gold mine, 6 MGBP in 1980) and Cluff Minerals plc ($5M in 
the Freda-Rebecca gold mine in 1987/8). The reasons for this were the depressed 
outlook for base metals over most of the period, the low proportion of profits that could 
be repatriated (35% until 1989) and the perceived regional instability arising from the 
South African apartheid regime's erstwhile policy of destabilisation of neighbouring 
states. 
In the 90s the MMA was amended to cater for a Special Mining Lease (SML) for the 
large BHP/Utah PGM investment. An SPL has its own regime in terms of CIT (15%), 
royalties (4%), an Additional Profits Tax (APT) and the freedom to market mineral 
production. To date there are only two SPLs- Zimplats (Implats) and Unki (Angloplats). 
Royalties and fees have recently been dramatically increased and now constitute a 
significant cost factor and deterrent to investment (see Table 13: Changes to Royalties 
and License Fees) 
Table 13: Changes to Royalties and License Fees  
 Gold Diamonds PGM Coal 
Old 
Royalty 
4.5% 10% 5%  
New 
Royalty 
7% 15% 10% 1% 
Old fees NA $1 million and nil Varied; less than 
$50,000 in total 
$5000 and 
$100,000 
New fees NA $1M application fee for 
prospecting and $5M 
registration fee for a claim, 
$500,000 
application fee and 
$100,000 
application fee 
                                            
 
49 Jourdan 1992 
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which includes mining if 
feasible deposit 
$2.5M registration 
fee 
and $500,000 
registration fee 
Gound 
rental 
NA From nil to $3000/ha From nil to 
$1000/ha 
From nil to 
$100/ha 
Source: McMahon 2012 (from Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe) 
The Zimbabwean minerals sector has undergone significant structural changes over 
the last 20 years with the exit of the old transnationals (Lonrho, Anglo, RTZ) and the 
entry of new ones (Implats, Mwana, Metallon and the re-entry of Anglo through Anglo 
Platinum).  
2. MINERAL POLICY ANALYSIS: MAXIMISING THE DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT 
2.1 MINERAL REGIMES TO ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT 
African mineral regimes, including Zimbabwe, are essentially based on the principle of 
“free mining”, or ‘free entry’. Barton50 defines free mining as including: 
“a right of free access to lands in which the minerals are in public ownership;  
a right to take possession of them and acquire title by one’s own act of staking 
a claim; and  
a right to proceed to develop and mine the minerals discovered” (p. 193). 
The mining laws broadly fit into the African mineral regimes reformulation process 
initiated and/or sponsored by the World Bank from the late 1980s until the present and 
in this regard Professor Bonnie Campbell notes in the Canadian Journal of 
Development Studies51: 
“. . . certain elements of the free mining doctrine that animated the nineteenth-century 
formulation of mining regimes in the American and British spheres have also guided 
the liberalisation process of African mining regimes over the 1980s and 1990s. One of 
the ways this came about was through the retrenchment of state authority, which in 
turn contributed to the institutionalisation of asymmetrical relations of power and 
influence that had important consequences for local political processes, local 
participation, and community welfare. The approach consequently helps explain some 
                                            
 
50 Barton, B.J. (1993) Canadian Law of Mining (Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 
Calgary). 
51 Campbell, B. (2010) ‘Revisiting the Reform Process of African Mining Regimes’ in 
Canadian Journal of Development Studies Vol. 30, Nos. 1–2, pp. 197–217. 
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of the social, economic, environmental, or human rights impacts of these regimes, and 
prompts one to question the extent to which current mining regime reform processes 
in Africa can transform the asymmetrical power relations that have typified mining 
activities on the continent in the past” (p. 199). 
Free mining refers to the mining regimes that were established in the European colonial 
conquests, including Zimbabwe. Laforce et al52, maintain that free mining ‘privileges 
the values and interests of mining companies in contrast to those of Aboriginal groups’, 
and that it was primarily designed to attract European settlers to expropriate the land 
and minerals and to neutralise the indigenous populations in the Americas, Africa, 
Oceania and elsewhere. The mineral regimes of Canada and Australia are modern 
equivalents of free-mining regimes, which are unsurprisingly strongly favoured by the 
mining transnational corporations and the World Bank. Zimbabwe’s mining laws 
contain many elements of a free-mining regime, particularly the first-come-first-
assessed (FIFA) principle, which dispenses the people’s mineral assets gratis, rather 
than seeking price discovery and the maximisation of the developmental impacts. 
Fundamentally, according to Lapointe, ‘The free-mining system limits the authority and 
discretionary powers of governments, and as such, governments’ abilities to discharge 
some of their responsibilities.’53 
A Zimbabwean resource-based development strategy should rather seek to establish 
a mineral regime that competitively and transparently concessions all ‘known’ mineral 
assets as time-limited leases to achieve the optimal resource rents and economic 
linkages. Price discovery could include both bidding up fiscal criteria (tax rates, such 
as resource rent taxes) and developmental criteria (industrial linkages, infrastructure 
and technology development). 
                                            
 
52 Laforce, M., Lapointe, U. and Lebuis, V. (2009) ‘Mining Sector Regulation in 
Quebec and Canada: Is a Redefinition of Asymmetrical Relations Possible?’ in 
Studies in Political Economy Vol. 84, Fall, pp. 47–78. 
53 Lapointe, U. (2009) ‘Origins of Mining Regimes in Canada and the Legacy of the 
Free Mining System’. Conference on ‘Rethinking Extractive Industry: Regulation, 
Dispossession, and Emerging Claims’, Centre for Research on Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CERLAC) and the Extractive Industries Research Group (EIRG), York 
University, Toronto. 
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The wholesale handing out of Zimbabwe’s mineral assets since liberation has probably 
lost thousands jobs, including those that could have been catalysed in other sectors, 
particularly in up- and downstream investments. In general, mineral investors will tend 
to have a much better idea of the value of the state’s mineral assets than the state 
itself, and competitive auctioning (concessions) would be an effective method of 
achieving fair value and developmental goals, through testing the market’s appetite for 
establishing industrial linkages. However, where there is little or no geo-data, an 
auction is unlikely to flush out fair value and these terrains should first be thoroughly 
surveyed by the state (geosurvey departments or sub-contractors) before auctioning 
via a time-limited mining concession (lease) or opened up for private exploration 
(where the asset is considered to be non-auctionable). 
Accordingly, following best practice in the oil and gas sector, Zimbabwe should 
demarcate its territory into areas of unknown mineral assets (high risk), areas of low 
risk over known mineralised terrains (low risk) and areas of partly known deposits. The 
first (high risk) would be open to private exploration (current FIFA system), the second 
(known assets) would be auctioned off as blocks with the state tax-take (resource rent 
share) as the main evaluation criteria (price discovery) in order to flush out the optimal 
net present value over the life of the concession for the state, as well as developmental 
criteria such as jobs, infrastructure, linkages and local capital participation 
(“indigenisation”). The third category (partly known occurrences) could be reserved for 
further geosurvey by the ZGS and ZMDC, or explored in partnership with private capital 
(Figure 21).  
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Source: Adapted from Jourdan 2011 54 
Figure 21: Zimbabwe- Possible mineral rights licensing regime. 
With increased investment in resource mapping and geodata acquisition, areas would 
be reclassified from high risk to low risk (Figure 21). Unfortunately, the most 
geologically prospective parts of the country have already been concessioned, usually 
with no attempt at price discovery or the maximisation of their industrial development 
potential. Almost all new Zimbabwean mines, ex-diamonds, opened in since liberation 
were not “discovered”, but were based on known assets, particularly old mines or 
workings and old exploration targets. 
Known and unencumbered mineral terrains could be prepared for public tender by the 
geological survey department (the GTK in Finland develops mineral targets for 
tender 55 ) or transferred to a state minerals development vehicle (ZMDC?) and 
prepared for competitive concessions. However, oversight of the auctioning process 
might be best undertaken by an adequately resourced dedicated resources 
concessions and compliance commission under the national treasury (Ministry of 
                                            
 
54 Jourdan 2011, “Africa’s Mineral Resources: What Must be Done to Make Them 
Drivers of Development” in “Advocates for Change: How to Overcome Africa's 
Challenges” Ed. Moeletsi Mbeki, Pan Macmillan SA, 2011. 
55 Mining Journal Supplement, Feb 2009, “Finland”  
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Finance), which could also oversee other competitive concessions (PPPs 56 , e.g. 
infrastructure) and carry out the ongoing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the 
concession conditions (including industrial commitments). An example of a bid scoring 
matrix, for the public tender of known deposits, that attempts to maximise the mineral 
linkages, is presented in Table 14: Example of a mineral concession bid evaluation 
matrix. 
Table 14: Example of a mineral concession bid evaluation matrix  
Element Mechanism Scoring (example: 
Ʃ100%) 
Fiscal: Tax Rate 
(e.g. RRT) 
Bid up from base tax rate Top bid 35, bottom 0, 
pro-rata in-between 
Spatial: Extra infra-
structure  
% extra capacity times the base-need 
capex  for power, transport, water = 
Ʃextra$  
Top bid 15, bottom 0, 
pro-rata in-between 
Downstream 
investments 
% extra VA above base product (ore, 
conc) exports @ 5y, 10y, 15y  = Ʃ%VA 
Top bid 20, bottom 0, 
pro-rata in-between 
Upstream 
investments 
% local VA purchases @ 5y, 10y, 15y  = 
Ʃ%VA  
Top bid 20, bottom 0, 
pro-rata in-between 
Knowledge 
formation targets 
Bid up local HRD/R&D spend from 5% of 
pay-roll/an  
Top bid 10, bottom 0, 
pro-rata in-between 
Total   100% 
∑: sum of; RRT: Resource Rent Tax; VA: value added; HRD: Human Resources 
Development; R&D: Research & Development 
Source: adapted from Jourdan et al, 2012. 
Zimbabwe’s mineral lease system is based on the staking of a claim (FIFA system) 
and has its origins in the system adopted by the BSAC when it conquered the country 
and is fairly typical of the colonial mineral regimes put in place by European invaders 
in the 19th Century all over the euro-imperial world (but not in Europe itself!). However, 
unlike most of the other FIFA colonial regimes, a mineral right (claim/block) is not time-
limited and can be held in perpetuity, provided that retention fees are paid or minimum 
work is carried out annually. 
The current system (Figure 22) is sub-optimal and includes the following flaws: 
 it allows known deposits to be claimed (FIFA) with no attempt at competitive price 
discovery; 
 it confers infinite exploitation rights (if fees are paid or work is done); 
                                            
 
56 PPP: Private-Public-Partnership 
Wits MSC 
 
69  
 it sterilises ground by immediately reserving exploration areas (EPOs57) whilst they 
await approval. This has apparently sterilised almost all of the nation’s prospective 
acreage (no EPOs have been granted in the last 10 years). 
 
Figure 22: Mineral Rights Administration 
There are wide ranging amendments to the Act in the pipeline (Figure 22) that clean 
up most of the obsolete sections and detailed modalities that should come under 
separately promulgated Regulations. However, it only corrects one of the above flaws 
(#2: Infinite mining rights), and then only for larger mines (not for ASM). The other two 
major flaws (FIFA rights for known state assets and immediate reservation of 
prospecting ground) are perpetuated. 
2.1.1 SUGGESTED FUTURE MINERAL RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION 
SYSTEM 
                                            
 
57 EPO: Exclusive Prospecting Order 
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Given the drawbacks in the current Act and in the proposed amendments, 
consideration should be given to developing a new state-of-the-art Minerals Act (clean 
sheet) that administers the nation’s mineral assets in order to maximise the 
developmental impact of their exploitation. Such a new “clean sheet” Act would have 
to also include comprehensive transitioning arrangements that give security of tenure 
to current mining rights holders.  
Such an new Minerals Act should only permit exploration over areas where the 
Geological Survey (ZGS) has declared that there are no known exploitable resources 
and be put out for public comment for at least 30 days before being granted (in case 
there are exploitable resources in the area that the ZGS are unaware of). This process 
would be greatly facilitated if the ZGS was resourced to immediately undertake a study 
to categorise the whole of Zimbabwe into areas of known mineral resources (biddable 
areas), areas of unknown resources (non-biddable = FIFA areas) and areas of partly 
known resources (reserved for further work by ZGS, ZMDC or state sub-contractors). 
This would be greatly facilitated by the introduction of a modern Mineral Cadastre 
System (MCIMS: Mineral Cadastre Information Management System). 
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Figure 23: Suggested future Exploration and Mining Rights Granting System 
A suggested mineral rights issuance procedure, for stakeholder discussion, is 
presented in Figure 23. It is suggested that an exploration license be given over up to 
65000Ha for 3 years followed by a possible extension by the MAB (dependent on 
original work-plan compliance) for a further 2 years over half the area and a further 
extension of 2 years over half the remaining area (25% of the original area). New work-
plans would have to be approved by the MAB for each extension (Figure 23). If 
economic conditions justify a postponement of mining, an Exploration Extension 
License could be granted by the MAB for up to 2 years, if the weighted value (price) of 
the basket of minerals to be produced (as per the mining plan) falls more than 30% 
below the average value of the basket for the previous 36 months. Accordingly, the 
remaining (25%) exploration ground could be encumbered (sterilised) for a maximum 
of 9 years (3+2+2+2). 
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An Exploration License would be transferable with the authorisation of the MAB, but 
should attract a 50% Capital Gains Tax (CGT) on the difference between sale price 
and all legitimate exploration expenditures undertaken to date of transfer, to 
discourage mineral property speculators (“flippers”) and to share in the capital gains 
on a state asset. A change in the holding company’s ownership of >50% should be 
considered a transfer of the License and accordingly require MAB approval. 
A Mining Lease would be issued against a CRIRSCO 58  compliant resources 
confirmation, a bankable investment/mining plan and a compliant environmental plan, 
by the Minister on advice from the MAB. The tenure would be as per the mining plan 
(based on the confirmed resources) for up to 25 years. Discovery of further confirmed 
resources could permit a lease extension against a new mining plan approved by the 
MAB. 
2.1.2 ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING (ASM) 
ASM should have its own less onerous regime to encourage indigenous entrepreneurs 
and should accordingly be restricted to Zimbabwean citizens. There are numerous 
definitions of ASM using, inter alia, volume of ore or mineral/metal production, value of 
sales, size of concession, degree of mechanisation or capital employed, number of 
workers, depth of operations, etc. (Table 15) It is proposed here that a combination of 
the volume of ore treated and the size of the concession be used in combination to 
qualify for ASM rights.  
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Table 15: Different criteria used in the definition of small-scale mining 
 
Source: UNECA 200259 
A reasonable figure for the volume of ore treated would appear to be around 
15kt/month (180,000t/an) and a mining right of up to 40,000m2 (4Ha). A small scale 
prospecting right could remain as is in the recommended amendments to the Act, 
namely 1km2. An ASM mining license should be convertible to a Mining Lease, if all 
the requisite conditions are fulfilled. 
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Figure 24: Suggested future ASM Prospecting & Mining Rights Granting System 
A suggested ASM mineral rights administration system is presented in Figure 24 for 
stakeholder review and discussion. Given that a MCIMS60 is still not in place, it would 
be prudent to ensure that the modalities of acquiring and maintaining an ASM 
prospecting and mining license are prescribed in the regulations rather than the Act. 
Although an ASM license needs to be as simple as possible, so as not to create 
onerous entry barriers to ordinary Zimbabweans, ASM has the potential to create 
severe environmental damage. In this regard the concept of creating proclaimed ASM 
zones might be worth considering. The state could carry out a Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) over such zones and build the necessary mitigation and 
remediation measures into the ASM licenses granted in the zone. Failure to comply 
with the measures would lead to a forfeiture of the license after a reasonable 
rectification period (3 months?) and appeal procedure (MAB). The state would further 
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carry out periodic environmental assessments over such proclaimed ASM zones and 
update the requisite conditions in all ASM License renewals in the zone. 
The pre-existing ASM support system of extension services (DMC 61 , regional 
geologist, GML 62 ), finance (DMC equipment hire-purchase pound), and 
marketing/quality (GML and MMCZ) needs to be rebuilt and reinforced. Consideration 
could also be given to creating an ASM Venture Capital Fund (VCF) as a PPP between 
the state and the Chamber of Mines (and donors, e.g. CASM grants63) 
 
DMC: District Mining Commissioner; GML: Government Metallurgical Laboratory; VCF: 
Venture Capital Fund 
In addition, the Government Roasting Plant (GRP: Kwekwe) used to treat refractory 
gold ores for ASM 
Given the historical role of women in ASM, support systems to facilitate the entry of 
female entrepreneurs into this sector should be configured, such as a special window 
                                            
 
61 DMC: District Mining Commissioner.  
62 GML: Government Metallurgical Laboratory 
63 World Bank “Communities and Small-scale Mining” grant system 
http://go.worldbank.org/6OCES521R0 
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in the ASM VCF and targeted short training courses under the Zimbabwe School of 
Mines in Bulawayo. 
2.1.3 TRANSITIONING ARRANGEMENTS 
The new Act would have to have a section on transitioning from current rights to the 
new rights whereby new licences/leases compliant with the new Act 
(prospecting/exploration licences) would automatically be granted to all mineral rights 
holders under the old Act. For example, all holders of unworked claims could elect to 
be issued with either a new Prospecting or Exploration License and all holders of 
operational claims could elect to convert to either a new ASM License or a Mining 
Lease. Current holders of SMLs would convert to the new Mining Lease. Current EPO 
holders could likewise elect to be issued with either a new Prospecting or Exploration 
License.  
2.1.4 MCIMS: MINERAL CADASTRE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
The proposed hybrid FIFA-Tender system would be greatly facilitated by the 
establishment of a modern functional MCIMS, as would the attraction of investors into 
the Zimbabwean minerals sector. Some work was apparently done in this regard by 
the Canadian government about 10 years ago and more recently the World Bank 
funded a “Diagnostic Study on Modernisation of the Mineral Licensing System in 
Zimbabwe”64 which concluded that a “...deep and systematic revision of the mining law 
is required, and the proposed amendments should be supplemented by new Licensing 
Regulations, including transitional measures for the adaptation of the existing licenses 
to the new licensing methodology”65. The study proposed a budget of $1.2 million to 
implement the MCIMS. However, the proposal that there be a conversion to a grid 
based system could add significantly to legal/administrative challenges (to convert all 
existing rights to a grid system and deal with resulting overlaps etc.). Given the 
availability of low cost and accurate GPS66 instruments, a system based on polygons 
                                            
 
64 Enrique Ortega Girones, “Diagnostic Study on Modernisation of the Mineral 
Licensing System in Zimbabwe”, World Bank, 2010 
65 Op cit, p 7 
66 GPS: Global Positioning System 
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that preserved the current shapes may be a better option. In addition, the $150k 
budgeted for Geodetic network review, is not absolutely essential. Consequently it is 
recommended that a competent MCIMS consultant be engaged to rapidly review the 
study and prepare a Terms of Reference, with a reduced scope, for a tender to 
establish a functioning MCIMS at the ZGS. 
A basic system could cost about half of the projected budget (i.e. around $600k). Given 
the importance of establishing a functional MCIMS, to deal both with the backlog and 
future mineral rights administration, priority should be given to securing the requisite 
funding from the Fiscus (Ministry of Finance) as well as from donors and the Chamber 
of Mines. Both the state and the private sector would benefit immensely from a 
functioning MCIMS. 
2.1.5 SUMMARY OF MINERALS MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS 
1. Streamline (simplify) MMA to cater for exploration licenses and ASM prospecting 
licences, ASM leases and Mining Leases on a use-it-lose-it principle. Shift the 
detailed procedures and modalities to attendant MMA Regulations; 
2. Amend the MMA to cater for a hybrid FIFA (claims) and public tender system 
(“known” and “unknown” mineral resource terrains); 
3. Amend MMA to cover back/forward linkages VA (%) milestones (e.g. at 5, 10, 15, 
20y) and the corporate minimum spend on knowledge formation (HRD/R&D) of 
≥5% of payroll; 
4. Build a mineral deposit public tender (auction) capacity in the Ministry of Mines and 
ZMDC; 
5. Urgently locate funds to establish a functional MCIMS (national mineral cadastre); 
6. Rebuild the ASM support “golden triangle” (finance, marketing and technical 
support); 
7. Establish an ASM VCF with COMZ, donors, et al. 
8. Reconfigure ZGS as a state agency with the ability to re-attract requisite 
professionals;  
9. Resource ZGS to recommence systematic geo-mapping and to categorise the 
country into known, unknown and partly known mineral resource zones; 
10. Capacitate ZMDC/ZGS to develop mineral targets for public tender, 
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2.2 THE CURRENT CRISIS AND THE UNDERLYING COMMODITIES 
BOOM 
Any strategy utilising a resource endowment clearly requires a degree of comfort that 
resources demand will be sustained and that prices will not suddenly collapse as 
happened in the 1980s and 1990s and in the second half of 2008. 
From 2002 to 2008, many developing countries displayed strong growth after several 
decades of stagnation due to the recent commodities boom, which was provoked by 
robust demand from China and, to a lesser extent, other emerging economies such as 
Brazil, Russia, India and Vietnam. Many developing countries have significant potential 
for commodities production, especially minerals, and consequently foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into the majority world has, according to the UNCTAD World 
Investment Report (WIR), displayed a marked upturn since 2002/3, mainly into the 
mineral resources and telecommunications sectors (Figure 25).  
 
(Source: UNCTAD 2011)67 
Figure 25: FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995-2010 (billions USD) 
The commodities boom faltered during the second half of 2008 due to the global 
recession caused by the US sub-prime debt crisis, but most commodity prices have 
recovered to the 2007/8 levels (Figure 26) and foreign direct investment is reviving. 
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(Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/) 
Figure 26: Indices of primary commodity prices. 
Nevertheless, the two seminal questions remain: when will the current global US toxic 
assets and Euro debt recession abate; and how long will the underlying demand last? 
Or will it peter out like so many earlier commodity booms? 
The underlying driver of mineral demand is the metals intensity of global gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth. Figure 27 below displays the global steel intensity (kg 
steel per capita), which is a good proxy for metals intensity, against world real GDP 
per capita.  
Wits MSC 
 
80  
 
Source: Adapted from http://advisoranalyst.com 
Figure 27: Global Minerals Intensity of GDP(steel proxy) 
2.2.1 PHASES OF GLOBAL STEEL INTENSITY OF GDP 
The global steel intensity of GDP shows three distinct phases since the Second World 
War: 
Phase 1 (1950 to ~1970): high intensity – Post-Second World War minority world (first 
world) reconstruction and increasing buying power within the minority world, resulting 
in strong minerals demand and prices and widespread move to greater state control 
(nationalisation) of resources. Negligible impact on the majority world (third world) 
industrialization. 
Phase 2 (1970 to 2000): low intensity – minority world infrastructure installed, move to 
services (only Asian tigers in high-intensity phase, but too small to impact on global 
trend). This resulted in over-supply and low prices for most minerals. Stagnation and 
political instability in resource exporting states (majority world). Widespread 
privatization of resources and return to colonial “free mining” regimes, often dictated 
by Bretton Woods Institutions (SAPs) under minority world “Washington Consensus” 
ideology. This growth gap reflected a failure of continuous global growth due mainly to 
minority world hegemony over international trade regimes and widespread use of 
subsidies.  
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Phase 3 (2000 to present): High intensity (higher rate than Phase 1) as the majority 
world takes off (Brazil, Russia, India, China – BRIC countries) and trade rules are 
increasingly revised, reflecting a partial loss of minority world hegemony over global 
trade systems. Period of high demand and prices and a return of “resources 
nationalism”, but temporarily stalled due to the extraneous US toxic debt Euro-zone 
crises, but by 2010 demand was already showing signs of recovery through stimulus 
packages and by 2011 most commodity prices had regained pre-crisis levels. 
Global metal intensity would have been on a continuously increasing trend if global 
growth had been diffused to more of the world’s people in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Instead, diffusion was only to the Asian tigers with a population of less than 80 million, 
resulting in only a minor impact on global minerals demand. The diffusion of global 
growth (and intensity) finally only occurred twenty years later (in BRICs), but it was 
temporarily stalled due to the US toxic debt crisis plunging the world into recession. 
However, demand appears to be recovering despite the Eurozone debt crisis. 
As is apparent from Phase 1 of intensity, sustained by minority world growth for any 
one country, the intensity tends to fall off once the basic national infrastructure is in 
place and most domestic markets have been developed and penetrated. Growth from 
then on is mainly in services accompanied by a falling proportion of employment in 
manufacturing, as evidenced by almost all mature minority world economies. 
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(Source: Australian Treasury 201268) 
Figure 28: Steel intensity per capita. 
The country steel intensity per capita data appears to indicate that, at around $16k-
$20k/capita, the metals intensity of GDP growth falls off, no matter when the initial 
metals consuming ‘lift-off’ phase occurred (Figure 28). Given that China is only at about 
one-third up this high-intensity phase, that India is at about a third that of China and 
given that they have a combined population approaching three times that of the 
minority world, it would then appear that the current global high metals intensity phase 
might continue at least as long as Phase 1 (see Figure 27) or roughly 30 years (1950 
to 1980). This assumption excludes growing intensity from other emerging economies, 
such as Brazil, Vietnam and Indonesia, which if included could make this a 30–50 year 
high-intensity phase. 
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Source: Cliffs Natural Resources Inc, 2012 
Figure 29: Steel Consumption Per Capita Versus Wealth 
In concluding this section, it appears that, despite the recent commodities slump, the 
underlying boom could be an unprecedented long ‘super-cycle’, provided that China 
and India keep up their robust economic growth, which should underpin rising metals 
intensity before growth is driven by services and technology (lower metals intensity) 
and finally, economic stabilisation (Figure 29). This then leaves us with the 
fundamental question of how can the current commodities-stimulated high prices be 
transformed into sustainable growth, industrialisation and development in Zimbabwe? 
2.2.2 A RESOURCE-BASED STRATEGY & THE “RESOURCE CURSE”  
The “resource curse” is a much debated and studied phenomenon, but it is clear that 
a resource endowment is not always a curse and, if well-managed, can be a “blessing” 
as evidenced by strong sustained growth in several resource economies (or erstwhile 
resource economies), such as Sweden, the USA, Norway, Malaysia, Finland,  
Australia, Canada, New Zealand (Aetoroa), Botswana, etc. A comprehensive paper 
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(Van der Ploeg, 200769,70) adequately surveys the literature in this regard and Collier 
and Goderis’ (Collier & Goderis, 200771) extensive and illuminating analysis of a large 
sample of countries (130), using a “panel cointegration methodology” refines the 
impact of the “resource curse” with the following findings: 
Empirical evidence suggests that commodity booms have positive short-term impacts 
on growth, but negative long-term impacts on developing countries; 
These adverse long-term impacts are only experienced by exporters of “high rent” 
mineral (non-agricultural) commodities; 
The key determinant as to whether a mineral boom will be a “blessing” or a curse” 
appears to be the level of governance, particularly the existence of “sufficiently good 
institutions” (Collier & Goderis, 2007); 
The main “channels” of the curse are: 
 High public and private consumption; 
 Low/inefficient investment; 
 Overvalued (strong) currency (“Dutch Disease”). 
However, what is significant is that all of these “channels” can be neutralised or 
ameliorated through appropriate policies and strategies and the resource “curse” can 
be turned into a “blessing” through targeted deployment of the resource rents and 
opportunities. In this regard Omano Edigheji also notes that “...what sets 
developmental states apart from mineral-rich countries is primarily the nature of 
institutions and consequently state capacity...”72, which is consistent with Colliers & 
Goderis’ findings. A common method of ameliorating the three “channels” is to capture 
the resource rents and to keep them offshore in a SWF73. The SWF could be used to 
                                            
 
69 “Challenges And Opportunities For Resource Rich Economies”, Frederick van der 
Ploeg, European University Institute, Florence, Oxcarre, Oxford University, University 
of Amsterdam, Revised 31 May 2007 
70 ”Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned Into a Blessing? The Role of Trade 
Policies and Institutions”, Rabah Arezki and Frederick van der Ploeg , CEPR 
Discussion Paper No 6225, 2007 
71 “Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a 
Conundrum”, Paul Collier and Benedikt Goderis, University of Oxford, August, 2007 
72 Edigheji, Omano, op cit, p12. 
73 SWF: Sovereign Wealth Fund 
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fund long-term physical and human (knowledge) infrastructure projects (i.e. “drip-feed” 
back into the economy) to enhance future economic competitiveness (inter-
generational equity). This thesis explores some strategies, particularly for Zimbabwe, 
to overcome or dilute elements of the “resource curse” and to build appropriate 
institutions. 
2.3 ZIMBABWE: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE-BASED 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Zimbabwe’s rich and diverse resource base, combined with the strong global 
resources demand, could underpin a viable resource-based re-industrialisation and 
industrialisation strategy that goes beyond supplying raw materials to the world 
economy. This could be achieved by utilising its extensive resource developmental 
opportunities to establish the requisite economic infrastructure across the country and 
into the region (particularly access to the coast) and to create the crucial resource 
sector linkages into the local, regional and sub-continental economies. 
This ‘deepening’ of the resources sector though up-, down- and side-stream 
(infrastructure) industrial linkages could form core industrialisation nuclei for the 
economy and could, over time, diversify with increasing human resource development, 
technology development and skills formation, through the lateral migration of these 
resource-dependent industrial clusters into resource-independent industrial activities. 
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Mining: Concentration, 
smelting, refining => metal/alloy
Forward Linkages:
Intermediate products =>
Manufacturing; Logistics ; 
other sectors (agriculture , 
forestry, fisheries, etc.)
Backward 
Linkages
Inputs:
Capital goods
Consumables
Services
Knowledge Linkages
HRD: skills formation
R&D: tech development
Geo-knowledge (survey)
Spatial Linkages:
Infrastructure (transport, 
power, ICT) and LED
Fiscal linkages:
Resource rent capture (RRT) & 
deployment: long-term human 
& physical infrastructure 
development
 
Source: Jourdan 2012 
Figure 30: Establishing the Seminal Resource Linkages 
In addition to the capture and judicious deployment of resource rents, Zimbabwe’s 
mineral resources endowment gives it a comparative advantage in establishing 
resource linkage industrial clusters (Figure 30) through the following: 
1) The immediate market offered by the local and regional resource industries’ 
demand for inputs such as plant, equipment, machinery, consumables and 
services. This market can be relatively large for specialised resource industries’ 
demand, ameliorating economies of scale constraints (for example, the region 
constitutes three-quarters of the global platinum group metals mining and 
processing inputs market); 
2) A potential technological advantage through close proximity to the resource 
industries’ demand for innovation, adaptation and problem solving (these activities 
often currently take place offshore in the minority world); 
3) A feedstock price advantage for downstream resource processing industries, 
particularly mineral processing (smelting, refining, alloying and fabrication); and 
4) Opportunities to develop the supplier industries for the extensive resource 
infrastructure requirements (Figure 31). 
 
Resource and resource-based inputs markets 
Mineral Exploration (equipment & services) 
Mining (capital goods, consumables, services) 
Concentration  (equipment, machinery, grinding media, etc) 
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Smelting (capital goods, consumables, services) 
Refining (equipment, machinery, chemicals, etc) 
 
Resource infrastructure inputs markets 
Construction (cement, ceramics, steel, fittings) 
Railways (rail, locos, rolling-stock and spares) 
Highways, roads (vehicles and trailers) 
Ports and airports (capital goods) 
Pipelines (gas, fuels and slurries) 
Power plants and transmission infrastructure 
Water (treatment, pumping, storage and transport) 
Telecommunications (transmission) 
Knowledge infrastructure (universities and R&D institutions) 
(Source: adapted from Jourdan 2008) 
Figure 31: Local resource and infrastructure markets 
2.3.1 RESOURCE LINKAGES INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS 
The development of these resource sector linkages slowly builds integrated resource 
linkages industrial clusters where the different components reinforce one another and, 
from initially serving local demand, develop competencies to export goods and 
services to resource sectors in the region and ultimately globally. 
The resource linkages industrial clusters are indirectly anchored on the comparative 
advantage of the resources sectors and are comprised of: 
- Upstream linkage industries: plant, machinery, consumables (inputs), 
engineering services, financial services, consultancies; 
- Downstream linkage industries: resources processing (value addition) into 
intermediate products, semi-manufactures, components, sub-assemblies and 
finished, resource-intensive products. Resource processing usually also 
produces co-products and by-products, which also constitute potential 
feedstocks for further downstream linkage industries. These resource 
beneficiation industries in turn create markets for further upstream industries 
(capital goods, consumables and services); 
- Sidestream linkages: Power generation and supply, construction, process 
automation, logistics, marketing, transport infrastructure (rail, road and ports), 
environmental industries, human resource development and skilling entities and 
other resource sectors that supply inputs into the resource sector (for example, 
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mineral inputs such as fertiliser and conditioners into agriculture, and chemicals 
into mining). These in turn create new demand for upstream industries. 
These linkages are illustrated for the Finnish forestry cluster in Figure 32 below, but 
similar sector clusters can be developed for Zimbabwe’s mineral resources natural 
comparative advantages. 
 
(Source: Adapted from Ramos 1998) 
Figure 32: Finland’s forestry cluster. 
 
According to Joseph Ramos (1998), the evolution of the resource linkage industrial 
clusters generally goes through the following four phases (p. 112): 
Phasing of Resource-based Industrial Clusters 
PHASE I: Resource extraction with minimum essential local processing (for example, 
ore concentration, raw cacao beans, roundwood and cotton lint). Almost all the inputs 
(capital goods, consumables and engineering services) are imported (except for 
production engineering services) in this phase; 
PHASE II: Resource processing and export (for example, wood pulp, agri-processing, 
mineral smelting and refining) as well as initial import substitution of the lower-
technology imported inputs (usually under licence for the local market) and increasing 
production engineering services; 
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PHASE III: Initial export of some goods and services established under import 
substitution in Phase II. The engineering services are increasingly based on local 
intellectual property and the resources are processed into higher value-added products 
(for example, fine and special papers, metal alloys, semi-manufactures, packaged 
agricultural products and textiles); 
PHASE IV: Exports of a wide range of resource goods and services of increasing 
complexity and technology including design engineering services, resource plant and 
machinery (predominantly based on local intellectual property). Exports of resource-
based products of greater variety and complexity and the migration of knowledge-
intensive resource services industries, into new, resource-independent sectors. 
These phases of resource industrial cluster development are in reality more diverse 
and complex with some activities moving faster and others slower, but overall there is 
an increase in product complexity and sophistication (both up- and downstream) that 
needs to be paralleled with the increasing production of high-level skills (engineers and 
scientists) and investments into research and development (R&D). 
Ultimately, a natural comparative advantage (Phase I) has been transformed into a 
competitive advantage (Phase IV) with continuous incremental improvements in 
productivity and design, and the basis has been laid for the migration of hi-tech 
industries into new, resource-independent (either as a feedstock or market) sectors 
and generic diversified industrialisation. 
Work by Maloney (2002) and the ANC (2012) indicates that the failure of resource-
based industrialisation is generally due to a lack technological adoption (backward 
linkages) because of a “deficient national learning or innovative capacity, arising from 
low investment in human capital and scientific infrastructure”74. The ANC SIMS study 
concluded that there appeared to be no resource-based industrialisation success story 
that had not succeeded in dramatically raising their technical HRD (engineers & 
scientists) capacity and their technology development capacity (R&D), both of which 
are a pre-requisite for fully exploiting the resources backward and forward industrial 
linkages. 
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There have been several similar linkages studies done for the minerals sector in both 
South America and southern Africa. A recent study of the South African platinum group 
metals sector noted that the engineering, procurement, construction management 
(EPCM) firms are critical to optimising the initial linkages, which also impact on the 
potential ongoing linkages in terms of the technologies and processes selected. In 
addition, the Mozal (BHPB) linkages programme has indicated that the configuration 
of local sub-contracts is important to the success of developing local suppliers. The 
failure to develop downstream linkages at the Hillside aluminium smelter (Gencor, later 
BHPB) in Richards Bay is predominantly due to monopoly pricing of the product at an 
import parity price (IPP). The stipulation of competitive pricing of all resource products 
is seminal to any successful forward linkages (downstream) strategy. 
Nevertheless, the development of regional resources inputs industrial clusters is also 
critically constrained by the small Zimbabwean national market. Even the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) market (Africa’s largest regional market) generally 
lacks the requisite demand for many world-scale viable capital goods plants. The 
accession of Zimbabwe into the SACU and the establishment of regional (SADC) 
common markets would greatly increase the possibility of a successful resource-based 
development strategy. Other resource-based industrialisation success stories either 
had larger domestic markets (US, Brazil) or had access to larger markets (the Nordics: 
access USSR and EU). 
A schematic phasing of a resource-based development strategy is presented in Figure 
33: Schematic resource-based industrialisation phasing, below, which displays the 
decreasing importance of resource exploitation as the resource linkages are 
developed. 
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Source: Jourdan 2008 
Figure 33: Schematic resource-based industrialisation phasing 
As the linkages are established more value is added through beneficiation than mining 
(I), resource infrastructure is densified to serve other areas (II), labour becomes 
increasingly skilled and mining more capital intensive (III), government revenues 
diversify from resources to other sectors (IV), imported mining inputs are increasingly 
produced locally (V), mineral technologies are locally developed or adapted rather than 
imported (VI) and resource exploitation is governed by general laws and institutions 
rather than project specific contracts (VII). 
 A Zimbabwe resource-based development strategy would typically go through similar 
phases of industrialisation, with decreasing importance of its resources comparative 
advantage and an increasing relative importance of a skills-based competitive 
advantage (Figure 33). 
Almost all African economies can be positioned on this continuum, though most would 
still be in Phases I or II, while Zimbabwe would probably be positioned somewhere in 
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Phase II (though slipping back). In summary, the key elements of a resource-based 
development strategy are: 
1) The realisation of a resource comparative advantage by overcoming 
infrastructure constraints through the establishment of infrastructure networks. 
This has largely been achieved in Zimbabwe (in need of rehabilitation) though 
major new infrastructure is needed for bulk mineral exports such as iron ore and 
coal (see Case Study: The Putative Mwanesi Development Corridor (SDI).  
2) The ‘densification’ of the resource-based infrastructure through the 
establishment of ancillary and feeder infrastructure to enlarge the resources 
corridor catchments and beneficiary sectors (agriculture, forestry and tourism). 
3) The deepening of the mineral sector linkages into the domestic and regional 
economy through beneficiation of these resources and creating supplier and 
service industries around the minerals sector and developing them into complex 
resource linkages industrial clusters (up-, side- and downstream industries). 
However this is critically dependent on: 
4) Dramatically increasing the national quality of human capital and technology 
development through concerted long-term investment in technical HRD 
(engineers, scientists, technicians) and R&D (innovation); 
5) Ensuring that value addition and the development of the minerals sector is part 
of the national innovation and industrialisation strategy  
6) The capture of resource rents through resource rent taxes and the re-
investment of resource rents into human resource development, skills and R&D 
for technology development to capitalise on the resource linkages opportunities, 
as well as into long-term infrastructure, for the development of mature resource 
industrial clusters and, ultimately, a competitive advantage, independent of 
resource endowments. 
A comprehensive Zimbabwean resource-based strategy should develop the labour-
intensive resources upstream sectors as well as going further downstream, beyond 
capital-intensive intermediate goods, into labour-intensive fabrication, which is often 
stunted by the widespread practice of monopoly pricing of intermediate industrial 
feedstocks. 
2.4 OPTIMISING THE RESOURCE LINKAGES TO MAXIMISE THE 
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT 
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African Mining Vision: In 2009 the African Union (AU) Heads of State adopted the “The 
African Mining Vision” that contains important strategies for the maximisation of the 
impact of mineral resources on growth and development. This Vision aims to achieve 
a “knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyses and contributes to the broad-
based growth & development of, and is fully integrated into, a single African market 
through: 
 Down-stream linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing; 
 Up-stream linkages into mining capital goods, consumables & services 
industries; 
 Side-stream linkages into infrastructure (power, logistics; communications, 
water) and skills & technology development (HRD and R&D); 
 Mutually beneficial partnerships between the state, the private sector, civil 
society, local communities and other stakeholders; and 
 A comprehensive knowledge of its mineral endowment”75 
The Africa Mining Vision correctly emphasises the need for mining to be integrated into 
the rest of the economy through developing the crucial mineral linkages sectors and 
investing in geo-survey. 
The key element to a strategy that uses natural resources to catalyse growth and 
development appears to be, from looking at successful resource-based 
industrialisation, the maximisation of the concomitant opportunities offered by a natural 
resources endowment, particularly the ‘deepening’ of the resources sector through 
optimising economic linkages into the local economy. 
2.4.1 FISCAL LINKAGES: RESOURCE RENTS  
Resource rents (returns in excess of the expected/average return on capital) should 
be used to improve the basic physical and knowledge infrastructure of the nation. 
Generally, the resource rents are not shared with the resource owner (the 
state/people), except, partially, through the Additional Profits Tax (APT) in the Special 
Mining Leases (SML) and the implementation of a resource rent tax (APT) should be 
considered for all mining operations, possibly to be kept offshore to ameliorate 
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currency appreciation and fiscal shocks, and which could be drip-fed back into long-
term (ten to twenty year) knowledge and physical infrastructure.  
2.4.2 SPATIAL LINKAGES (INFRASTRUCTURE) 
The FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organisation) notes that “Only 21 percent of 
[Africa’s] population live within 100 km of the coast or of a navigable river, against 89 
percent in high-income countries. The proportion of the population that is landlocked 
is seven times higher than in rich countries. Landlocked countries in Africa have 
average freight costs almost three times higher than in high-income countries”76.  
Furthermore, over two centuries ago, Adam Smith observed that “There are in Africa 
none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, the 
Mediterranean and Euxine seas in both Europe and Asia, and the gulphs of Arabia, 
Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam in Asia, to carry maritime commerce into the interior 
parts of that great continent: and the great rivers of Africa are at too great a distance 
from one another to give occasion to any considerable inland navigation.” 77 
Zimbabwe’s land-locked location clearly leaves it with a severe logistics constraint in 
terms of trading in the global markets, which will constrain future growth, unless 
overcome. 
The high-rent resources infrastructure (mainly minerals) could be used to open up 
other lower rent, resource potential (such as agriculture, forestry and tourism), as per 
the spatial development initiatives (SDI) methodology in order to access zones of 
economic potential with lower returns that cannot afford their own requisite 
infrastructure. All resource concessions must include third party access at non-
discriminatory user-tariffs to all the resources infrastructure (transport, power, water 
and tele-communications), in order to catalyse the higher development impact 
resource infrastructure ‘hitch-hikers’ (such as agriculture), which in general have a 
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much higher socio-economic propulsive impact. This condition needs to be configured 
into all resource contracts (concessions) for all resource infrastructure. 
Resource infrastructure generally relies on state assets (servitudes) or rights (licences) 
and consequently constitutes a potential lever for encouraging the resource and the 
infrastructure concessionaires to optimise the local mineral and infrastructure linkages. 
2.4.3 DOWNSTREAM VALUE ADDITION [FORWARD LINKAGES] 
The locational advantage of producing crude resources should be used to establish 
resource processing industries that could then provide the feedstocks for 
manufacturing and industrialisation. In this regard, the resource contracts or licences 
need to provide incentives or disincentives for mineral resources downstream 
beneficiation. However, the widespread practice of monopoly pricing of beneficiated 
minerals/metals could negate this advantage for the manufacturing industry (especially 
steels and polymers). In addition, the first steps of beneficiation are often energy 
intensive (smelting), which is currently constrained by Zimbabwe’s power shortages. 
Consideration should be given to much greater intra-regional power trade (through, for 
example, the regional power pool: SAPP78), which could be based on potential low 
cost and sustainable hydro-power from the Congo, Zambezi and other rivers between 
the tropics. However, in many cases, mining companies in Africa have encouraged 
beneficiation offshore. An example would be Anglo American’s divestment from its 
main platinum group metals downstream beneficiator and technology developer, 
Johnson Matthey Plc in the 1990s (when it was the major shareholder, at more than 
40%), after investing heavily in it, especially in technology development, over the 
previous 40 years. This was probably due to its increasing focus on ‘core competence’ 
(mining) in preparation for its exit and London listing. This appears to indicate that the 
South African decision to allow Anglo to relist abroad was possibly ill-advised and that 
the ‘unfettered’ movement abroad of domestic capital should be curtailed. 
2.4.4 UPSTREAM VALUE ADDITION [BACKWARD LINKAGES] 
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The resources sector market should be used to develop the resource supply/inputs 
sector (for example, capital goods, consumables and services). This often offers a 
relatively large market for specific inputs for particular resource exploitation. Zimbabwe 
used to boast a substantial mineral inputs sector which contracted during the currency 
crisis, but is slowly growing again due to the resuscitation of the mining sector. 
However, it will need strategic interventions to get back to and surpass its former 
capacity, especially in attracting back skills that were lost during the crisis.  
Much of Zimbabwe’s mineral capital goods are imported and of the few capital goods 
companies that it had, several have shut down or contracted over the last decade, in 
part due to the disinvestment of the old southern African mining houses (e.g. Anglo 
American and Lonrho), which used to invest in a plethora of up- and downstream 
industries.  
Local content (local value-added) milestones need to be built into the resource 
contracts or licences. In a Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Development Centre policy brief, Gøril Havro and Javier Santiso79 point out 
that both Norway and Chile experienced: 
“…direct efforts to diversify their economy and to support industries associated with 
the natural-resource sector – such as engineering and supply – as well as non-
resource sectors. Norwegian policies in the 1970s were markedly interventionist in this 
regard . . . The legal framework emphasised local content until 1990, to develop the 
infant petroleum supply industry. Norway also pushed for state participation in the 
same areas, in spite of reluctance on the part of many of the international companies.” 
Havro and Santiso further contend that: 
“…local-content requirements could potentially have beneficial effects as well, as seen 
in Norway, since they would contribute to developing domestic economic activity rather 
than relying on rents, while at the same time increasing human capital through 
learning-by-doing and technological spillovers. However, there is a need for good co-
operation with the foreign companies to ensure that such requirements are not 
commercially unviable, and at the same time to ensure that they have a real learning 
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impact and are not just seen as another tax payment by companies. Standardised 
local-content agreements worked out with experts in the field could be useful in 
achieving this.”80 
The platinum group metals seams of the Bushveld Complex in South Africa and the 
Great Dyke in Zimbabwe reportedly constitute the world’s largest trackless mining 
opportunity. However, the requisite capital goods will predominantly be supplied by 
imports, due to the failure to invest in the local development of trackless mining 
equipment, especially after the demise of the Chamber of Mines Research 
Organisation (COMRO) in South Africa and the Institute of Mining Research (IMR) in 
Zimbabwe. 
2.4.5 KNOWLEDGE LINKAGES [HUMAN & TECHNOLOGY/PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT]  
Resources exploitation technologies generally need to adapt to local conditions (for 
example, climate, mineralogy and terrain) in order to provide opportunities for the 
development of niche technological competencies in the resources inputs sector. This 
sector tends to be knowledge-intensive and accordingly needs ‘priming’ through 
investment in human resource development and R&D. However, several studies have 
shown that it has the capacity to later ‘reinvent’ itself outside the resources sector to 
produce new products for other non-resource markets. 
Future exploitation contracts or licences need to facilitate the establishment of a 
domestic resources R&D capacity, and the requisite human resource development. 
This type of capacity needs to be rebuilt and resourced across the continent, together 
with the mining and capital goods sectors to ensure that mineral technology 
opportunities do not leak away to states such as Sweden and Finland, which offer 
greater R&D incentives and support.  
Critical to the development of technologies and products is the development of the 
requisite human resources with technical skills (engineers, scientists, artisans, 
technicians) and investing in HRD capacity development institutions (universities, 
colleges, training centres, etc). However, these tertiary education institutions need to 
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be fed from the schooling system with adequate graduates with maths and science 
competency (A-levels). Consequently investments need to be directed at upgrading 
the maths and science capacities at school level. A proportion of the resource rents 
garnered by the state could be reserved for investment into dramatically enhancing the 
production of technical cadres. No resources dependent economy has ever 
industrialised without concerted investments into technical HRD and R&D. 
2.4.6 DEVELOPING THE LINKAGES INDUSTRIES AND CLUSTERS 
Zimbabwe should focus on developing its resource linkages firms by applying best 
practice from more industrialised states that had a similar set of endowments. In this 
regard Justin Lin (201081) proposes six useful steps for “growth identification and 
facilitation” of firms and clusters that provide several insightful measures for growing 
these sectors, as follows: 
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In Zimbabwe’s case some “role models” might be Finland (was a resource-based 
economy 40 years ago – forestry and minerals – and today is an advanced industrial 
nation) and Brazil (although still resource-based – minerals & agriculture – it is rapidly 
industrialising). South Africa (slow growing) may be a good example of what not to do 
– its resource linkages industries and resource knowledge sectors have shrunk over 
the last 20 years. 
The experience of other erstwhile resource economies that are today industrialised 
strongly indicates that the development of the resources economic linkages sectors 
was seminal to their success. The principal linkages sectors are discussed in the next 
sections. 
2.5 MINERAL FISCAL LINKAGES: MAXIMISING THE DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT 
Step 1: Find fast growing countries with a similar endowment structure and with about 
100% higher per capita income. Identify dynamically growing tradable industries that 
have grown well in those countries for the last 20 years. 
Step 2: See if some private domestic firms are already in those industries (of which 
may be existing or nascent). Identify constraints to quality upgrading or further firm 
entry. Take action to remove constraints. 
Step 3: In industries where no domestic firms are currently present, seek FDI from 
countries examined in step 1, or organize new firm incubation programs. 
Step 4: In addition to the industries identified in step 1, the government should also 
pay attention to spontaneous self discovery by private enterprises and give support 
to scale up the successful private innovations in new industries 
Step 5: In countries with poor infrastructure and bad business environment, special 
economic zones or industrial parks may be used to overcome these barriers to firm 
entry and FDI and encourage industrial clusters. 
Step 6: The government may compensate pioneer firms in the listed identified above 
with: Tax incentives for a limited period, Direct credits for investments, Access to 
foreign exchange. 
Source: Lin, Justin Yifu (2010) “New Structural Economics. A Framework for 
Rethinking Development”, World Bank, WPS 5197 
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2.5.1 DISCUSSION 
The “economics” of the minerals sector has many features specific to it, which often 
underpins the rationale for special instruments to capture and manage mineral rents. 
In general, the sector has: 
- Finite assets- ultimately depleted. Left with a “hole in the ground”; 
- Potential for huge rents and huge disasters; 
- Volatility of commodity prices: forex and fiscal inflows: 
- Impact on exchange rates (stronger/weaker currency) 
- Impact on fiscus (expand then can’t contract, increase in debt, finally SAP….)  
- Dominated by large TNCs: Increasing ownership concentration; 
- Enclave nature of mines and processing facilities (spatial inequalities) 
- Generally capital intensive (low job/capex ratio)  
- Political desire for greater VA (downstream beneficiation) at any cost; 
- Irregular unpredictable ‘windfall’ profits; 
- Diversion of local capital into resource boom sectors;  
- Asian demand stimulated mineral “supercycle”?  
- Resource nationalism: greater state intervention/participation;  
- Rent “diversion” by elites, discouraging development of other sectors; 
- Asymmetric contract negotiation capacity between TNC and host states; 
- Lack of transparency and accountability on resource contracts 
(licenses/leases); 
- Lack of transparency and accountability on tax proceeds (EITI); 
- Environmental degradation and negative impacts on local communities; 
- The “Resource Curse” and Dutch Disease;  
- Etc...  
2.5.1.1 TAX INSTRUMENTS 
A typical and broadly applicable impost which is not unique to mining is the corporate 
income tax. Here, the rate of tax, allowable deductions from gross income and the 
extent to which losses are carried forward (or even back) are the typical issues 
considered. As indicated above, capital allowances are a mechanism by which policy 
seeks to influence the pattern of expenditure in a project. The treatment of 
environmental expenses, particularly those for on-going environmental management, 
disaster mitigation and for funding mine closure requires innovative treatment in fiscal 
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regimes. For example, the creation of environmental funds into which companies 
contribute has become common in most mining regimes. Whether expenditure on 
community or social activities should be permitted as a deduction from gross income 
for the purposes of determining taxable income also becomes more of an issue with 
the increasing focus on CSR82. Which other costs are deductible in calculating taxable 
income, is a matter which has to be addressed.   
The determination of revenues can also be a challenge. Virtually all economically 
important minerals have a published price and it is therefore relatively easy to 
determine the appropriate sales revenue. Even where there is no published price, it is 
still possible to find a reference price to be used in determining the income of the mining 
company. For instance, the price of aluminium is often used as a reference for 
determining the income of bauxite and alumina producers. Controversy can however 
arise over the proper valuation of by-products, depending on the ease with which they 
can be separated from the main value mineral.  
Where advances are obtained from project sponsors or off-takers in return for 
commitments to supply the mineral produced, it is necessary to ensure that the 
valuation of the mineral produced is transparent and at an arms-length competitive 
price. To avoid potential problems, the development agreement should stipulate the 
price references (benchmarks) to be used in determining revenues.  
The meagre fiscal benefits to African governments during the “Asian Boom” were 
limited due mainly to the overly generous mineral policy regimes in existence in most 
countries, resulting from the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s prescribed by the World 
Bank/IMF that generally failed to capture resource rents (no progressive taxes). 
Admittedly, this followed years of stagnation of the sector, due to the falling intensity 
of minerals in global growth (GDP), falling prices and profits and consequent under 
investment, mainly by state mining companies, provoking an over-compensation in the 
opposite direction (far too attractive mineral fiscal regimes). One important feature of 
most of these regimes is that the incidence of taxes is distributed in such a way over 
the mine’s life cycle that little tax is paid until the capital invested has been recovered. 
Accordingly, tax payments are postponed and during times of booming prices this 
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inevitably accentuates the impression of inequity.  A state revenue breakdown from a 
typical mineral project (with a RRT) is presented in Figure 34. 
 
Source: Adapted from Land 2008 
Figure 34: Typical Mineral Project Economic Breakdown 
Many of Africa’s mineral regimes were revised from the late 1980s onwards with a view 
to promoting increased foreign direct investment for exploration and mine 
development. Tax rates were lowered, generous allowances were introduced for 
exploration and capital expenditures, import tariffs and VAT/GST were reduced or 
zero-rated and, in a few instances, tax holidays were granted to investors in the mining 
sector (the “race to the bottom”). In addition, “stabilisation clauses” that dramatically 
curtailed the state’s ability to increase its share of boom rents, were widespread, often 
reinforced with external (Minority World) arbitration clauses. The framework for 
evaluating a country’s fiscal policy was often whether or not its regime was sufficiently 
“competitive”, viewed against those of other countries with similar geological 
prospectivity to attract investment for greenfields and brownfields investment, resulting 
in the so-called “race to the bottom”.  The apparent failure of these generous policy 
regimes to result in tangible benefits to African economies has galvanized the search 
for new frameworks for the sector. 
2.5.1.2 WHY MINERAL SECTOR SPECIFIC TAXES?  
Due to scarcity of exhaustible resources (Hotelling rule) they can have high 
economic/resource rent potential. Accordingly they generally have their own tax 
instruments. However, there is a tendency to use normal (economy-wide) taxes 
in combination with resource specific taxes. Mineral resources are finite 
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(wasting asset) which is part of the rationale for the state to capture the extra 
rents: whilst the asset is still extant. Resource rents are excess profits over 
minimum rate of return which is required to justify investment, which are rarer 
or lower in other sectors, resulting in customised taxes for minerals 
2.5.1.3 TAXING MINERAL RESOURCE VARIABILITY 
Mineral deposits display enormous variation in grade/richness resulting in huge 
differences in embedded economic rent which makes it difficult to design a “one-size-
fits-all” tax regime. However, deposit-by-deposit tax regimes would be problematic to 
design and administer, due to the lack of state knowledge of the true value of the 
resource at the outset (asymmetric state-investor deposit knowledge, though a 
resource rent tax self-adjusts for deposit “richness”). In general, there appears to be 
increasing consensus around the use of several tax instruments, that cater for different 
grades/costs and prices, to capture a “fair share” of the rent. There is now also a 
general consensus on the need for instruments that self-adjust to deposit richness, 
demand (price) and risk (progressive taxes such as a resource rent tax).  
2.5.1.4 HISTORIC TRENDS IN MINERAL TAXATION: 
For centuries ad valorem or in kind royalties were the main instruments of mineral 
taxation. From WWII: combination of fiscal instruments- royalties, company profit 
taxes, withholding taxes, etc. became the norm. From the 1970s governments 
attempted to increase their share of economic rents through introduction of production-
sharing contracts (particularly for HCs83), equity participation and resource rent taxes, 
first in HCs and later for minerals, in some countries.  
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Taxes on expatriated dividends and state carried equity participation (which is 
sometimes in lieu of dividend taxes) are also features in many fiscal regimes.  Duties 
on imported inputs, particularly those used during the exploration or mine development 
phases, tend to be limited, if imposed at all. If not properly monitored, this can prevent 
the development of local supply systems (where it is economically viable) and hence 
deny the country the benefits of enhanced local backward linkages, as well as cause 
revenue loss through duty-free imports “leaking” into the general economy. In a 
number of jurisdictions, the local government system prescribes property rates which 
are payable to the local authority in the area in which land and structures are located. 
Depending on how these are valued and the rate of tax, these could yield significant 
revenue for the local authority from the assets of large-scale mining operations.  
2.5.1.5 MINERALS CORPORATE/COMPANY TAX (CIT) 
Most states apply a standard national corporate rate in the range of 20% to 30% of 
profits (Zimbabwe 25%). This has the advantage of a single administration and 
collection system (capacity). However, occasionally a deposit specific CIT is 
negotiated (for some large projects), but these exceptions to the national system are 
cumbersome to administer and maintain (each change requires a legislative 
amendment). 
Dividend withholding taxes on foreign shareholders are common (10-15%), to 
encourage re-investment in the country. Brazil also has an escalated withholding tax 
(25%) on companies domiciled in tax havens. 
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Special capital allowances for capital intensive projects (mostly 100% expensing for 
exploration and development) are also widespread, to attract investment into large 
projects. Deductions for contributions to mine rehabilitation trust funds (closure funds) 
are increasingly allowed.  
2.5.1.6 TAX DILUTION: TRANSFER PRICING (OVER- AND UNDER-
INVOICING)  
TNCs are dominant in minerals and their multi-state operations enable them to exploit 
tax rate differentials, by deflating profits in higher-tax jurisdictions and declaring profits 
in lower-tax jurisdictions by: 
- Sale of minerals below market prices to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions. Many 
minerals do not have terminal markets (metal exchanges) especially ores and 
concentrates, which are difficult for the state to value: A possible remedy is to 
stipulate that a portion (10%) is sold by local open tender, to get a market price 
indicator;  
- Complex price hedging mechanism between related parties : A possible remedy 
is to limit hedging to a max portion of production, and/or insist on open tender 
for the hedging instrument;  
- Debt finance provided by related parties at above-market interest rates:  A 
possible remedy is to limit debt interest rate to a function of a recognised 
international corporate rate (e.g. MOODCAAA 84  plus X%?) and to limit 
allowable debt ratios (gearing);  
- Related party excessive management fees, technical services, or HQ costs. A 
possible remedy is to cap HQ (headquarters) costs at a percentage of costs; 
- High leasing fees for capital goods and machinery from related parties: A 
possible remedy is to insist on open tender of leasing; 
- General: African states should seek assistance from OECD tax authorities – 
they have the same problem! Introduce OECD-type anti-transfer pricing rules 
(trade with associated or related parties) and ring-fencing provisions.  
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Box: Ring-fencing 
Ring-fencing
o Ring-fencing mineral from non-mineral 
income: To limit the transfer of value 
from/to other sectors, to contain mineral-
specfic tax instruments (e.g allowances);
o Ring-fence per deposit/project (e.g.SA): To 
limit the transfer of value from/to other 
mines, to contain mine-specfic tax 
instruments (e.g capex allowances);
o In general, ring-fencing could aid tax 
collection, limit the avoidance options, but 
could distort investment decisions. 2  
While transfer pricing of production has attracted considerable attention, there is a 
strong possibility that transfer pricing of inputs and equipment constitutes a more 
important problem for governments and one less easily handled. Prices are often less 
transparent and tax evasion may take place through the use of non-arm’s length 
suppliers based in tax havens. Debt service to institutions linked to the investor can 
cause similar problems. In this connexion, it should be noted that the G20, the OECD 
and the EU are all making efforts to prevent or limit the use of tax havens. These 
initiatives need to be tapped into.    
2.5.1.7 PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE INCOME TAX (CIT) 
Some states have progressive CIT to cater for deposit variability and price cyclicity (tax 
on profitability rather than profit - e.g., SA gold mining formula tax and the Additional 
Profits Tax in Zimbabwe), to attempt to capture resource rents. There are various 
methods of capturing these “resource rents” such as deposit specific graduated or 
stepped CIT rate linked to a higher unit price of the commodity, or production volume 
or sales turnover or profit-to-sales ratio. However, a stepped rate structure is not an 
accurate proxy for varying rates of return and could lead to distortions on step edges 
(under-reporting of income) and the monitoring is complex. 
The South African gold mining tax formula with built-in progressivity, linked to level of 
profitability of gold mine (marginal mine taxed at 0%), increases as the return on 
turnover increases: 
y = a-(ab/x), where: 
‘y’ = tax rate to be determined (sliding scale taxing higher profits at high rates) 
‘a’ = marginal tax rate 
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‘b’ = portion of tax-free revenue 
‘x’ = ratio of taxable mining income to total income  
However, return on revenue is a poor proxy for return on investment. A Resource Rent 
Tax (RRT), like the Additional Profits Tax (APT) would more accurately target resource 
rents (return on investment). Progressive taxes encourage mining at average grade 
(disincentivises high-grading) and therefore tend to maximise ore extraction. 
2.5.1.8 RESOURCE RENT TAX (RRT)  
David Ricardo proposed that Economic Rent is a surplus of individual investors' paper 
profit (which has its value in control over resources rather than directly in the resources 
themselves) over societal gain (Figure 35). As such, it does not represent any gain but 
rather an unearned transfer of wealth. Accordingly it is argued that there is a need for 
a Resource Rent Tax (RRT) on mineral exploitation. An RRT usually includes the 
following: 
- It triggers in after a threshold real rate-of-return (RoR) on investment has been 
achieved by the investment/project. 
- The hurdle rate (threshold) approximates the “expected” (average) rate of return 
for the jurisdiction. Best linked to the state long-bond rate (+7%?) to self-adjust 
to country risk. 
- RRT is calculated by increasing annual cash flow by threshold RoR and carrying 
it forward until it turns positive- when the RRT triggers for all future after tax 
profits (other taxes are usually allowable as costs). 
- The RRT rate is generally from 20% to 50%, but there is an argument for 
differential rents (embodied in the asset) to be shared equally between the asset 
owner and the concessionaire (50/50). 
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Figure 35: Resource Rent Tax (RRT): 
However, few African states apply a RRT, due to: 
- Perception that it would make them less attractive for FDI; 
- Strong opposition from mining companies; 
- Short-term vision of politicians (back-loaded- will only trigger in after their 
tenure- inter-generational) 
- Perception of complexity (but no more complex than CIT) 
An RRT is generally applied in on top of other taxes (CIT, royalty), as deposits with 
RoR below the threshold will never pay it. Several African countries have forms of a 
RRT (Table 16), especially for hydrocarbons (HCs). 
Table 16: RRT in Africa  
Country  Sector  Year/s  Type  
Ghana  HCs  1984  contractual  
Tanzania  HCs  1984  contractual  
Ghana  Minerals  1985-2003  Law  
Madagascar  HCs & Minerals  1980s  Law  
Namibia  HCs  1993  Law  
Zimbabwe  Minerals (SML) 1994  Law  
Angola  HCs  1990s  contractual  
Malawi  Minerals  2006  Law  
Liberia  Minerals  2008  Law  
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Adapted from Land 2010, p243 
Resource rent tax (RRT) mechanisms, which are imposed on the profit of the project 
or company after deduction of a “normal” rate of return on capital, seek to implement 
the basic concept of rent apportionment. There seems to be some ambivalence to 
them within the mining investment community. This ambivalence has been 
dramatically illustrated by the vociferous opposition to the recent proposals for a 
resource rent tax (super profit tax) in Australia.  For a discussion of the Australian 
proposals, see Garnaut 201085, particularly the relative efficacy of a RRT and a Brown 
Tax (the original Henry Tax Review86 proposal). Despite this ambivalence by mining 
companies, it is generally recognized that a resource rent tax has the advantage of 
being neutral with respect to its impact on investment. Thus, unlike other taxes, it 
causes no distortion of incentives. On political philosophy grounds it is also argued that 
Governments have the right to capture all or part of the mineral resource rents as the 
owners of the resources.  
The basic elements addressed in such resource rent tax schemes include: (a) the 
threshold rate of return after which the tax should be imposed; (b) the rate of tax to be 
imposed; (c) whether the impost should be on each project ring fenced from others or 
on a group of projects by the same investor; and (d) what deductions should be allowed 
from income for tax purposes. Land, (2008 & 2010) provides recent discussions on 
resource rent taxation in the minerals industry.  
It deserves to be noted that one of the most controversial elements of the Australian 
resource rent tax as originally proposed was the threshold rate of return. A possible 
way of getting around the difficulty of determining a specific rate could be to link it to 
the long term yield on bonds issued by the host country, since this yield can be 
expected to incorporate country risk. A threshold rate corresponding to this yield plus, 
say, 5 to 7 per cent, would appear to be equitable in almost all cases. States that do 
not as yet issue Treasury long-bonds, a clause could be inserted in their revenue codes 
and/or MDAs87 that states that once a long-bond is issued, the RRT threshold will be 
                                            
 
85 Ross Garnaut 2010, “The New Australian Resource Rent Tax” University of 
Melbourne. 
86 Government of Australia 2010, Henry Tax Review, 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_reports.htm 
87 MDA : Mineral Development Agreement 
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the rate plus 500 – 700 basis points. Until then the state concerned would have to 
estimate a fixed threshold (around 10% to 20% for most African states). As for the rate 
of the resource rent tax, there is considerable support for a 50 percent rate, although 
it should be noted that Papua New Guinea has applied a 75 per cent rate for many 
years.  A RRT is one of the least distortionary of the usual mineral tax instruments, as 
it does not sterilise resources which high royalties could do. Marginal deposits would 
never breach the RRT threshold and therefore a high RRT rate would not impact on 
the investment decision for such a deposit. 
“Resource rent taxation has a reputation for administrative complexity, which may 
weigh against it: 
- RRT has mostly the same information and audit requirements as 
conventional income taxation. The main differences are: 
- the project ring-fence basis for assessment (typically only relaxed for  
exploration expenses) but ring-fencing is not unique to RRT; 
- the cumulative rather than annual income basis of assessment… this is 
mainly a computational issue (there may be an issue over prior year 
records); 
- the cash flow rather than accounting basis for assessment – non- tax cash 
charges, like depreciation are not used … this may add to the burden of the 
audit function; 
- Tax leakage safeguards (dealing with transfer pricing, thin capitalisation, 
allocation of overheads, expenditure verification) are no different from those 
needed for any other kind of profits taxation. 
- Tax administrators would need training on conceptual underpinnings of RRT 
(discounted cash flow, cost of risk capital, investment returns, etc)”88 
2.5.1.9 MINERAL ROYALTIES 
It is usually recognised that some recompense is due to the owner/country once its 
minerals are extracted and sold, regardless of whether or not the seller reports a profit, 
                                            
 
88 Land, Bryan, ppt to IMF Conference on “ Taxing Natural Resources” Washington 
2008  
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though account ought to be taken of the potential adverse effects of high upfront 
payments on the development and operation of mining projects. 
Royalties are the oldest form of mineral taxation: Usually imposed on value of mineral 
sales (ad valorem) or a set charge per production volume (specific). Historically royalty 
was in kind (volume/weight). Royalties are a factor payment or consideration for the 
right to deplete the national asset (similar to capital and labour input costs). However, 
due to local ownership claims some jurisdictions share royalty proceeds between 
central and local levels of government. This effectively privileges mineral rich regions. 
Royalties have the advantages of being easier to administer (more difficult to subvert 
than profit-based taxes) and are front-loaded, giving the state much-needed immediate 
receipts from first production. However, they add to working costs and consequently 
increase economic cut-off grade of a mineral deposit (i.e. could sterilise marginal 
deposits/resources).  
There is generally a transfer pricing problem (under invoicing) for mineral products 
without terminal markets (e.g. LME), which implies a need for state capacity to 
determine market prices. The state could insist on local open tender sales of a 
proportion of production, to get a market price and to facilitate local VA (value added). 
Some states decrease royalties with increasing VA to encourage local beneficiation 
(VA). However, this is only effective if the mining company beneficiates, unless it is 
applied to exports, then it equates to an export tax, (below). 
Royalties should be based on value at mine gate, but several states find it simpler to 
apply them at the port (FoB value- to determine value) – thus effectively becoming an 
export tax (below). 
Royalties are the principal means for ensuring that the country obtains some minimum 
of the value of the mineral produced. These may be imposed as an amount per unit of 
production (unit-based); or at a rate based on the value of the mineral sold; or, less 
commonly, on the basis of the profits from or the profitability of the mining operation. 
In addition to ensuring that at least a minimum amount is paid in taxes, royalties have 
the advantage of being relatively easy to determine and collect, and thus pose less 
demand on the sophistication of the government’s tax auditors. Otto et al. (2006) 
provides a comprehensive account of the different forms of royalty. Royalties are 
generally applicable on the value of the minerals at mine-gate, to recompense the state 
for the loss of the resource, whether or not a profit is made. However, if royalty rates 
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are set too high they will sterilise marginal deposits/reserves as they are effectively a 
working cost. 
2.5.1.10 MINERAL EXPORT TAXES 
Mineral export taxes are usually applied on the FoB value of mineral exports. Used in 
order to: 
- encourage local beneficiation (VA); 
- protect strategic feedstocks for local consumption; 
- raise revenue (not efficient);  
Almost no African states use mineral export taxes (but used extensively by NICs: 
China, Russia). It could be an effective instrument to facilitate mineral value addition, 
where there is a clear business case for beneficiation. However, they are strongly 
opposed by OECD who fear limited access to mineral resources (curtailed in EU EPAs 
and EC “Raw Materials Strategy”89).  
An export tax could be distortionary if set too high (>5%) as it is effectively a second 
(export) “royalty”, adding to working costs (thus increasing the hurdle rate and 
consequently would sterilise deposits/reserves). It should only be applied to selective 
minerals, only after a feasibility study (PFS90) on the next VA step has shown it to be 
economic viable. However, like royalties it is relatively easier to administer and collect. 
2.5.1.11 OTHER INDIRECT TAXES 
Import duties: These should ideally be an industrial development instrument, but in 
many states it is unfortunately applied as a fiscal instrument, Nevertheless, many 
states offer exemptions due to the capital intensity of large mineral projects. These 
exemptions should only be for the capex phase of the project (1 to 3y), if at all, to 
encourage backward linkages for the ongoing project consumables (opex). 
VAT/GST: African mineral production is mostly exported (zero-rated in terms of 
standard destination-based VAT system). Consequently, some states have made 
                                            
 
89 European Commission 2011, “Tackling the Challenges on Commodity Markets and 
on Raw Materials”,  COM(2011) 25 final, Brussels, 2.2.2011 
90 PFS: Pre-feasibility Study 
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mining project imports; VAT free, but due to weak VAT administrations (tardy refunds) 
this effectively disadvantages local suppliers (backward linkages) and should be 
avoided (mineral project imports should attract VAT/GST and import duties); 
Labour Levies: For skills development, unemployment benefit, etc. They are usually 
applied on the value of wages (pay-roll). Although these also add to costs, there is a 
“normal” necessary level that responsible companies have to invest to renew/develop 
their skills assets in order to generate returns. This would be the minimum obligatory 
level, which would not impact on “responsible” companies, but would oblige companies 
that rely on poaching skills to contribute to the national skills pool91. 
2.5.1.12 STATE EQUITY 
State equity is equivalent to CIT (but maintains the national CIT rate). State equity 
could:  
1. Secure higher slice of economic rent in times of buoyant commodity prices (in lieu 
of super-profit or additional profits taxes); 
2. Enhance stability and prevent renegotiation of fiscal terms (but an RRT could be 
more effective); 
3. Increase government influence on establishing mineral linkages (in lieu of effective 
laws/regulations?) and other national development objectives (however, state 
representatives on the boards of mining companies are often “captured”); 
Equity can be costly for paid-up equity and carries potential conflict of interest as 
regulator and player (e.g. environmental and labour laws). Investors tend to prefer 
government’s role as regulator and tax collector, with equity less than 15%. State 
equity participation is realised in many forms: 
- Commercially transacted paid-up equity 
- Paid-up equity on concessional terms 
- Carried interest- government pays for it out of production proceeds  
- Tax exchanged for equity (reduced tax liability) 
- Equity in exchange for state infrastructure provision 
- Free equity or “free carry” (less transparent as taxes may be offset) 
                                            
 
91 The SA Mining Charter sets the “normal” target at 5% of pay-roll. 
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- Combinations of the above 
2.5.1.13 OTHER FORMS OF MINERAL REVENUES 
Some other forms of revenue from mining are: 
An upfront “bullet” payment (auction, public tender), which could be costly as the state 
will generally get more from back-loaded instruments because it invariably has a lower 
discount rate than the investor; 
Surface fees: Usually on area ($/Ha), which assist in limiting exploration and mining 
areas to economic targets and avoid the “sterilisation” (squatting) of potential mineral 
assets. They need to be set as a very low percentage of costs (increase the hurdle 
rate) in order not to sterilise potential projects (especially large marginal projects). For 
exploration a better instrument is an annual minimum work ($/ha) obligation. 
Capital gains tax on exploration “flips”: To discourage opportunistic speculators, a 
capital gains tax (CGT) could be considered for exploration licenses that are “flipped” 
before mineral production (mining license). The tax would apply to the difference 
between the flip price and total allowable exploration spend to the flip date. 
License fees: These are necessary to filter out opportunists, but need to be low enough 
to not discourage serious explorers/investors;  
2.5.1.14 FISCAL STABILITY CLAUSES 
As many have pointed out, it is important not only to focus on particular elements, but 
also on the overall tax package. In many large-scale projects in Africa, sponsors (and 
their lenders) have sought and obtained assurances that there would be no additions 
to the total tax package agreed to initially (save for minor taxes up to a specified 
amount). During the recent period of high prices and profits, where the agreed regimes 
have not earned countries commensurate shares of the higher profits generated, the 
pressure on governments to impose additional taxes in spite of such stabilisation 
clauses has proved irresistible in several instances. This reinforces the argument on 
the necessity to develop fiscal regimes that uphold equity during booms and busts in 
the mineral price cycle.  
Stability clauses facilitate the raising of capital for investment in large projects. 
However, the clauses are often unnecessarily broad and extensive. In principle, there 
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should be little need for the assurance to the investor provided by stability clauses on 
discrete tax instruments beyond the tenure of the initial loans.   
If taxes are deferred continuously, the pressures for renegotiation grow… Hence, most 
investors seek fiscal stability clauses. The perception of fiscal stability is enhanced if 
tax measures are introduced that correlate tax take closely with the rate of return, such 
as progressive profit taxes, such as a RRT. 
Fiscal preservation clauses may initially appear attractive, but over long run prove to 
be very expensive as it limits state ability to change fiscal terms in face of ‘super profits’. 
There are different forms of stability clauses such as freezing rates and the tax base 
definition and a guarantee of the investor share of economic rent. These could be 
administratively complex if applied per project. Fiscal stability clauses should only be 
used sparingly, and then only on discrete fiscal elements and only for the duration of 
the initial loans (max 7 years?). 
2.5.2 MINERAL TAXATION IN ZIMBAWE  
The Zimbabwean tax regime is fairly complex in comparison with other states in the 
region, with the exception of SA. The normal corporate tax is 25%, but there are 
numerous other direct and indirect taxes as well as fees and levies. Several tax 
instruments apply only to minerals, such as royalties, marketing fees (MMCZ92), 
Additional Profits Tax (APT: only Special Mining Leases) and surface fees (retention 
fees). See   
                                            
 
92 MMCZ: Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe 
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Table 17. 
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Table 17: Zimbabwe- Taxation  
Tax  Governing 
legislation 
Applicable to 
mining operations 
Applicable to other 
taxpayers operations 
Corporate Income 
Tax  
Income Tax Act Yes Yes 
Aids Levy  Income Tax Act No Yes 
VAT  Value Added Tax 
Act 
Yes Yes 
PAYE  Income Tax Act Yes Yes 
Capital Gains Tax  Capital Gains Tax 
Act 
Yes Yes 
Withholding Taxes  Income Tax Act Yes Yes 
Additional Profits Tax 
(APT) 
Income Tax Act Yes (only SMLs) No 
Customs Duties  Customs and Excise 
Act 
Yes Yes 
Royalties  Mines and Mineral 
Act 
Yes No 
Marketing 
Commissions 
(MMCZ)  
Mineral Marketing 
Corporation Act 
Yes No 
Source: Deloitte 2011 (from COMZ) 
There are several taxation rules where mining companies are treated differently to 
companies operating in other sectors of the economy, both positively and negatively (  
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Table 18). 
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Table 18: Zimbabwe- Sector Taxation Comparisons  
Item  Normal 
Miners  
SML 
Miners  
Petroleum 
Operators  
Farmers  Life 
Insurance  
Others  
Special rules 
for taxable 
income  
Yes – 5th  
Schedule  
Yes-22nd  
& 23rd 
Schedule  
Yes- 20th 
Schedule  
Yes – 7th 
Schedule  
Yes – 8th 
Schedule  
Yes – 4th  Schedule  
Normal Tax  25%  15%  25%  25%  25%  25%  
Aids Levy  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Additional 
Tax  
None  Yes- APT None  None  None  None  
Capital 
Allowances  
100%  100%  100%  Some at 
100% (7th 
Schedule) & 
others at SIA 
or W&T  
As per 
others  
Allowed equally over 
4y unless SME 
where it is proposed 
to be over 3y with 
50% in 1st year.  
Expiry of Tax 
losses  
No Expiry  No Expiry  6 Years  6 Years  6 Years  6 Years  
Recoupment  Full Sales 
Value  
Limited to 
Cost 
claimed  
Limited to 
Cost 
claimed  
No 
recoupment 
on 7th 
Schedule 
allowances  
Limited to 
allowances 
granted  
Limited to 
allowances granted  
Royalties 
&Statutory 
Commission  
Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  
Export 
Incentives  
No  No  No  No  No  Yes – 20% CIT for 
>50% manufactures 
exports by volume.  
Source: Deloitte 2011 
The current mineral tax system is complex and is in urgent need of overhaul. The main 
mineral fiscal revenue instruments are surface fees (area retention fees), royalties, 
CIT, withholding taxes and duties. Special Mining Leases have their own tax regime 
with a lower CIT and royalty, but with an Additional Profits Tax (APT) that varies with 
the CIT rate (current rate of 41.5% on profits above a 15% return). There are only two 
SMLs: Zimplats and Unki, both PGM miners.  
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Box: Zimbabwe- Mineral Taxes 
Standard (as of January 2011)
• Ad valorem royalty
– Diamonds  15%
– Platinum 10%
– Precious stones-10 %,
– Gold 7%  
– Other Precious metals- 4%    
– Base metals and Industrial minerals- 2% 
– Coal- 1%
– discretionary exemption
• Corporate Income Tax (CIT)
– 25% flat
– Special Initial Allowance (100% write-off of capex)
– Deductions for royalty, interest
– Expensing of exploration, stripping, shaft sinking
– Unlimited loss carry forward
– CSR payments not recognized
– Mine closure provisions not recognized
– Mine-by-mine ring fence (except for exploration)
– Presumptive tax of 2% on gold sales of ASM
• Withholding
– Dividends 20% (non-resident)
– Interest 10% (non-resident)
• VAT
– 15% input VAT payable but qualifies for deferment 
(TBC); zero-rating for exports
• Duties
– Variable rates; for certain items duty exemption 
replaced rebate system in 2011
– Export duty on semi-processed chrome ore of 20%
• Other fees and levies
– MMCZ marketing levy of 0.875% on mineral sales 
other than gold
– Area retention fees; environmental levies 
Varied for Special Mining Lease (SML)
• Contractual stabilization
• CIT
– rate of 15%
– Exploration expensed; development 
depreciated 25% per year
– Full ring fence*
• Additional Profits Tax
– Negotiable – only 2 SMLs
– 2 tier: 15% and 20% rates of return
– Rates: vary with CIT rate – at current CIT 
rate first tier APT rate is 41.5%
• Full duty exemption for 5 years
Note: The mining tax regimes would apply to the holder of a 
mining interest held by virtue of the indigenization law
Source: Adapted from COMZ 2012 
Royalties 
Mineral Royalties have been increased several times recently and are now the 
highest in the region, if not the world. Royalties are a crude and destructive tax 
instrument because they add to costs (based on value of output) and thereby raise 
the cut-off grade and consequently sterilise resources and curtail mining activity. 
However, they do have the advantage of being less susceptible to tax evasion, 
particularly transfer pricing, than taxes on the surplus produced (susceptible to over-
invoicing of costs). A regional comparison of royalty rates is presented in   
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Table 19. 
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Table 19: Mineral Royalties- Regional Comparison  
Zimbabwe  1% - 15% Diamonds 15%, 
Platinum and Precious stones-10 %, 
Gold 7%   
Other Precious metals- 4%     
Base metals and Industrial minerals- 2%  
Coal- 1%  
Angola  2% - 5% Stones and precious metals - 5% (semi-precious stones- 4%)          
Metallic minerals - 3%    
Others minerals- 2%    
Botswana  3% - 10% Precious stones- 10%,  
Semi-precious -5%,  
Other-3%  
Mozambique  3% - 10% 10% on diamonds and precious metals (Au, Ag, Pt))and 
precious stones,  
6% on semiprecious stones;  
5% on basic minerals;  
3% on coal and other mining products   
Namibia  4% - 5% Precious metals - 5%  
Base and rare metals - 5%,  
Semi-precious stones - 4%,  
Industrial minerals - 4%.  
Tanzania  2%- 
12.5% 
A 3% royalty is charged on gold and all other minerals  
5% on diamond and  
12.5% for petroleum and gas.  
Zambia  3%-5%  Precious metals and stones -5%  
Base Metals – 3%  
Source: Deloitte 2011 
In addition, the Indigenisation Law of 2007 could result in a quasi tax, depending on 
how the 51% equity is to be financed. The composite mineral tax regime is both 
onerous (by both regional and international comparisons) and inefficient in terms of 
optimising the revenue from mining, whilst still attracting investment in mining and 
growing the sector. 
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Table 20: Effective Tax Rate and Level of Profitability  
Net Profit % (excl. royalty 
payments)  
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 
Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total  Costs excluding 
Royalty 
(90) (80) (70) (60) (50) (45) (40) (35) (30) 
Royalty (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
MMCZ (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Taxable Income 2 12 22 32 42 47 52 57 62 
Normal Tax (1) (3) (6) (8) (11) (12) (13) (14) (16) 
Profit After Tax (PAT) 2 9 17 24 32 35 39 43 47 
PAT % of Revenue 2% 9% 17% 24% 32% 35% 39% 43% 47% 
Total taxes plus royalty (9) (12) (16) (20) (23) (25) (27) (29) (30) 
PAT & levies 1 8 14 20 27 30 33 36 40 
Effective Tax Rate- on Profit 
before tax (Pbt) 
25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Effective Total Tax Rate on 
adjusted Pbt 
86% 61% 53% 49% 46% 45% 45% 44% 43% 
Utilization of Revenue Earned          
Revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Spent on Costs (90) (80) (70) (60) (50) (45) (40) (35) (30) 
Paid to Government (9) (12) (16) (20) (23) (25) (27) (29) (30) 
Paid to Shareholder after 
WHT on Dividends 
(1) (8) (14) (20) (27) (30) (33) (36) (40) 
Source: Deloitte 2011 
Table 20, above, appears to indicate that the current mineral taxation regime 
inordinately prejudices marginal or low profit miners as compared to higher profitability 
operations which could lead to the sterilisation of marginal deposits, with concomitant 
loss of employment, fiscal revenues and markets for supplier industries. 
Despite the current low capacity levels and high costs of production the sector’s 
contribution to the fiscal revenue is fairly comparable to the sub-region. In SA, Zambia, 
Tanzania and Swaziland the contribution are 12.2%, 13%, 10% and 2% respectively 
(Figure 36).  
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Source: Kwesu I, 2012 (Appendix 3) 
Figure 36: Contribution to Fiscal Revenue: Regional Comparisons 
The current mineral fiscal regime is sub-optimal because it fails to balance maximising 
state revenues with encouraging investment in new exploration and mining. It tends to 
add to costs (relatively high royalties, fees, levies) thereby sterilising resources, rather 
than focussing on getting an equitable share of the surplus (profit) generated. 
However, although taxes on surpluses (including resource rents) could yield larger 
revenues to the state over the longer term through a higher rent share, through (1) 
increased new exploration and mining investments and (2) the exploitation of more ore 
(minimisation of the cut-off grades), these revenues will tend to be “back-loaded” over 
the life of the mine: i.e. they will generally come later than taxes based on revenue or 
costs, due to high start-up costs (capex) for most mineral developments (capital 
expensing provisions) and resource rent return thresholds. Yet there is a clear national 
need to increase fiscal revenues from mining in the short to medium term! 
Consequently there are two, apparently contradictory, state mineral fiscal objectives-  
1. to maximise the returns to the state from its mineral endowment (over life of 
mine) as well as  
2. to garner short-term income to ameliorate the current fiscal revenue crisis. 
However, this conundrum could be finessed through a judicious combination of tax and 
hedging instruments. 
An optimal mineral fiscal regime should minimise taxes that add to costs and maximise 
taxes on the surplus generated. 
2.5.3 FISCAL PROPOSALS: 
2.5.3.1 CIT 
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The CIT rate is within international and regional norms and the minerals sector should 
continue to pay at the national rate of 25%. 
2.5.3.2 ROYALTIES  
Royalties are generally above global norms, sterilise resource and constrain mining 
activity. Consideration should be given to reducing them to a single rate of 1% to 2% 
of sales for all minerals and compensating the fiscus through a RRT on all minerals 
(below). Over the life-of-mine, the RRT will yield much higher revenues on significantly 
greater production (lower hurdle rate) than the current royalties’ configuration. 
2.5.3.3 RESOURCE RENT TAX (RRT) 
Resource Rent Taxes (such as the SML APT) are generally considered to be the least 
distortionary of tax instruments as they do not impact on investment decisions for 
average or marginal resources (they only trigger in above a threshold return set at the 
“expected” return). Strong global mineral demand (Asian growth) has resulted in a high 
global minerals intensity of GDP and much larger resource rents (scarcity rents from 
higher prices) and this situation is expected to continue. 
The current crisis and the underlying commodities boom”, above). Zimbabwe 
accordingly needs to ensure that it captures an equitable share of these resource rents 
while they last. 
A resource rent tax of 50% on all minerals should be considered that triggers at the 
“expected” rate of return on investment (ROI). The current SML APT is overly 
complicated and open to interpretation. Instead of making the rate a function of the CIT 
rate, a simpler methodology could be to allow all other taxes (CIT, royalties, levies, 
fees) as costs before applying the RRT to the remaining free cash. Withholding taxes 
would be still applicable on dividends declared after the payment of RRT. All legitimate 
investments would be carried forward at the RRT trigger rate (threshold) creating a 
“RRT shield” that would be drawn down annually by the free cash. Once the RRT shield 
has been consumed, the investment/s would have made the threshold rate of return 
and the RRT will trigger in. Any further investments would recreate the RRT shield and 
the same procedure would be followed (a generic wording of RRT legislation is 
attached as Appendix 5). 
The RRT threshold (the expected return on investment) would vary depending on 
investor’s perception of the risk, particularly sovereign risk. Accordingly, a premium on 
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the Treasury long-bond rate could be used as this will move in tandem with the 
market’s perception of Zimbabwean investment risk. The Australian RRT uses the 
long-bond rate plus 7% which could be applied in Zimbabwe once the Treasury 
recommences issuing long bonds (10 year or greater). Until then the APT threshold 
(20%, tier 2) could be used as a provisional RRT trigger. On introduction, the RRT 
could be back-calculated over the 5 years previous to the imposition, which would 
recognise all the past investments and free cash generation (over 5 years) for 
determining the whether the past returns (RoI) have breached the RRT threshold. A 
simplified example of an RRT on a new investment of $1 billion is given in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: RRT Example for an investment of $1,000mn 
Given that most deposits embodying resource rents have most probably already 
received the threshold return, there may not in fact be a difference between the 
revenue from the current high royalties and revenue from the proposed RRT with a low 
flat royalty rate (there may be a positive immediate impact on the fiscus, even in the 
short-medium term). Consequently, ZIMRA should be resourced to undertake an 
appraisal of the likely impact and resulting revenue differential, if any. In effect, this 
proposal shifts the tax burden from marginal-average return deposits to high return 
operations and would also drop all cut-off grades (lower royalties) and stimulate 
investment in more new mines and the mining of more reserves from existing 
operations. A conceptual graph illustrating the effect of high royalties on exploitable 
resources is presented in Figure 38. In addition to the sterilisation of potential reserves 
at operating mines, it should be noted that new investment projects (mines) that fall 
between the two cut-off grades (Figure 38), would also be non-viable at the higher 
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royalty rate. Nevertheless, many states opt for high royalties because they are easier 
to administer and more difficult to avoid/subvert, despite their value destruction. 
 
Figure 38: Conceptual Impact of Royalty on Exploitable Resources 
Nevertheless, given the current dire need for state revenue, if the Zimra appraisal 
indicates a revenue short fall in the short-term (but gain in the longer term), 
consideration could be given to making a portion (say, 30%) of the projected RRT (as 
per the company’s work-plan) an advance to the fiscus at an international average 
interest rate, such as the Moody's Corporate Bond Index Rate (MOODCAAA) plus, 
say, 3%, in equal instalments over, say, the next 7 years (by which time all operations 
containing resource rents should have started contributing RRT). This is in effect 
hedging 30% of the projected RRT at MOODCAAA plus 3%. Alternatively the same 
could be done for the projected royalty over, say, 10 years, to generate royalty fiscal 
receipts immediately and RRT receipts later (10 years of royalties at 1-2% should yield 
around $200M to $400M immediately).  
Bryan Land (2008) points out that the “RRT has mostly the same information and audit 
requirements as conventional income taxation” and that “Tax leakage safeguards 
(dealing with transfer pricing, thin capitalisation, allocation of overheads, expenditure 
verification) are no different from those needed for any other kind of profits taxation.” 
Nevertheless, the scope for transfer pricing is greater than that for royalties (can also 
over-invoice costs for RRT) and consequently ZIMRA needs to be appropriately 
capacitated to minimise leakages. This could be reinforced by obligating all mining 
operations with revenue above a threshold (say, $100mn/an) to pay for a periodic (say, 
every 5 years) forensic tax audit reporting to ZIMRA. 
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3.5.3 RRT SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND (SWF) 
Although dollarisation has meant that sudden inflows from commodity price spikes will 
not result in the Dutch Disease appreciation of the local currency causing other exports 
to become uncompetitive, the other manifestations will still occur such as the sucking 
in of scarce national capital and skills into the resource boom sectors. A sudden inflow 
of dollars due a resources price spike would also fuel inflation in non-tradables 
particularly financial and professional services. Consequently, consideration could be 
given to putting RRT revenues into a SWF with three possible disbursement windows: 
1) Long-term Human and Physical Infrastructure Fund. The fiscus would draw on 
these funds for investment into long-term physical infrastructure (road/rail, power, 
telecoms) projects and human resources development, particularly the production 
of technical cadres (engineers, scientists, technicians) with investments into maths 
and science capacity at primary, secondary and tertiary education levels, to build 
the future competitiveness of the economy (contributing to inter-generational 
equity).  
2) Minerals Development Fund: This fund could finance the massive investment 
required for geological survey to acquire a better understanding of the geology and 
to uncover new exploration targets. It could also fund the development of targets 
for tender or development by the state (or sub-contractors), the development of a 
national minerals technology capacity in partnership with the private sector, and 
investments into the backward and forward mineral linkages industries in 
partnership with the private sector. Finally, it could also fund immediate redemption 
of private exploration expenditure through negotiable tax certificates, to stimulate 
the delineation and development of new mining operations; 
3) Fiscal Stabilisation Fund: A major proportion of the RRT revenues could be 
accumulated into a stabilisation fund to be drawn down by the fiscus when 
commodity prices fall below predetermined long-term projections93, protecting the 
budget from revenue shocks; This fund would, over time, become a Future Fund94 
                                            
 
93 Similar to the functional Chilean Stabilisation Fund 
94 Similar to the Norwegian “Future Fund” 
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(intergenerational equity) for the nation to draw on as mineral resources are 
depleted (finite endowment). 
When (if) a local currency is re-launched the RRT SWF should be kept offshore to 
protect the currency and the economy from the classical Dutch Disease effects 
(currency appreciation). 
2.5.3.4 MINERAL EXPORT TAXES 
Mineral export taxes are effectively a second royalty for most minerals and accordingly 
should be used with great circumspection and only be used to stimulate forward 
linkages (beneficiation) and not as a fiscal revenue instrument. A configuration that 
could minimise the negative impacts (resources sterilisation) would be to stipulate in 
all mining leases that the company must undertake a feasibility study on the next value 
addition step, five years after first production. The feasibility study should be 
undertaken by independent world-class consultants selected from a list of four, 
supplied by government. If the feasibility study indicates a real rate of return greater 
than 10% then government would reserve the right to impose an export tax of up to 
5% on all exports of the unbeneficiated product/s.  
2.5.3.5 WITHHOLDING TAXES (WHT) 
The current rates for withholding taxes on dividends are high for non-resident 
shareholders and could be reduced. However, for companies registered in tax 
havens, there will always be a strong incentive to transfer price in order to rather 
declare profits in the lower tax jurisdiction. Brazil has tackled this problem by 
imposing a 25% withholding tax on dividends to entities registered in “tax havens”, 
thereby diminishing the incentive to invest from a tax haven. Zimbabwe could explore 
efficacy of introducing a similar instrument (WHT 30%?). Withholding taxes for a 
selection of countries are presented in   
Wits MSC 
 
130  
Table 21. 
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Table 21: Withholding Taxes – Country Comparisons 
 Country WHT on 
Contracts 
WHT on 
Royalties 
WHT on 
interest 
WHT on dividends WHT on 
remittances 
WHT on 
fees 
Zimbabwe  10% 15% 15% 15% & 20%(NR) 15% 15% 
Angola  5.25% 10% 15% 10% 5.25% or 
3.5% 
5.25% 
Australia  46.50% 0%, 30%  10% 30% 30% N/A 
Botswana  3% 15% 15% 7.50% N/A 15% 
Canada  N/A 25% 25%(RP) 25% 25% 25% 
Chile  35% 30% 35% 35% 35% 35% 
Ghana  5% 10% 8% 8% 15% 10% 
Mozambique  20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Namibia  N/A 10.50% 10% 10% N/A N/A 
South Africa  N/A 12% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tanzania  2% 15% 10% 5% & 10% N/A 5% 
Zambia  15% 15% 15% 0% 15% 15% 
Source: Deloitte 2012, from COMZ 
2.5.3.6 RETENTION FEES 
Retention fees also add to costs (>cut-off grade) and would appear to be obsolete once 
all licenses/leases are time-bound (tenure) with minimum work (exploration) or 
production (mining) targets (minimum requirements to retain the license/lease). 
Consequently consideration should be given to scrapping them in the new Act. 
2.5.3.7 HRD (R&D) LEVY 
The Zimdef levy is currently 1% of payroll. Given the seminal importance of building 
technical skills to the establishment of the critical resources upstream and downstream 
linkages industries, consideration should be given to a Mining Lease condition of a  
≥5% of pay-roll corporate spend on knowledge development (HRD and R&D), in 
addition to the Zimdef levy, and the creation of a dedicated Minerals Sector Knowledge 
Fund, in partnership with the industry. The Fund could also finance the development 
of mineral technologies (R&D) together with the private sector, which, from 
international experience, are critical to using the mineral industrial linkages sectors 
(back/forward) to catalyse industrialisation. Current expenditure by mining companies 
on local HRD and R&D could be funded by the putative Knowledge Fund, meaning 
that responsible companies that are already spending around 5% of pay-roll on local 
skilling and technology would not be impacted. 
2.5.3.8 MARKETING LEVY 
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The current MMCZ marketing levy of 0.875% should be reviewed to ensure that it is 
cost reflective using international mineral trading commissions as benchmarks. Gold 
sales to the Reserve Bank should be reintroduced through resolving the outstanding 
debt issues, and the state gold refinery (Fidelity) should be reactivated. 
2.5.3.9 TRANSFER PRICING 
Mining companies generally have more scope to transfer price because their products 
are mainly exported and often a large proportion of their inputs are imported. This is 
more the case for foreign mining companies with operations in numerous countries 
where it becomes extremely difficult to determine if a supplier or purchaser is a related 
or associated party. Foreign companies domiciled in tax havens (or lower tax 
jurisdictions) will always have a strong incentive to transfer price (move profits to the 
lower tax jurisdiction) in order to maximise returns to shareholders. In addition, they 
are generally much better resourced to disguise transfer pricing than the revenue 
authority (Zimra) is to uncover it. A schematic of the effects of transfer pricing is 
presented in Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39: Transfer Pricing- the export of profits 
However, this is also a challenge faced by OECD countries and in this regard 
Zimbabwe should seek assistance from well-resourced revenue authorities. In 
addition, consideration should be given to introducing a “Forensic Tax Self-Audit” 
under which the mining company would fund a 5-yearly audit by a reputable auditing 
company, selected from a list of four supplied by Zimra, and the audit would report to 
Zimra. The audit ToR would focus on transfer pricing (over and under invoicing) and 
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the generic ToR template should be agreed upon between government and the 
industry (COMZ) as both are ostensibly opposed to transfer pricing. 
However, given the corporate costs (both external and internal) of such an obligation, 
it could be restricted to the larger operations with a turnover of, say, greater than $100 
million. Also, given that the scope and incentive for transfer pricing is much greater for 
foreign companies, consideration could be given to making it applicable to them only. 
2.5.3.10 INDIGENISATION AND FDI 
The 51% indigenisation target under “Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act” 
of 2007 could be considered as a “quasi tax”, depending on how the equity is funded, 
especially if it is configured as a free-carry or as a “vendor loan” to be serviced by the 
future dividend streams. Reports appear to indicate that 10% will be earmarked for a 
community equity holding and a further 10% for an employee shareholder scheme. 
The Zimbabwean government needs to decide whether or not it wants FDI in the 
minerals sector. There are several successful erstwhile resources-based states that 
reserved mineral resources development for nationals or the state at some point in 
their development (e.g. Finland, Sweden, China). However, the advantage of FDI is 
that it brings in much-needed capital, technology and skills to rapidly realise mineral 
potential, rather than depending on the much slower development by cash-strapped 
national capital. The disadvantage of FDI is that foreign investors are generally less 
likely to maximise the crucial economic linkages, due to their global perspective, than 
would be the case for national capital. 
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Source: Author 
Figure 40: The Minerals FDI Trade-off 
Figure 40: “The Minerals FDI Trade-off”, outlines some of the key issues in the FDI 
versus development (linkages) question. However, it could be possible to balance the 
two strategies through putting in place the requisite regulatory instruments (e.g. a 
resource rent tax) and licence/lease conditions (e.g. back/forward value addition 
milestones) and building the necessary state capacity to effectively implement them: 
i.e. “riding the tiger”! 
The 51% indigenous equity target as it stands will be a major deterrent to FDI. “Except 
for very lucrative known deposits, it also seems unlikely that new greenfield 
investments or major expansions [will] take place”95.  It could in effect limit FDI to very 
rich deposits only, but it is often the less attractive deposits with complex 
geology/mineralogy or metallurgy that FDI might realise with its access to global skills 
and technology. Government appears to be split over the issue96 and it is also opposed 
                                            
 
95 McMahon 2012, p18 
96 Supported by ZANU PF and opposed in its current form by MDC 
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by the union confederation (ZCTU97), who claim that it “will only enrich the elite aligned 
with President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party”98. 
 
Figure 41: Impact of indigenisation risk on mineable reserves 
Consequently, government needs to come to an agreement on whether or not it wants 
to use FDI to develop the nation’s mineral assets and, if it does, then it needs to 
develop a clear policy for governing FDI, given the drawbacks (Figure 40: The Minerals 
FDI Trade-off) in order to maximise the advantages (capital, skills, technology) and 
minimise the disadvantages (low linkages realisation). Many states have effectively 
used FDI, such as Norway in hydrocarbons, where they managed to make the linkages 
despite the use of FDI, through good governance of the oil trans-nationals. 
If Zimbabwe goes the route of encouraging FDI combined with a mineral regime that 
ensures the realisation of the seminal linkages (“riding the tiger”) then it needs to 
reassess its indigenisation policy, which is currently a major constraint to attracting 
FDI, especially into lower return mineral projects (often more complex deposits), due 
to (a) the lack of certainty around the policy and (b) the ultimate quantum (51%). An 
indigenisation configuration that might finesse this could be to set the 10 year target at 
25% and the 25 year target (i.e. on any Mining Lease renewal 99 ) at 51%. This 
                                            
 
97 ZCTU: Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.  
98 VOA 19 Oct 2010, www.voazimbabwe.com 
99 Assuming Mining Leases are limited to 25 years or less (life of mine) as per the 
proposed amendments to the MMA. 
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configuration would likely only have a marginal negative impact on attracting FDI into 
new mining projects, but would still ultimately “indigenise” the sector. 
2.5.3.11 INSTRUMENTS TO MAXIMISE THE FISCAL LINKAGES  
Summary of Fiscal Proposals: 
Fiscal Instrument Current Proposed  
CIT  25% (SMLs 15%)  25% (all)  RI  
Royalties  1% - 15% (by mineral)  1-2% (all)  RI  
RRT (APT)  0% (SMLs only-42.5%)  50%; ROI > 20% (all)  RI  
RRT advance  0%  30% @ MOODCAAA plus X%?  RI  
Mineral Export Tax 0% 1-5% (if VA shown to be viable)  
Marketing  0.875% (ex gold)  0,875%  (ex gold)  SI  
Fiscal Stabilisation Fund  0  30% of RRT (locked offshore 
fund)  
SI  
National HRD levy  1% of payroll (Zimdef)  1% of payroll (Zimdef)  SI  
Minerals HRD/R&D spend  0%  5% of payroll  SI  
Withholding Tax (foreign)  20%  15%  SI  
Withholding Tax (local)  10%  10%  SI  
Withholding tax – tax 
havens  
20%  30%  SI  
Retention Fees  Variable, high: $/claim  0  SI  
Forensic Tax Self-Audit  none  5 yearly (Mine revenue > 
$200mn,  
financed by Mine, under 
ZIMRA)  
SI  
Expl. License transfer 
CGT  
0%  50%  SI  
Indigenisation  51% by year 5?  25% by year 10; 51% by year 
25  
SI  
Notes: VA: Value Addition; RI: Revenue Instrument; SI: Strategy Instrument  
2.6 BACKWARD LINKAGES: MAXIMISING THE DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT 
2.6.1 INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE 
Of all the mineral resources economic linkages opportunities, the backward linkages 
potential most probably represents the most important as well as the most difficult to 
realise. The mineral inputs (purchases) sector is dominated by capital goods (vehicles, 
rolling stock, plant, machinery, etc.), services (technological, engineering, analytical, 
financial, labour, etc...) and consumables (explosives, fuels, wear parts & spares, 
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grinding media, reagents, etc.). In general, the backward linkages are knowledge 
intensive (engineering) which take time to build, but they are also the most “agile” in 
that international experience has shown that many enterprises that started out in the 
resources inputs sector were able to reinvent themselves in other sectors, due to being 
“engineer-intensive”. Consequently, as a cluster, it is able to reduce dependence on 
exhaustible resources and form the nuclei of resource-independent industrialisation 
and job creation.  
There are numerous factors impacting on the growth, competitiveness and 
sustainability of the upstream cluster including: “access to engineering and technical 
skills, access to skilled artisans, access to government incentives and finance for R&D 
for ‘home-grown’ firms, awareness of projects and business opportunities, lack of 
adequate business training and management, certification, high cost of imports, lack 
of resources to identify assistance programmes, lack of understanding of BEE, 
preferential relationships in the procurement process, and threat of inferior imports”100. 
However, experience from states that managed to make the transition from resource-
based economies to industrialised economies with full employment (e.g. the Nordic 
states), strongly suggests that the most important instruments that facilitate the growth 
of the backward linkages industries are: 
• HRD- production of engineers, scientists and technicians 
• R&D- technology development, both state and private 
• Access to capital  
                                            
 
100 Walker M, 2005: “Unpacking the Nature of Demand and Supply Relationships in 
the Mining Capital Goods and Services Cluster: The Case of PGMs”, Corporate 
Strategy and Industrial Development (CSID) Research Programme, School of 
Economics and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand 
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Figure 42: Finland- Mineral Inputs & Outputs Sector 2007 
In 2011 The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) completed a major 
study101 on the broader economic impact of their minerals sector and showed a 6:1 
employment generation in other upstream and downstream industries, due to their 
well-developed mineral linkages (Figure 42 and   
                                            
 
101 Hernesniemi, H, Berg, B, Rantala, O & Suni P: Kalliosta Kullaksikummusta 
Klusteriksi: Suomen mineraaliklusterin vaikuttavuusselvitys, ETLA 2011 
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Table 22). The Finnish mineral technology cluster employed as many people abroad 
as in Finland. 
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Table 22: Finland: Mineral cluster size ratios   
2009/2010 Mining 
opera-
tions 
Services 
Mining 
industry 
Natural 
Stone 
Industry 
Stone 
material 
industry 
Mineral-
technology 
companies 
Mineral 
Cluster in 
Finland 
Mineral-
technology 
companies 
abroad 
Mineral 
Cluster 
Total 
Companies 25 36 306 294 104 765 ..  
Locations 27 58 347 365 122 919 ..  
Net sales, €mn 27 768* 212 492 1 115 2 614 2 447*** 5 062 
Employment  
TOTAL 
368 3 725* 2 291 2 660 7 177 16 222 16 248 32 469 
Company staff 202 2 044* 1 627 1 742 4 727 10 342 10 702*** 21 043 
Input Industries 
personnel **** 
166 1 682 664 918 2 450 5 880 5 546 11 426 
Industry products 
Exports €mn ** 
 141 70 20 1 064 1 295 ..  
Industry products 
Imports, €mn ** 
 1 806 14 16 434 2 270 ..  
Industry imports, 
€mn** 
 50 30  80   
Overall impact on 
employment **** 
504 7 135 2 750 3 486 11 014 24 889 24 935 49 824 
Effects of the 
total output **** 
48 1 444 363 802 1 851 4 508 4 063 8 571 
* ETLA: An assessment of companies since 2010, National Board of Customs ** 2010, *** Business and the National 
Board of Patents and Registration, data for 2009 and **** ETLA calculated using information from an intermediate 
product purchases and input -output model multiplier effects. 
Source: Hernesniemi, H, Berg, B, Rantala, O & Suni P: Kalliosta Kullaksikummusta Klusteriksi: 
Suomen mineraaliklusterin vaikuttavuusselvitys, ETLA 2011. Table 10 (rough translation).  
The Asian boom has given a second wind to Finnish mining, which had been in decline 
at earlier prices and cut-off grades. However, due to their well-developed mineral 
linkage industries, ETLA estimates total projected employment at more than 3 times 
the mining jobs, excluding foreign jobs (Table 22). 
There have been several similar linkages studies done for the minerals sector in both 
South America and southern Africa. A recent (2009) study of the South African PGM102 
sector developed the backward linkages which are generic to most minerals (Figure 
43). 
                                            
 
102 PGM: Platinum Group Metals 
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Figure 43: South Africa- PGM Linkages 
 
Source: Lydall, 2010. Cited in AU 2011 “Minerals and Africa’s Development” p103103 
The EPCM104 firms are critical to optimising the initial (capex) linkages, which also 
impact on the potential ongoing (opex) linkages in terms of the technologies and 
processes selected. In addition, the Mozal (BHPB) linkages programme has indicated 
that the configuration of local sub-contracts is important to the success of developing 
local suppliers. A survey of mining supplier firms in Ekurhuleni (Gauteng, SA) indicated 
that the elevated price of steel (AMSA105: IPP pricing) was a major constraint to the 
growth of the cluster, as steel represented 30%-50% of their material costs. The 
mooted rehab of ZISCO by ESSAR needs to provide steel to this cluster at competitive 
prices (EPPs106). This should be built into any government contracts (leases) for critical 
feedstock suppliers. 
The upstream cluster tends to be knowledge (engineer) intensive, especially the 
provision of capital goods (plant, equipment and machinery) and its after-market 
                                            
 
103 African Union 2011, “Minerals and Africa’s Development”, AU/UNECA, Addis 
Ababa 
104 EPCM:  Engineering, Procurement, Construction Management 
105 AMSA: Arcelor-Mittal South Africa 
106 EPP: Export Parity Price 
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(spares), Figure 44. Consequently its development requires the concurrent 
development of technical skills (engineers, scientists, technicians). 
 
Source: Jourdan 2008 
Figure 44: Mining Pipeline Inputs: Capital goods and services 
Unlike other countries in the SADC region, Zimbabwe had a developed mining inputs 
manufacturing sector, before the meltdown, supplying a wide range of mining capital 
goods, consumables and services. This is fast coming back due the booming minerals 
sector, but a significant proportion must however still be imported, particularly heavy 
equipment (capital goods). The major constraints facing the backward linkages sector 
appear to be: 
- Reliable power supply (especially to foundries) 
- Access to capital 
- Skills 
- Import tariffs for feedstocks 
- Availability of scrap 
- Market size and access 
2.6.2 ECONOMIES OF SCALE:  
Although the Zimbabwean minerals sector constitutes a growing and significant large 
market for mineral inputs industries (backward linkages), the southern African region 
(SADC) has a rapidly growing minerals inputs market and significant future mineral 
potential. The viability of establishing supplier industries in Zimbabwe and elsewhere 
in the region would be substantially enhanced by (the accession of Zimbabwe some 
other SADC states the SACU, with a review of the current agreement to facilitate 
investments in new capacity (products and services), distributed equitably across the 
region. In this regard a special facility to promote investment in the sub-continent 
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should be investigated, possibly through a “regional development fund” funded through 
a proportion of the resource rents and donors, to invest in long-term human & physical 
infrastructure. A larger market could also facilitate competitive pricing of mineral-based 
intermediate products (and manufacturing jobs) as the small size and relative isolation 
(land-locked) of Zimbabwe will inevitably lead to monopoly pricing in certain sectors 
which could be overcome by increasing regional economic integration and competitive 
pricing within southern Africa (SADC).  
2.6.3 INSTRUMENTS TO GROW THE UPSTREAM (BACKWARD) 
LINKAGES:  
Mineral concession contracts (licenses/leases) should include clear milestones on 
local value addition in order to maximise the upstream linkages, failing which the 
concession/lease could be suspended and ultimately forfeited and re-concessioned. 
All HRD and technology development related to the exploitation of the mineral asset 
must be done in-country, where feasible, in order to facilitate further growth of the 
upstream cluster and related sectors. Investments in new upstream (supplier) 
industries, particularly mineral capital goods and R&D facilities, should form part of the 
evaluation matrix for all competitively concessioned mineral assets. In this regard the 
following interventions could be investigated: 
1. Resolution of the power constraint through rehab of existing capacity, fast-tracking 
of expansion projects, new projects and imports, expand access through the SAPP; 
2. Amend the MMA107 to include upstream value addition (backward linkages: local 
content) as a clear objective of the Act and strengthen the Minister’s power to 
include such conditions in the mining concession/lease. This could be done through 
the development of clear local content milestones (5, 10, 15 year targets) for all 
mining concession contracts (leases) in order to maximise local value addition. The 
concession contract (lease) should make it clear that failure to achieve the asset 
owner’s targets could result in a suspension of the contract and that, after a 
rectification period, the asset will be re-concessioned (auctioned against 
developmental criteria). Once a new MMA is in place all current licenses should be 
                                            
 
107 MMA: Mines and Minerals Act 
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revisited to include such local content milestones (and the new Act should cater for 
this); 
3. Make local content commitments a bid variable with significant weighting for all new 
competitively tendered mineral concessions (auctions); 
4. Consideration could be given to expanding the Indigenisation Law to include 
competitive purchases from indigenous suppliers 108 , based on indigenous 
proportion of local value added in the goods or services supplied, rather than the 
total value of the goods or services, to facilitate backward linkages; 
5. Task the Ministries of Industry and Commerce, of Economic Planning and 
Investment Promotion, of Mines and Mining Development and of Science and 
Technology with developing and implementing comprehensive industrial sub-
sectoral strategies to grow the mineral upstream sectors (capital goods, services, 
consumables) including the use of instruments such as import tariffs, investment 
incentives, innovation stimuli, market access, access to finance, competitive 
feedstocks, etc. 
6. Task the ZMDC with developing appropriate local mining capital goods, with the 
private sector and technology institutions, to overcome the technological 
challenges of the minerals sector and to improve health and safety of workers. 
PPPs in the sector could be explored. 
7. Establish a Minerals Sector Knowledge Fund in partnership with the industry, 
through an obligatory spend of 5% of payroll on local HRD and R&D, to rebuild 
backward linkages technology development capacity. 
2.7 FORWARD LINKAGES: MAXIMISING THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT 
2.7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of the locational advantage (CIF-FOB) of producing crude resources to 
establish resource processing industries (beneficiation) that could provide the 
feedstocks for manufacturing and industrialisation. In this regard the resource 
contracts/leases need to provide incentives/disincentives for mineral resources 
downstream beneficiation. The first steps of beneficiation are often energy intensive 
                                            
 
108 The South African BEE supplier experience could be useful in this regard. 
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(smelting) which is currently constrained by Zimbabwe’s power shortages. 
Consideration should be given to importing low cost and sustainable hydro-power 
(HEP) from other SADC states, which have enormous potential (estimated at 200GW). 
These could be ring-fenced imports, thereby placing the supply risk with the 
beneficiation (mining/smelting) companies, as is the case with the existing Zimplats 
deal with HCB (Cabora Bassa). Expansion of power access through the SAPP, 
specifically to support the beneficiation process should be prioritised. 
 
2.7.2 MINERAL FEEDSTOCKS  
Value addition of minerals (forward linkages) can be tackled from a supply-side or a 
demand-side methodology. The former starts with what mineral resources the nation 
has and then develops strategies for their beneficiation109, whilst the latter identifies 
what mineral inputs the economy needs for rapid job creation and then develops 
strategies for the cost-effective supply of those mineral inputs. 
                                            
 
109 This generally appears to be the SA approach in “A Beneficiation Strategy For 
The Minerals Industry Of South Africa”, DMR 2011 
Box: The Need for State Intervention on Beneficiation 
One of the southern African beneficiation enigmas is manganese in South 
Africa where two-thirds of this high-grade resource is exported as crude ore, 
despite the next step (smelting to produce manganese ferro-alloys) being 
electricity intensive and South Africa having had low electricity prices over the 
last 30 years. However, the manganese export ore price was controlled by a 
global oligopoly of four companies which resulted in monopoly ore prices and 
very high returns for mining. Any downstream investments in capital intensive 
smelting would consequently have yielded lower returns on capital than selling 
ore at monopoly prices. In this way one distortion (monopoly pricing) led to 
another (lack of beneficiation) and this would be a good example of the 
necessity for state intervention to effect a correction, through, for example, by 
applying a correcting export tax on manganese ore exports, a resource rent tax 
on the excess profits or using state infrastructure tariffs.  
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Given the overriding importance of creating jobs in Zimbabwe, the latter (domestic 
demand driven) methodology is used here, except for minerals with potential “producer 
power” (where southern Africa has a large share of global resources combined with 
relatively low global supply and demand elasticities).  
Table 23: The Principal Mineral-Based Feedstocks into the Economy - Strategic 
Minerals demand sectors 
Manufacturing:  Steel, polymers (from coal, HC110s), base metals 
Energy (electricity):  Coal, radioactive minerals, natural gas (and CBM, shale gas), 
limestone (emissions) 
Infrastructure:  Steel, copper, cement (from limestone, gypsum, coal) 
Agriculture:  Nitrogen (from coal, gas), phosphate, potassium, conditioners (e.g. 
limestone, dolomite, sulphides) 
Producer power: Finally, where Zimbabwe has potential producer power, there could 
be increased downstream (beneficiation) potential: e.g. PGMs 
The Principal Mineral-Based Feedstocks into the Economy are presented in Table 23. 
2.7.2.1 MINERALS FOR MANUFACTURING 
The manufacturing sector has the greatest potential for rapid job creation and the most 
important mineral-based inputs are steel (from iron ore and coking coal), polymers 
(from coal or CBM) and base metals (Cu, Zn, Pb, Ni, etc.). Globally steel and polymers 
are by far and away the most important feedstocks into manufacturing at about 1.4Gtpa 
and 0.4 Gtpa respectively, compared to less than 0.2 Gtpa for all other metals 
combined. 
2.7.2.1.1 STEEL 
By volume the global consumption of steel alone is around 10 times that of all other 
metals combined! By value it is more than double all other metals combined, including 
precious metals (Figure 45). 
                                            
 
110 HCs: Hydrocarbons 
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Figure 45: Global Materials Market 
Steel: The main cost drivers of steel production are: 
- Iron ore and scrap 
- Reductants (coking coal, coal or gas) 
- Energy (electricity) 
- Capital 
The table below (  
Steel 
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Table 24) gives costs for a typical blast furnace (BOF) steel plant using coking coal: 
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Table 24: Typical Costs for Steel Production, 2010 
Item $/unit Factor  Unit Unit cost 
$ 
Fixed 
Costs  
Variable 
Costs  
Total 
Costs 
%  ∑ Zim 
Iron ore  1.435  t 62  88.97  88.97 23%   +++ 
ore transport  1.435  t 20  28.7  28.7 8%  31% +++ 
Coking coal  0.519  t 128.5  66.69  66.69 18%   +++ 
C transport  0.519  t 19.5  10.12  10.12 3%  21% ++ 
Steel scrap  0.162  t 325  52.65  52.65 14%   ~ 
Scrap delivery  0.162  t 5  0.81  0.81 0%  14% ~ 
Oxygen  80  m3 0.08  6.40  6.40 2%   + 
Ferroalloys  0.014  t 1400  19.60  19.60 5%   +++ 
Fluxes  0.521  t 30  15.63  15.63 4%  9% ++ 
Refractories  0.011  t 600  6.60  6.60 2%   ++ 
Other costs  1   13 3.25  9.75  13 3%   ~ 
By-products     -20.00  -20 -5%   ~ 
Thermal energy,  -2.68  GJ 12.50  -33.50  -33.5 -9%   ~ 
Electricity  0.122  MWh 150 2.75  15.56  18.3 5%  -4% ++ 
Labour  0.64  m-h 35 5.6  16.8  22.4 6%   + 
Depreciation     40.00   40.00 11%   ~ 
Interest     44.00   44.00 12%  23% -  
Total     95.6  284.78  380.37 100%   ++ 
Source: derived from steelonthenet.com 
The last column attempts to give Zimbabwe’s relative global position. For most items 
Zimbabwe is in a relatively very strong position (+++) or strong position (++) due to 
having the requisite mineral resources (ore, coal, fluxes, alloys, etc.). Only on the cost 
of capital (interest) is Zimbabwe in a negative position, due to higher interest rates than 
most competitors (though an export plant would presumably be able to borrow at off-
shore USD rates). However, on cost of transport of products to the global market, 
Zimbabwe would be in a negative position, though not for the regional (SADC) market. 
Nevertheless, overall, this would appear to indicate that steel could be produced very 
competitively in Zimbabwe for the domestic and SADC markets, and possibly the world 
market (Table 24). 
However, steel is supplied into the domestic market at high imported prices. 
Recognising the seminal importance of low-cost manufacturing feedstocks, several 
developmental states established state utilities to supply low-cost (or cost-plus) steel 
into their manufacturing sector and thereby underpin their international 
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competitiveness. Examples are POSCO in S.Korea 111 , Japan Iron & Steel 
Company112, CSC (Taiwan), Rautaruukki (Finland), NJA113-SSAB (Sweden) and Bao 
Steel in China.  
The Mwanesi iron ore deposit could provide the resources not only for a world class 
steel plant, but also for a low logistics corridor to the global Market. Mining is one of 
the few economic activities that could have strong spatial (infrastructure) links to both 
its immediate surroundings and the local, provincial, national and regional economies, 
if appropriately configured. What is special about minerals is that they require a diverse 
set of infrastructure to support them (transport, power, water, etc.). An important aspect 
of mineral development impact arises from the fact that the spatial linkages that it 
creates first with its immediate surroundings and then with the broader economy, tend 
to be strong. Like most minerals economies, the spatial linkages that the minerals 
industry has created in Zimbabwe traverse the infrastructural spectrum. Through its 
demand for transportation, energy, water, and social infrastructure for the workers who 
work in the mines, the industry has had an impact on Zimbabwe’s economy that dates 
back from the BSAC invasion in 1890.  
Mining activities always require a significant investments in infrastructure before the 
actual mining takes place especially in a context where deposits to be mined are 
located in remote areas lacking infrastructure. It is for this reason that minerals are 
usually regarded as a catalyst of development in as far as it can provide the basic 
infrastructure (road, ports ,rail, power and water) that can open up previously isolated 
areas or enhance existing areas of low economic activity. Zimbabwe has a history of 
infrastructural development that has greatly been influenced by the mining industry. 
                                            
 
111 POSCO: The Pohang Iron and Steel Company; “With the strong Korean 
shipbuilding and automobile industry dependent on POSCO for steel, it has been 
seen as the bedrock of Korea's industrial development over the past 40 years.” 
(www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/POSCO). 
112 In 1934 the Japanese government merged The Imperial Works at Yawata with six 
leading private steelmakers--Wanishi, Kamaishi, Fuji, Kyushu, Toyo, and Mitsubishi & 
mdashø to form the Japan Iron & Steel Company, Ltd., which was about 80% owned 
by the government. (http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Nippon-
Steel-Corporation-Company-History.html). 
113 Norrbottens Järnverk- merged into SSAB, privatised 1989 
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This can play an important role in opening up regions for other economic activities with 
the objective of creating sustainable local economies, post mineral depletion. 
2.7.2.1.2 POLYMERS 
Polymers (plastics) are the second most important global feedstock into manufacturing 
at around 400Mtpa. The Zimbabwean plastics industry is still nascent but has the 
potential to grow provided that it can source competitively priced feedstocks and have 
cost-effective logistics to markets 
Recognising the seminal importance of low-cost manufacturing feedstocks, several 
developing states established state utilities (refineries or oil companies) to supply low-
cost (or cost-plus) polymer feedstocks into their manufacturing sector and thereby 
underpin their international competitiveness. Examples are CPDC (polymers) in 
Taiwan114, Petronas in Malyasia, Sasol in SA and Petrobras in Brazil. Brazil has had a 
“Plastic Export Plan” since 2002 and the converter sector currently employs around 
300k workers. This would equate to about 20k workers in Zimbabwe with ~6% of the 
Brazilian population, but a much lower GDP/capita.  
Electricity sales to the mining sector averaged about 1,500GWh/an for the period 1995 
to 2006 then dropped below 1000GWh due the crisis and supply constraints. 
Local polymer production could be based on coal gasification or CBM. Government 
needs to investigate the viability of establishing a world-scale facility based on these 
resources and attracting an investor or a JV partner with the requisite technologies and 
capital. 
2.7.2.1.3 BASE METALS 
The most important base metals feedstock into manufacturing (and infrastructure) is 
copper. Zimbabwe has very limited primary copper resources and modest copper 
                                            
 
114 CPDC: China Petrochemical Development Corporation:  Owned by the KMT, its 
principal activity is refining petroleum and petrochem production: chloral-alkali, 
phosphoric acid and other related chemicals and derivative products. Other activities 
include researching and developing chemical related products; trading, handling and 
selling garment, accessory, electric, book, stationery, automobile and household 
products, entertainment facilities; designing and selling computer software, handling 
information registration. (www.corporateinformation.com)  
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associated with the PGM and nickel resources. Copper is mainly consumed in the 
electrical, construction, transport and capital goods sectors. Most copper alloy (brass) 
is generally obtained from scrap. 
Copper was produced by MCM (mined out), BNC (scheduled to restart) and the 
Empress BMR115 operates on imported feed. It is currently extracted by the PGM 
miners as a by-product, but it leaves the country as a concentrate or matte to be refined 
in South Africa, despite the existence of several BMRs, including the BNC and the 
Zimplats BHP-Utah Selous BMR (on care and maintenance). 
Government needs to commission an independent investigation on options for a BMR 
based on the PGM miner’s feed followed by a PMR116 to produce PGMs and gold. Both 
primary copper and scrap needs to be made available in the domestic market at 
competitive prices (EPP).  
2.7.2.2 MINERALS FOR ENERGY 
Adequate, reliable and low-cost energy is critical to the development of Zimbabwe, 
particularly the mineral forward linkage industries (beneficiation). The main minerals 
used in power generation are: 
2.7.2.2.1 COAL 
Coal is an important energy feedstock in Zimbabwe at nearly two-thirds of electricity 
supply capacity. The major power supply sources are the Hwange coal-fired thermal 
power station (920 MW capacity), and the Kariba South Bank hydro power station (750 
MW capacity). There are also 3 minor coal fired stations with a combined capacity of 
290 MW. Overall installed generation capacity is about 1960 MW but available capacity 
is about 1100 MW. 
The Hwange thermal power plant presently produces between 400-550MW of power 
out of its 920 MW capacity due to regular failures of components in both the generation 
blocks as well as common auxiliary facilities and lack of spares for maintenance. 
Current national peak demand is estimated at between 1800 and 2100 MW resulting 
in power supply shortfalls of between 700 and 900 MW This situation has given rise to 
                                            
 
115 BMR: Base Metals Refinery 
116 PMR: Precious Metals Refinery 
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the ongoing power curtailment exercise whereby between 400 - 600 MW of national 
load is shed despite imports of about 300 MW.  
Hwange Power Station (HPS) consumes over 2Mtpa tons of coal per annum. Hatch 
has completed a feasibility study for the HPS and Kariba Power Station extensions and 
technical bids are being sent out to pre-qualified contractors for appointment 
of successful contractors.117 
Zimbabwe has been experiencing debilitating power shortages and the generation 
capacity needs to be substantially expanded to cater for national energy requirements 
and job creation, including IPPs 118  such as the proposed Sengwa power station 
(RioZim). Coal resources need to be prioritised for this need.  
“We envisage Zimbabwe's net power consumption increasing by an annual average of 
8.7% over our 10- year forecast period, from an estimated 12.64TWh in 2011 to 
28.70TWh by 2021. Underlying the rise in energy consumption will be a steady 
increase in GDP, together with the continued expansion of Zimbabwe's population. 
Following an increase in 2011 real GDP of 9.3%, BMI forecasts average annual growth 
of 7.2% between 2011 and 2021. Meanwhile, the population is expected to rise from 
12.8mn in 2011 to 14.3mn in 2016, increasing to 15.8mn in 2021.”119 
2.7.2.2.2 GAS 
Zimbabwe’s CBM and shale gas resources need to be assessed for possible power 
generation plants (CCGT) to diversify the energy mix and to meet projected demand 
and the putative Lupane CCGT120 power station should be expedited as should an 
investigation on the viability of producing gas-based chemicals and fertilisers. 
2.7.2.3 MINERALS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
Zimbabwe used to probably have the best physical infrastructure in the whole of Africa 
outside of South Africa. It had an excellent paved and unpaved road network covering 
most of the country and all of the main mining areas. The railway network is well 
                                            
 
117 ZESA website 2012 
118 IPP: Independent Power Producer 
119 Business Monitor International (BMI) 2012, Zimbabwe Power Report Q3 2012, 
www.researchandmarkets.com 
120 CCGT: Combined Cycle Gas Turbine 
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developed and most major mines are linked by rail, but over the last two decades the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) failed to maintain the system and handle the 
rail traffic, particularly the domestic distribution of coal.  
Before 1976 most mineral exports were via the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo, 
particularly the latter, but in March 1976 the Mozambican government closed these 
two routes in compliance with the then UN sanctions against the rebel settler regime 
and all mineral trade was routed through South African ports. After independence in 
1980 minerals once again started flowing through the Mozambican routes but by 1984 
these were once again effectively closed due to sabotage by the South African special 
forces and/or their surrogate, Renamo. They were reopened through the intervention 
of Zimbabwean troops in the second half of the eighties, but unfortunately the port of 
Beira's ability to handle bulk mineral cargo is limited, both in terms of the port's handling 
facilities and the limited tonnage of vessels that can enter the port. Maputo (Matola) is 
more suited for mineral exports, but the virtual collapse of NRZ has resulted in most 
mineral exports being trucked to South Africa. They future of bulk mineral development 
for export (e.g. iron ore and coal) will critically depend on establishing heavy haul rail 
corridors to the closest coast (Mozambique) that could have a much wider impact on 
the national economy (SDI), by significantly lowering the logistics cost for all products, 
possibly to as low as $6/t, from the centre of the country. 
The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) has an electricity grid over most of 
the country including all of the major mines, but has it has been vandalised by thieves 
(for copper and aluminium. ZESA has failed to maintain generating capacity resulting 
in regular power outages, but tenders have reportedly closed for the construction of 
the new generation capacity at Kariba South Power Station and Sino Hydro is 
apparently the only bidder for the project. The Hwange power station will also be 
expanded by 600MW. These development projects will add 900MW to Zimbabwe’s 
capacity by 2016. In addition ZESA is planning a 350MW gas-fired station based on 
CBM (Coal Bed Methane) and a tender for the quantification the Lupane CBM gas has 
reportedly gone out. It also plans to invest in a 30MW hydropower plant at Gairezi and 
in $500 million transmission integration project. ZESA’s main constraint is in raising 
capital for its $2 billion new build, given that the state is virtually bankrupt with a 
reported $10 billion sovereign debt burden. 
The Cabora Bassa (HEP) power station in Mozambique, is linked to the Zimababwean 
grid at Bindura and several mines have direct supply from HCB (Hidroelectrica Cabora 
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Bassa). ZESA imports from HCB are set to resume with the reduction of the HCB debt 
from $150 million to $3 million and power imports are set to increase from the current 
50MW to 350MW. In addition, the new coal projects in Tete Province will reportedly 
also produce 1-2GW of thermal power from the lower grade overburden coal, which 
could be available to Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe and Zambia are also working on a joint 1 650MW Batoka Gorge project 
below Vic Falls which is set for completion in 2019 after Zimbabwe agreed to clear its 
$71 million legacy debt with Zambia by end of March 2014. 
Currently there is a generation capacity shortfall of 750MW, which will reportedly be 
reduced to 480MW in 2013 and 445MW in 2014 after new projects are come on 
stream. The average national power production is about 1400MW against demand of 
around 2200MW. The shortfall is met through imports through the SAPP. 
Zimbabwe used to have an excellent financial sector boasting several commercial 
banks, merchant banks, a discount house, and a thriving stock exchange. This is 
rapidly being rebuilt and confidence is returning after the hyperinflation damage, but 
there is a general lack of liquidity in the economy which needs to be resolved by sorting 
out the sovereign debt (HIPC process) and recapitalising the Reserve Bank to underpin 
the banking sector. The proposed RRT 30% advances could be used to this end. 
Fixed line telecommunications needs to be rehabilitated after years of under-
investment. However wireless communications have improved with the entry of two 
mobile telephony operators, but data speeds and coverage are still poor.  
An elucidation of how the potential of the mineral spatial linkages could have a much 
wider impact on national growth and development is perhaps best done through the 
following case study, on a potential development corridor based on the Mwanesi 
Range iron resources (Case Study: The Putative Mwanesi Development Corridor - 
SDI). 
Zimbabwe also has significant resources of chromium and nickel, the key constituents 
of stainless steel. The possibility of establishing a Zimbabwean stainless steel slab 
plant based on local FeCr and Ni needs to be investigated, once the power shortage 
has been resolved. 
2.7.2.3.1 CEMENT (LIMESTONE, COAL, GYPSUM) 
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The Zimbabwean construction industry could be major job creator and growth in the 
construction industry has obvious implications for the local cement industry. By 2010, 
production capacity stood at around 800ktpa, though production is under 500ktpa, 
mainly due to power shortages. The main companies are PPC, Lafarge, Sino-
Zimbabwe Cement Company (JV with the IDC) which started up in 2001 near Gweru. 
These four players operate as a virtual cartel resulting in high cement prices with 
consequent negative impacts on the cost of construction. Cement is a vital feedstock 
for infrastructure provision and as such cement minerals (limestone, gypsum and coal) 
and the country has ample resources of calcareous rocks for the nation’s construction 
needs. However the state needs to ensure that cement is supplied into the local market 
at the lowest possible prices (EPP). 
2.7.2.3.2 OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE MINERALS 
Steel (rebar, profiles, etc.) and copper (electrification) are dealt with under “Minerals 
for Manufacturing”, above. 
2.7.2.4 MINERALS FOR AGRICULTURE (NPK) 
“Most of the soils in Zimbabwe are nutrient deficient and are degrading at a rapid rate. 
Large portions of Zimbabwe’s soils are derived from granitic parent materials with 
nutrient-deficient sandy soils and low organic matter contents. The soils with 
‘greenstones,’ as parent material have a much higher inherent soil fertility. Zimbabwe’s 
soils are continuously cropped but nutrient removal through harvesting without 
sufficient nutrient replenishment leads to a continuing decline in soil fertility. The two 
main limiting nutrients on Zimbabwe’s soils are nitrogen and phosphorus.”121 
                                            
 
121 Van Straaten, Peter 2002 “Rocks for Crops: Agrominerals of Sub-Saharan Africa”, 
University of Guelph (www.uoguelph.ca/~geology/rocks_for_crops/56zimbabwe.PDF) 
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Source: Van Straaten, 2002 
Figure 46: Carbonatite and Guano (cave) Deposits of Zimbabwe 
Phosphate: There are four Mesozoic carbonatite deposits (Dorowa, Shawa, 
Chishanya, and Katete: Figure 46), but only Dorowa is mined for phosphates by 
Dorowa Minerals (Chemplex Corporation Ltd.) which produces phosphoric acid using 
pyrites from the Iron Duke Mine to make phosphatic fertilisers. 
Nitrogen: Sable Chemical Industries Ltd. (TA Holdings Ltd., 51%; Chemplex 
Corporation Ltd., 36%; Yara Zimbabwe) is the only producer, from the electrolysis of 
water to make ammonium nitrate, but production by this route is expensive and is 
severely curtailed by power shortages. Nitrogen is a critical input into agriculture and 
jobs in agriculture and agro-processing. The viability of producing nitrogenous 
fertilisers from coal gasification and/or CBM should be investigated. 
Liming: Zimbabwe has over 200 known deposits/occurrence of calcareous rocks 
(limestone, dolomite, calcrete), many of which are used for conditioning of soils. 
Given the lack of competition in fertiliser production, price abuse is inevitable (IPP) and 
the price of these critical inputs into downstream jobs should be regulated (at EPP). 
2.7.3 RESOURCES DOMINANCE 
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2.7.3.1 PGMS 
Platinum is the only metal where southern Africa has a majority of world’s resources 
(Zimbabwe and SA have close to 90% of global Pt resources) and which has relative 
supply and demand inelasticity. However, the bulk of the region’s platinum production 
is beneficiated in the developed countries into catalysts and jewellery. In order for 
Zimbabwe to use this potential producer power to realise the backward and forward 
linkages opportunities, it requires influence over the marketing of its PGM assets.  
In this regard the state should amend the Gold Trade Act to become a “Precious Metals 
Act” requiring state authorisation to market both gold and PGMs (Authorised Dealers). 
Platinum, like gold, represents a store of value (platinum bars/coins) and should 
accordingly fall under the same legislation. Marketing authorisation should then only 
be granted if the producers jointly commit to a reasonable plan for the refining of PGMs 
in Zimbabwe. A rough threshold for a basic refinery (Pt, Pd, Rh & Au) viability is 
apparently around 500,000oz per annum (~16tpa) of PGMs which has already been 
surpassed (2011 = ~21tons). 
Consideration should be given to the coordination of PGM marketing with South Africa 
in order to negotiate a PGM beneficiation plan with global customers that would see 
the establishment of downstream PGM value addition being located in the two 
countries. 
 
Source: www.platinum.matthey.com, accessed 02/11/11 
Figure 47: Platinum Exchange Traded Funds (EFTs) 
Like gold, platinum has become a major store of wealth (investment instrument), 
especially in times of global uncertainty. “Total net investment demand for platinum 
was 650,000 oz in 2010... Investment demand for platinum in 2010 was largely a story 
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of physically-backed ETFs122, with total net fund holdings reaching over 1.2 million 
ounces for the first time in 2010 (Figure 47). The unique combination of worldwide 
economic circumstances in 2010, a time of low interest rates and rising commodity 
prices, led to a flood of investment in ETFs”123. 
2.7.3.2 OTHER MAJOR GLOBAL RESOURCES (CHROMIUM, 
ASBESTOS) 
Other minerals where Zimbabwe has a strong position in terms of global resources are 
chromium, chrysotile asbestos and to a lesser extent Lithium. However the supply and 
demand elasticities (substitutes, other accessible resources, etc.) are not as strong as 
for the PGMs. Consequently the state should commission an expert study to assess 
the potential producer power for each (including regional producers) by determining 
the relative supply elasticity (other resources, substitutes, etc.) and demand elasticity 
(price sensitivity, alternatives, etc.). The Ministries of Mining and of Trade and 
Commerce could manage the study and develop a strategy to maximise the economic 
linkages, as per PGMs, based on the assessment. 
2.7.4 INSTRUMENTS TO GROW THE DOWNSTREAM (FORWARD) 
LINKAGES:  
1. Ensure competitive local prices (EPP) of strategic mineral feedstocks into 
manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, agriculture; 
2. Resolve the debilitating power constraint through investments into power 
generation and through imports, including the temporary permitting of direct 
imports by beneficiators; 
3. Harmonise mineral production and industrial strategies through strong 
coordination of Ministries of Mines and of Industry, of Agriculture, etc. 
4. Introduce beneficiation milestones in mining leases at 5, 10, 15 and 20 years 
and make downstream value addition a bid variable for all new competitively 
tendered mineral concessions; 
                                            
 
122 ETFs: exchange traded funds 
123 Johnson Matthey 2011: “Platinum 2011”, p30, www.platinum.matthey.com, 
accessed 02/11/11 
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5. Impose a small export tariff (<5%) on select raw mineral exports to encourage 
beneficiation (where independently shown to be viable). The viability of a PGM 
refinery should be assessed and, if positive, an export tax on unrefined PGMs 
should be considered; 
6. Establish new steel producers to sell at EPP (Mwanesi?) in the domestic market; 
7. Ban all scrap metal exports (reserve for domestic use); 
8. Producer Power- PGMs: Amend the Gold Trade Act to also require PGM 
Authorised Dealers;  
9. Enlarge the local market through equitable regional integration (SADC, SACU, 
CMA); 
10. Support beneficiation technology and skills development (through creation of a 
Knowledge Fund). 
2.8 KNOWLEDGE LINKAGES: MAXIMISING THE DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT 
2.8.1 INTRODUCTION 
A recent survey124 of successful resource-based industrialisation states clearly shows 
that countries that successfully utilised their natural endowment for developmental 
purposes were successful at technical training (HRD) and technology development 
(R&D). These are a pre-requisite for taking advantage of the other minerals economic 
linkages opportunities, particularly the backward linkages. These countries included 
Sweden, Finland, China, Malaysia, Australia and, more recently, Chile and Brazil, 
though the last two are still well behind the Nordics. In order to effectively use mineral 
resources as drivers of development, adequate human and technology development 
is a necessary pre-condition. 
HRD and R&D are seminal to unlocking the developmental potential of mineral 
resources (especially in the linkage industries) and virtually all the countries that have 
successfully used their resources to industrialise, invested heavily in technical HRD 
                                            
 
124 ANC 2012 “Maximising the developmental impact of the people`s mineral assets: 
State Intervention in the Minerals Sector (SIMS)”, 
http://www.anc.org.za/list.php?t=Reports&y=2012 
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and R&D. Failure to attend to this will severely compromise and constrain all other 
resource-based development plans and interventions.  
An important task of a state minerals company (ZMDC) should be to stimulate 
investment into human and technology development- Statoil in Norway has trained 
over 80,000 people since it was established in the ‘70s. Likewise Outokumpo (Finland) 
and LKAB (Sweden) fulfilled critical HRD and R&D mandates. The technology division 
of Outokumpu has been spun out into a separate company, Outotec, which has 
become a world leader in mineral processing and metallurgical technologies. In 
general there is a very strong correlation between establishing the mineral linkages 
sectors and concerted investment into technical HRD and technology development. All 
resource-based economies that managed to industrialise invested heavily in technical 
HRD and R&D (particularly the Nordic countries).  Consequently a key mandate of 
ZMDC should be minerals HRD and R&D to underpin the mining industry in general 
and the upstream cluster in particular. ZMDC should collaborate with other government 
departments and tertiary institutions in developing and strengthening R&D and human 
resources capacity. 
Education, and the knowledge it generates, is a key factor in development – it is crucial 
for economic and social progress everywhere. No country has managed to attain a 
high level of economic and social development without appropriate investments in 
good quality schooling and post-school education. Education impacts on economic 
development in many ways, through for example, its impact on labour productivity, 
poverty eradication, technology, and health.  
There is a strong correlation between knowledge and economic performance in 
general, and knowledge and (economic) sectoral performance in particular. Investment 
in technical skills at both the schooling and post-schooling levels is critical for the 
optimal performance, for example, of the Zimbabwean minerals sector and linkage 
industries. However, the current state of education and training in Zimbabwe is not 
conducive to knowledge generation and the development of the appropriate technical 
skills necessary for growth in key sectors such as mining and its important backward 
and forward linkages sectors. The education and training challenge comprises both 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions. 
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Table 25: Zimbabwe- UNICEF Education Indicators  
Indicator Score 
Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate (%), 2005-2010*, male 98 
Youth (15-24 years) literacy rate (%), 2005-2010*, female 99 
Number per 100 population , 2010, mobile phones 60 
Number per 100 population , 2010, Internet users 12 
Primary school participation, Net attendance ratio (%), 2005-2010*, male 90 
Primary school participation, Net attendance ratio (%), 2005-2010*, female 92 
Primary school participation, Survival rate to last primary grade (%) , 2005-2010*, 
survey data 
82 
Secondary school participation, Net attendance ratio (%), 2005-2010*, male 45 
Secondary school participation, Net attendance ratio (%), 2005-2010*, female 45 
Source: UNICEF 2010 (www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_statistics.html) 
Although literacy rates and primary school attendance are high, only 45% of children 
attend high school (Table 25) and only 1% reaches the SACMEQ 125  Level 8 in 
mathematics competency, below the regional average (1.2%). More disturbing is that 
only 0.1% of rural children reach Level 8 mathematics competency (Table 26). 
Consequently a portion of mineral rents needs to be invested in school mathematics 
and science education, both in the mining areas through CSI126 and nationally through 
the fiscus. Due to the economic crisis, there has been a massive exodus of 
Zimbabwean educators who are teaching in many SADC states and beyond. A 
strategy needs to be developed to re-attract this valuable diaspora, possibly through 
engaging a competent head-hunting agency to locate them, and a package of 
incentives to bring them back (subsidised relocation costs, placements, remuneration, 
etc.) 
                                            
 
125 SACMEQ: Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education 
Quality 
126 CSI: Corporate Social Investment 
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Table 26: Zimbabwe Pupil Mathematics SACMEQ 2007 
 
Source: SACMEQ 2010127  
2.8.1.1 HIGHER EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Higher education is an important form of investment in human capital development. In 
fact, it can be regarded as a high level or a specialized form of human capital, 
contribution of which to economic growth is very significant. The contribution of higher 
education to development can be varied: it helps in the rapid industrialization of the 
economy, by providing individuals with professional, technical, and managerial skills. 
In the present context of transformation of nations into knowledge economies and 
knowledge societies, higher education provides not just educated workers, but 
knowledge workers to the growth of the economy. It creates attitudes, and makes 
possible attitudinal changes necessary for the socialization of the individuals and the 
modernization and overall transformation of the societies. Fourthly, and probably most 
importantly, higher education helps, through teaching and research in the creation, 
absorption and dissemination of knowledge. Higher education also helps in the 
formation of a strong nation-state and at the same time helps in globalization. Lastly, 
higher education allows people to enjoy an enhanced ‘life of mind’ offering the wider 
society both cultural and political benefits. 
2.8.1.2 HIGHER EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL ABSORPTION 
In a rapidly technologically changing world, technology makes a significant difference 
to the economic growth of nations. UNDP (2001) developed a technology achievement 
index (TAI), based on the degree of creation of technology in a given economy, the 
extent of diffusion of old and recent innovations, and human skills. It is clear from this 
                                            
 
127 SACMEQ (Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education 
Quality) 2010, SACMEC III Working Document #1, (www.sacmeq.org) 
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body of work that the level of achievement in technology critically depends upon the 
level of higher education in a given economy. After all, it is higher education and 
research that help in developing new technology; and it is higher education and 
research that contributes to innovations and in their diffusion. Consequently one can 
expect a very strong effect of higher education on the development of technology in 
any society. In fact, the level of achievement in technology may be a close indicator of 
economic growth itself. Most countries with high enrolment ratios in higher education 
became ‘leaders’ in technology, with high levels of achievement in technology, as 
shown in the table below. The converse is also true: a large number of countries with 
low enrolment ratios (say less than ten percent) are ‘marginalized’ in the area of 
technology. Those with medium level of enrolment ratios, nearly 20 percent, like 
Singapore and Hong Kong have indeed become ‘potential leaders’ in technology 
(Table 27. below).  
Table 27: Higher Education (GER) and Technology (Technology Achievement Index) 
Gross Enrolment 
Ratio (GER) 
  High TAI   (>0.5) Medium 
TAI (0.4 -
0.5) 
  Low TAI  (<0.4) 
High (>20) New Zealand, 
Korea, Australia, 
Israel, Japan 
 Philippines 
Medium (11-20) Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Thailand, Cyprus, Syria 
Low (<10)   Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, China, Pakistan, 
Zimbabwe 
GER: Gross Enrolment Ratio; TAI: Technology Achievement Index, Source: ANC 2012 
A few countries like Philippines and Thailand with medium and high levels of enrolment 
ratios are classified by the UNDP as “dynamic leaders”. The rest who did not expand 
their higher education systems well, are indeed ‘marginalized.’ There is not a single 
country with a low enrolment ratio (less than 10 percent) in higher education which has 
achieved high or medium level of achievement in the technology index.  
The relationship between higher education and technology could be shown statistically 
as well. The simple coefficient of correlation between enrolment ratio in higher 
education and TAI in the Asia and the Pacific countries is as high as 0.8 and that 
between technology and higher education attainment it is 0.65. Though the number of 
observations is small, the simple regression equations estimated show a very strong 
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and statistically significant effect of higher education on the level of achievement of 
technology. 
2.8.1.3 THE ZIMBABWE BRAIN DRAIN 
There have been two “brain drains” (loss of skills) from Zimbabwe: The first was mainly 
European settlers following liberation in 1980 when an estimated 50k to 60k left 
because they could not adjust to the changed political circumstances. The second 
phase was from 1999 to 2009 when it is estimated that around 800k left128 mainly due 
to the economic crisis. “The Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines estimates that more than 
half the industry’s skilled personnel emigrated from the country in 2007 and that in 
early 2008 there were 1116 vacancies for professional and technical staff.”129 
Table 28: Official Emigrants by country of destination, 2002–2005n  
Destination 2002 2003 2004 2005 
AFRICA 6,307 6,330 7,079 6,256 
Botswana 2,286 2,193 2,889 1,524 
Kenya 66 102 109 110 
Malawi 374 1,076 496 687 
Mozambique 1,372 1,167 1,751 1,390 
South Africa 1,741 87 61 1,502 
Swaziland 12 15 28 15 
Tanzania 23 701 805 81 
Zambia 274 718 577 540 
Other 159 271 363 407 
AMERICA 231 292 366 431 
ASIA 92 103 163 221 
EUROPE 1,471 1,584 3,597 3,758 
Other 84 117 100 122 
CSO/Zimstat in IOM 2010 
However, the official (CSO/Zimstat,Table 28) data “...give an extremely distorted and 
underestimated image of Zimbabwean emigration patterns” and “...despite the great 
                                            
 
128 IOM 2010 “Migration in Zimbabwe. A Country Profile 2009”, International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/mp_zimbabwe.pdf 
129 Hawkins 2009 
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variety of estimates, a range of statistical sources suggest that there is a maximum of 
1.5 million Zimbabweans in South Africa, including regular and irregular migrants.”130 
Table 29: Positive and Negative Effects of Migration from Zimbabwe 
 
Source: IOM 2010 
 
Although there are positive effects of immigration (Table 29), they are overwhelmed by 
the negative effects on growth and development due to the depletion of human capital 
stock. 
Several studies indicate that two-thirds of Zimbabweans abroad intended to return to 
settle permanently (skilled & unskilled migrants)131. However “...skilled migrants might 
find it easier to integrate into the host country and be less unwilling to resettle even if 
political and economic conditions were to change”. 
                                            
 
130 IOM & Zimstat 2010 “Migration in Zimbabwe. A Country Profile 2009”, p37, 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/mp_zimbabwe.pdf 
131 Jonathan Crush, Abel Chikanda, and Godfrey Tawodzera 2012 “The Third Wave: 
Mixed Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa”, SAMP, Southern African Research 
Centre, Queen’s University, Canada 
(www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/policyseries/Acrobat59.pd
f) 
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One of the contributors to the Finnish economic success has been ascribed to the over-
production of engineers in the 50s and 60s which led to some immigration and the 
acquisition of world-class know-how abroad that contributed the rapid technology 
development and growth when they returned home in the 70s and 80s. Zimbabweans 
abroad could provide a similar stimulus if they can be enticed to return home. 
2.8.1.4 GRADUATE HOLDING STRATEGIES  
Due to the economic crisis from 1999 to 2009, Zimbabwe lost a major proportion of its 
skilled workforce. In the light of these losses and an education system that is not 
Box - Minerals Sector Skills Crisis 
“The number of university graduates needed in mining disciplines is estimated at 
between 480 and 550, but the maximum capacity of mining-related departments at 
the University of Zimbabwe is 124 students per year, meaning that it will take 4 to 
5 years to supply existing needs, let alone providing for the anticipated recovery 
and growth of the industry in a post-crisis environment. 
“In the longer term,” the report says “the flow of graduate learners from the 
University of Zimbabwe is at risk due to the serious depletion of academic staff in 
mining engineering, metallurgical engineering, electrical engineering, geology, 
survey and chemistry. Only five geologists were expected to graduate in 2007 and 
none for the subsequent 4 years as the department is being restructured.” (page 
56) 
Vacancies for academics at the University of Zimbabwe have reached such a stage 
that courses in mining, metallurgical and electrical engineering as well as in 
geology and survey are at risk. The vacancy rate in the Faculty of Engineering in 
mid-2007 was 66 percent while in the Geology and Chemistry departments of the 
Faculty of Science the vacancy rate was 62 percent. In Geology only three 
academics were in a post out of an establishment of 16, while the departments of 
mining engineering, metallurgy and survey had a total of 5 people in post against 
an establishment of 35. 
The Zimbabwe School of Mines (ZSM) in Bulawayo was established to train 
selected employees sponsored by mining companies on a block release basis. The 
School has an annual capacity of 160 students annually who are prepared for the 
Mine Managers Certificate of Competency, but both trainers and examiners are in 
short supply.  
A survey undertaken by the Government – The Zimbabwe National Human 
Resources Survey 2006 – concluded that as many as 70 percent of 1519 graduates 
surveyed indicated a wish to emigrate – 76 percent for graduates and 86 percent 
for postgraduates. The University itself estimates that of 2800 students who 
graduate each year only about 700 wish to stay in Zimbabwe.” (Hawkins 2009 p18) 
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producing the requisite skills, the number of so-called scarce skills in the economy 
increased dramatically. 
The training of engineers and scientists is heavily subsidised by the state and in order 
to discourage the exit of these skills, consideration should be given to converting the 
state subsidy into a notional loan that will be written off over 10 years of employment 
in Zimbabwe. The “loan” (difference between full costs and fees paid) should be paid 
off like a bond at prime over 10 years by working in Zimbabwe. If graduates decide to 
emigrate before 10 years, they will be liable for the full outstanding portion of the loan 
(i.e., the loan converts from notional to real).  
2.8.1.5 MINERALS SKILLS FUND 
Consideration should be given to the setting up of a Minerals Skills Fund (MSF) as a 
PPP with industry and tertiary education institutions (Figure 48) in combination with an 
obligatory corporate HRD spend of 5% of pay-roll (ex-Zimdef), as a Mining Lease 
condition. Contributions to the MSF would then qualify towards the obligatory HRD 
spend. A “normal” corporate spend on HRD to renew the corporate human asset base 
is currently ~5% of pay-roll: On average the SA mining industry already spends around 
5% of pay-roll (R4G of R90G) on HRD and skilling 132  (ex the 1% Skills Levy), 
consequently this obligation would only be a burden for below average companies that 
presumably rely on poaching skills from responsible companies. 
                                            
 
132 Personal communication with SA Chamber of Mines, Sept 2012. 
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Figure 48: Possible Minerals Skills Fund (MSF) Structure 
2.8.2 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) 
There is a correlation between a country’s investment in technology development and 
its economic performance. A recent study on mineral resource based industrialisation 
found that there was an almost total correlation between successful industrialisation 
and elevated spending on technology development (>2% of GDP). 
Zimbabwe needs R&D capacity in minerals technologies to enable it to take advantage 
of the back/forward mineral linkages opportunities, to mine more resources and to deal 
with technical health and safety challenges. “It creates the tools and techniques to 
liberate value from increasingly difficult-to-mine ore bodies; and provides the 
environment where the high-level technical skills can be created that will greatly 
increase our ability to take full advantage of mineral resources.”133 
Apart from universities, mineral research institutions (e.g. IMR and GML) are also 
important in addressing the challenge of high-level skills. Not only should they 
undertake fundamental and applied research, they also provide the training ground for 
the development of very high-level engineering skills. Both the IMR and the GML need 
to be re-capacitated and the development of a mining technologies development 
capacity needs to be considered for the Zimbabwe School of Mines. Collaborative 
research links between these institutions and the private sector should be 
strengthened. 
                                            
 
133 Maloney (2007) 
Targets
MSF
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Knowledge Levy, GoZ, 
ZMDC, Mining 
Industry, Donors
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2.8.3 INVESTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINERALS R&D  
The Zimbabwean mineral technology needs and capacity should be surveyed, 
especially the needs of local mining suppliers, in order to develop a national minerals 
technology strategy and to prioritise technology development projects, which could 
also be funded through the Minerals Knowledge Fund (levy on payroll)  Such a fund 
could also be incentivised through a concessionary tax write-off (>100%) on local R&D 
expenditure and a small percentage of the skills levy could be allocated to post-grad 
and post-doc research projects. In this regard the establishment of a dedicated 
Minerals Technology Fund (MTF) could be considered, funded by Knowledge Fund, 
State, ZMDC, COMZ, Mining companies and Donors (Figure 49). 
 
 
Figure 49: Possible Minerals Technology Fund (MTF) Structure 
2.8.4 INSTRUMENTS TO GROW THE KNOWLEDGE (SKILLS/R&D) 
LINKAGES:  
If Zimbabwe is to use its mineral resources to underpin growth and development it 
needs to regain its lost skills, rapidly develop new skills and rebuild its minerals 
technology development capacity. Some proposals in this regard include:  
1) The reinforcement of the National Migration Management and Diaspora Policy to 
include the location of skilled Zimbabweans in the diaspora and instruments to 
facilitate their return such as assisted relocation and remuneration subventions for 
critical scarce skills;  
2) Investigate the conversion of tertiary state training costs into notional loan to be 
worked off over 15 years by working in-country (coverts to real loan if graduate exits 
before year 15);  
Targets
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Funders
Knowledge Fund, State, 
ZMDC, COMZ, Mining 
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3) The introduction of minimum minerals knowledge corporate spend of 5% of payroll, 
to fund skills formation for the minerals sector and back/forward linkage industries, 
as well as local technology development. The South African Mining Charter134 
targets HRD expenditure of 5% of pay-roll by 2014. Including the 1% National Skills 
Levy, this comes to 6% of the company’s pay-roll; 
4) Rebuild mineral technology development institutions (IMR, GML, BSM, 
Universities, et al);  
5) Use of a portion of the proposed RRT to fund: 
a. The training and remuneration of Maths and Science specialists to assist in 
Maths and Science Education in primary schools across the country where 
such need is identified. The precise mechanism for implementing this should 
be worked out in consultation with the Ministry of Education,  
b. Grants/loans for Engineering and Science students to be administered 
through the Universities. Tertiary training should be free in critical technical 
areas; 
c. Financial support to Engineering Faculties based on the number of 
undergraduate students graduating and registering with the Engineering 
Council of Zimbabwe (ECZ), as well as financial support to Engineering 
Faculties for post-graduate studies. 
d. Grants for Engineering and Technician learnerships. 
6) However, it may be advisable to first carry out a survey of the critical minerals 
technical skills needs and to then develop a HRD strategy with government. Such 
a plan might best be resourced by establishing a National Minerals Skills Fund, 
together with the GoZ and the mining industry, funded in part by the Mineral 
Knowledge Corporate Spend (5% of payroll).  
7) Investigate the establishment of a dedicated Minerals Technology Fund (MTF) as 
a PPP with the mining industry, pedagogical institutions and state enterprises 
(ZMDC) and institutions.  
 
2.9 SPATIAL LINKAGES: MAXIMISING THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT 
                                            
 
134 www.dmr.gov.za/mining-charter.html 
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Mining is one of the few economic activities that could have strong spatial 
(infrastructure) links to both its immediate surroundings and the local, provincial, 
national and regional economies, if appropriately configured. What is special about 
minerals is that they require a diverse set of infrastructure to support them (transport, 
power, water, etc.). An important aspect of mineral development impact arises from 
the fact that the spatial linkages that it creates first with its immediate surroundings and 
then with the broader economy, tend to be strong. Like most minerals economies, the 
spatial linkages that the minerals industry has created in Zimbabwe traverse the 
infrastructural spectrum. Through its demand for transportation, energy, water, and 
social infrastructure for the workers who work in the mines, the industry has had an 
impact on Zimbabwe’s economy that dates back from the BSAC invasion in 1890.  
Mining activities always require significant investments in infrastructure before the 
actual mining takes place especially in a context where deposits to be mined are 
located in remote areas lacking infrastructure. It is for this reason that minerals are 
usually regarded as a catalyst of development in as far as it can provide the basic 
infrastructure (road, ports, rail, power and water) that can open up previously isolated 
areas or enhance existing areas of low economic activity. Zimbabwe has a history of 
infrastructural development that has greatly been influenced by the mining industry. 
This can play an important role in opening up regions for other economic activities with 
the objective of creating sustainable local economies, post mineral depletion. 
2.9.1 INFRASTRUCTURE 
Zimbabwe used to probably have the best physical infrastructure in the whole of Africa 
outside of South Africa. It had an excellent paved and unpaved road network covering 
most of the country and all of the main mining areas. The railway network is well 
developed and most major mines are linked by rail, but over the last two decades the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) failed to maintain the system and handle the 
rail traffic, particularly the domestic distribution of coal.  
Before 1976 most mineral exports were via the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo, 
particularly the latter, but in March 1976 the Mozambican government closed these 
two routes in compliance with the then UN sanctions against the rebel settler regime 
and all mineral trade was routed through South African ports. After independence in 
1980 minerals once again started flowing through the Mozambican routes but by 1984 
these were once again effectively closed due to sabotage by the South African Special 
Wits MSC 
 
173  
Forces and/or their surrogate, Renamo. They were reopened through the intervention 
of Zimbabwean troops in the second half of the eighties, but unfortunately the port of 
Beira's ability to handle bulk mineral cargo is limited, both in terms of the port's handling 
facilities and the limited tonnage of vessels that can enter the port. Maputo (Matola) is 
more suited for mineral exports, but the virtual collapse of NRZ has resulted in most 
mineral exports being trucked to South Africa. They future of bulk mineral development 
for export (e.g. iron ore and coal) will critically depend on establishing heavy haul rail 
corridors to the closest coast (Mozambique) that could have a much wider impact on 
the national economy (SDI), by significantly lowering the logistics cost for all products, 
possibly to as low as $6/t, from the centre of the country. 
The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) has an electricity grid over most of 
the country including all of the major mines, but has it has been vandalised by thieves 
(for copper and aluminium. ZESA has failed to maintain generating capacity resulting 
in regular power outages, but tenders have reportedly closed for the construction of 
the new generation capacity at Kariba South Power Station and Sino Hydro is 
apparently the only bidder for the project. The Hwange power station will also be 
expanded by 600MW. These development projects will add 900MW to Zimbabwe’s 
capacity by 2016. In addition ZESA is planning a 350MW gas-fired station based on 
CBM (Coal Bed Methane) and a tender for the quantification the Lupane CBM gas has 
reportedly gone out. It also plans to invest in a 30MW hydropower plant at Gairezi and 
in $500 million transmission integration project. ZESA’s main constraint is in raising 
capital for its $2 billion new build, given that the state is virtually bankrupt with a 
reported $10 billion sovereign debt burden. 
The Cabora Bassa (HEP) power station in Mozambique, is linked to the Zimababwean 
grid at Bindura and several mines have direct supply from HCB (Hidroelectrica Cabora 
Bassa). ZESA imports from HCB are set to resume with the reduction of the HCB debt 
from $150 million to $3 million and power imports are set to increase from the current 
50MW to 350MW. In addition, the new coal projects in Tete Province will reportedly 
also produce 1-2GW of thermal power from the lower grade overburden coal, which 
could be available to Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe and Zambia are also working on a joint 1 650MW Batoka Gorge project 
below Vic Falls which is set for completion in 2019 after Zimbabwe agreed to clear its 
$71 million legacy debt with Zambia by end of March 2014. 
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Currently there is a generation capacity shortfall of 750MW, which will reportedly be 
reduced to 480MW in 2013 and 445MW in 2014 after new projects come on 
stream. The average national power production is about 1400MW, against a demand 
of around 2200MW. The shortfall is met through SAPP imports. 
Zimbabwe used to have an excellent financial sector boasting several commercial 
banks, merchant banks, a discount house, and a thriving stock exchange. This is 
rapidly being rebuilt and confidence is returning after the hyperinflation damage, but 
there is a general lack of liquidity in the economy which needs to be resolved by sorting 
out the sovereign debt (HIPC process) and recapitalising the Reserve Bank to underpin 
the banking sector. The proposed RRT 30% advances could be used to this end. 
Fixed line telecommunications needs to be rehabilitated after years of under-
investment. However wireless communications have improved with the entry of two 
mobile telephony operators, but data speeds and coverage are still poor.  
An elucidation of how the potential of the mineral spatial linkages could have a much 
wider impact on national growth and development is perhaps best done through the 
following case study, on a potential development corridor based on the Mwanesi 
Range iron resources: 
2.9.1.1 CASE STUDY: THE PUTATIVE MWANESI DEVELOPMENT 
CORRIDOR (SDI135) 
The Mwanesi Range NE of Chivhu contains large iron ore resources over a 60km 
banded ironstone formation (BIF136) in the shape of a compressed letter “C” (Figure 
50). Resources are estimated at 33 billion tons 137  grading at about 40% Fe, 
necessitating upgrading to a saleable product (~65% Fe). 
                                            
 
135 SDI: Spatial Development Initiative (Development Corridor) 
136 BIF: Banded Ironstone Formation- alternating thin layers of iron ore & silica/shale 
137 Worst 1962, “The Geology of the Mwanesi Range”, Zimbabwe Geological Survey 
Bulletin No. 54 
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Figure 50: Mwanezi Range Location 
Initial indications are that this resource could constitute an “anchor project” for a 
Development Corridor (DC) to the Mozambican coast (Port of Beira or a new port north 
of Beira) that could catalyse numerous other developments along the corridor in 
sectors such as agriculture & agro-processing, forestry & wood products, 
manufacturing, etc. (Figure 51). 
 
Source: Jourdan 2010 
Figure 51: SDI Methodology 
Such a DC (Figure 52) could also dramatically lower Zimbabwe’s logistics costs to 
the world and significantly increase its economic competitiveness. However, in order 
to optimise the developmental impact of this seemingly significant mineral asset, the 
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seminal economic linkages need to be maximised through a well-crafted international 
tender of the concession to identify a partner that will not only develop the mine, but, 
more importantly, use the asset to catalyse wider development across the economy. 
 
Figure 52: Putative Mwanesi Development Corridor 
2.9.1.1.1 IRON ORE LINKAGES 
This project could underpin a massive boost to the Zimbabwean economy, if the 
concession is carefully configured to maximise the potential wide-ranging economic 
linkages: 
2.9.1.1.1.1 FISCAL LINKAGES: 
The state tax take over the life of the concession should be by the most important bid 
element – the bidders could bid up the Resource Rent Tax (RRT) from a base rate of 
50%, or a combination of the RRT rate and the royalty rate. Mining and upgrading costs 
should be about $12-$15/t and transport costs to the coast could be as low as $15/t, 
resulting in an FoB coastal cost of ~$30/t. Assuming a long-term iron ore fines price of 
~$70/t, this would result in a profit of ~$40/t once the capex has been amortised. 
Consequently a 50% RRT could yield around $1200 million per annum for a 
production rate of 60 Mtpa, once “steady-state” is reached (after capex is paid). There 
Wits MSC 
 
177  
would also be numerous other fiscal revenues from CIT138, royalties, tariffs, PAYE, 
etc., both from the project, the linkages projects and economic activity catalysed by the 
project (collateral impacts). 
2.9.1.1.1.2 FORWARD LINKAGES: 
Iron/steel is by far the most important feedstock into manufacturing globally and 
Mwanesi could underpin the revival of Zisco (Redcliff) and/or a new steel flat products 
(CRC139) plant located either at Redcliff or Mwanesi, as well as a possible gas-based 
reduction plant (iron/steel) at the coast in Mozambique140. The availability of iron/steel 
in the domestic market at EPP141 could in turn underpin the revival of Zimbabwean 
manufacturing. Consequently, a second bid item should be to bid up investments in 
downstream iron/steel (value addition). 
2.9.1.1.1.3 BACKWARD LINKAGES 
The Mwanesi mega mine, steel plant/s and infrastructure will create a large new market 
for a wide range of inputs, including capital goods (plant & machinery), consumables 
and services. All of these present potential investment opportunities. The third bid item 
should be to bid up investment in upstream industries/activities by bidding up the 
Zimbabwean local content by year 5, 10, 15, 20. 
2.9.1.1.1.4 KNOWLEDGE LINKAGES 
This project should stimulate massive development of local skills and technology 
capacity which should in turn facilitate the backward & forward linkages. Consequently 
the fourth biddable element should be the annual investment in local HRD and R&D. 
2.9.1.1.1.5 SPATIAL LINKAGES  
                                            
 
138 CIT: corporate income tax 
139 CRC: cold rolled coil 
140 However, the concession should stipulate that ore must be made available to local 
beneficiators at a cost plus price (cost plus a reasonable return) 
141 EPP: export parity price = international price less the logistics costs = competitive 
price. 
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In the longer term the spatial linkages emanating from this project could have the 
largest impact on the Zimbabwean economy, through the provision of a low-cost 
logistics connection to the global economy (Figure 53). This could underpin 
widespread economic activity across the economy. However these spatial linkages will 
not be realised unless configured and facilitated through the establishment of a SDI 
programme with Mozambique, to maximise the collateral economic impacts to 
transform a resources-corridor into a development corridor. Consequently the 
concession should stipulate third party access at non-discriminatory prices to all 
concession infrastructure, as well as obligatory over-capacity, to cater for the rest of 
the economy.  It should also stipulate that an ore slurry pipeline to the coast will only 
be permitted once a low-cost new rail link has been established, to maximise the 
collateral impact (3rd party users) of the transport infrastructure. The degree of excess 
infrastructure capacity could also be a biddable tender item. 
 
Source: Author 
Figure 53: National gateway to the World? 
2.9.1.1.2 WAY FORWARD 
A schematic sequencing for the public tender of the Mwanesi deposit, with 
Mozambique, is presented in Figure 54. 
1. The current Essar agreement should be restricted to the rehab of Zisco with 
sufficient ore resources to realise this (possibly the enriched high grade 
 
 
  
 
Potential low-cost 
trade logistics corridor 
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haematite deposits). BIMCO could be transferred to the ZMDC who could then 
undertake this mega concession, with other government departments & 
agencies, through public tender to select an international partner that offers the 
highest bid in terms of realising the economic linkages (above) and consequent 
growth and development. 
 
Figure 54: Mwanesi- Possible Tender Process 
2. The Government of Zimbabwe should invite the Government of Mozambique to 
“partner” Zimbabwe on the concession, especially as regards the transport 
corridor, new port/terminal and the back-of-port facilities, including a possible 
pelletising plant and second iron/steel plant, with a view to a single infrastructure 
concessioner (NRZ & CFM?) to ensure seamless logistics operations.  
3. The two governments should appoint a Joint Project Team (JPT) to coordinate 
the selection of the best possible investment partner/consortium. 
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4. The JPT should engage a CRIRSCO142  compliant company to develop an 
accredited Resource Prospectus from all the existing data on the deposit. 
5. The JPT should publish a call for EOI 143  in the appropriate international 
media/websites to get the maximum possible coverage of potential investment 
partners. The EOI should include the bidder’s financial and technical capability 
(including similar project experience) to carry out the project. 
6. A shortlist of 10-20 of the top EIO companies/consortia should be made, based 
on their capability to execute the project and other criteria desired by 
government. 
7. The JPT should engage world-class transaction advisors using resources from 
existing facilities/resources (ALSF144, ISLP145, UNDP, etc) and/or resourced by 
a project partner DFI146 (e.g. AfDB, KfW, IDC, DBSA, etc.) in partnership with a 
local investment bank, selected by ZMDC. 
8. The short-listed companies should then be invited to pick up the RFP147 for a 
small fee ($20k-$40k) which will contain the “Bid Pack” including the critical bid 
scoring matrix, outlining the nation’s aspirations to optimise all of the project’s 
potential economic linkages (Error! Reference source not found.). The 
potential bidders should be given at least 90 days to develop and submit their 
bids (matrix elements). 
9. The sealed bids should be opened and scored at a public event and the top two 
preferred bidders should be announced immediately.  
10. A thorough due diligence should be carried out on the top two preferred bidders 
and if one fails, it should be replaced by the third-placed bidder. 
11. Negotiations to arrive at a BAFO148 and to finalise the concession contract 
elements should be carried out simultaneously with both bidders (in separate 
                                            
 
142 CRIRSCO: Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards 
(e.g. SAMREC, JORC). www.crirsco.com 
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144 ALSF: African Legal Support Facility (AfDB) 
145 ISLP: International Senior Lawyers Project 
146 DFI: Development Finance Institution 
147 RFP: Request for Proposals 
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rooms) to flush out the best possible contract for the peoples of Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique. 
Table 30: An indicative Mwanesi Bid Matrix 
Tax Rate - 
RRT149  
Bid up from, say,  50%  40% 
Downstream  % extra VA (iron/steel) above base product (ore, conc) 
exports  
20% 
Upstream  % local content (VA) purchases @ 5y, 10y, 15y  = Ʃ%VA  20% 
HRD & R&D  $/an local spend- Bid up from $X/an  10% 
Extra 
infrastructure  
% extra capacity times the base capex  for power, transport, 
water, etc. = Ʃextra$ (above obligatory excess capacity) 
10% 
Total   100%  
 
12. The final concession contract for ~30 years should be drawn up and concluded 
between Zimbabwe, Mozambique (Figure 55) and the concessionaire, with 
clear investment and output milestones, which if not met, could trigger a 
concession suspension.  
13. Execution of the concession contract. 
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Figure 55: Mwanesi SDI: Possible Project Structure: 
2.9.1.1.3 CONCLUSIONS ON MWANESI 
The Mwanesi Range iron ore resources could underpin a putative Mwanesi SDI that 
could be configured to be by far the largest investment and development project in the 
history of both Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and dramatically lower national logistics 
costs. This could facilitate economic activity in diverse industries across the economy 
and position Zimbabwe’s manufacturing sector to compete in global markets. 
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3. DISCUSSION 
By far the major two problems facing the mining industry have been insufficient and 
erratic power supply as well as the lack of mineral policy certainty (combined with 
sudden impositions of new royalties, fees and opaque indigenisation targets). 
Dollarisation and strong international prices have however underpinned a remarkable 
recovery of the sector since 2009. 
The next pressing problem is the acute national shortage of capital and the high 
interest rates. This particularly affects the smaller mines (mainly gold) that lack the 
ability to raise capital abroad.  A prerequisite for building liquidity in the economy is the 
resolution of the national debt burden (around $10) through, for example, a HIPC150 
process with the main debtors. The Reserve Bank should be recapitalised, in part 
possibly through the proposed RRT 30% advance,  which would allow it to play its role 
of “lender of last resort” to the commercial banking sector and to consequently bring 
down interest rates through the repo rate. 
The increases in energy costs, caused by Zesa’s requirements to rehabilitate and 
expand the current generation and transmission capacity, as well as supply shortages, 
are constraining the sector. This should be urgently resolved through temporarily 
allowing more foreign exchange earning mines to import electricity until Zesa’s 
rehab/expansion projects give it the capacity to supply locally, as well as licensing IPPs 
(e.g. RioZim’s Sengwa thermal power project). In addition to the expansion and new 
build projects currently under consideration, the viability of Zesa partnering with coal 
miners in Tete Province in Mozambique on their planned low-cost thermal power 
projects, should be investigated. 
As a land-locked country Zimbabwe has logistic problems in getting its mineral 
products to the nearest ports. These problems have been compounded by the virtual 
collapse of the NRZ and the limited capacities of the Mozambican ports of Maputo and 
Beira (two-thirds of Zimbabwe's exports before the independence of Mozambique), 
forcing exports to leave via more distant South African ports, at higher cost. As with 
ZESA, the NRZ’s major constraints are capital and skilled personnel (managerial and 
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professional), compounded by the exodus during the economic crisis preceding 
dollarisation. 
Due to the massive exit of skilled personnel, their replacement is now cited by most 
medium to large mining companies as their most serious problem after power 
shortages. There was a steady flow of experienced staff out of the country after 
independence (mainly settlers) which became a stampede during the melt-down 
(mainly Zimbabweans), though there have been some signs of skills returning. Skills 
shortage is not only peculiar to the Zimbabwean minerals industry, it is a world-wide 
challenge. The recent Ernst and Young Report (2012)151 on the top ten business risks 
in the world minerals industry lists shortage of skilled manpower only second to 
resource nationalism. Thus, Zimbabwe’s skills strategy has to be cognisant of the 
competition for the limited skills world-wide.  
Over the last thirty years the mines have moved away from migrant labour and 
currently have a permanent workforce, but this has not led to a significantly greater 
degree of mechanisation, due to capital constraints. 
Only a small fraction of the total value of mineral production is consumed by local 
industries. By far the majority is exported to be transformed into finished products 
elsewhere, some of which will ultimately be re-imported by Zimbabwe. Primary 
commodities, mineral and agricultural, typically constitute about 90% of total exports. 
There are several projects for the further transformation of minerals in the country that 
have been under consideration for some time such as the manufacture of stainless 
steel from local chromium, nickel and steel; the refining of PGMs, the manufacture of 
refractory bricks; the spinning of asbestos fibre, and a coal-based chemical industry.  
But, as long as downstream transformation is only for import substitution for the local 
market, the primary commodities sector (mining and agriculture) will continue to be the 
foreign exchange generator for the rest of the economy and the manufacturing sector 
will continue as a net foreign exchange consumer. 
Strategies for integrated economic development therefore need to increase exports of 
manufactures, decrease dependence on primary commodity exports and decrease 
dependence on imported capital goods by developing a local capital goods 
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manufacturing capability. Given the limited possibilities of Zimbabwe penetrating the 
world market for manufactures, regional economic integration (or “collective self-
reliance”) in the region is the only viable method of breaking away from the present 
vertical integration with developed world and, increasingly, Asia. Local content 
requirements have to be explicit upfront to concretely support integrated local 
development. 
A regional strategy is not only necessary in terms of an increased market for 
manufactures, but also in terms of utilising the larger resource base (human and 
material) for the development of primary industries, particularly capital goods. The 
SADC region produces, or has resources of, virtually all the raw materials essential for 
integrated industrialisation. Regional cooperation in metals refining has already taken 
place in the case of copper-nickel matte from Botswana and, previously, copper 
concentrates from Mozambique were refined in Zimbabwe, but there is a large 
potential for similar schemes in the region. 
But by far the most important regional cooperation by Zimbabwe with another SADC 
state was the securing of the rail and road corridors through Mozambique to the ports 
of Beira and Maputo. This cooperation could be massively expanded through the 
putative Mwanesi SDI.  An essential prerequisite for the maintenance of mineral 
production is the provision of an operational and cost-effective transport system for 
exports. 
Zimbabwe had a diverse and well-developed minerals sector which is rapidly 
recovering and plays an crucial role in its economy as a source of fiscal revenues, as 
an employer, a foreign exchange earner, as the provider of raw materials to the 
manufacturing, metallurgical sectors and agricultural sectors and as a market for 
supplier industries. The mining sector used to be supported by an exceptional physical 
and financial infrastructure which is in dire need of rehabilitation and expansion. In 
addition, there used to be a well-established manufacturing sector which was able to 
provide a substantial proportion of mining inputs, which needs to be reactivated. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 MINERALS GOVERNANCE 
The current “free-mining” (FIFA) colonial mineral regime is inappropriate for using 
mineral assets to underpin wider development and industrialisation and consequently 
consideration should be given to the following proposals on the administration of 
national mineral assets: 
1. Streamline (simplify) MMA to cater for exploration licenses and ASM 
prospecting licences, ASM leases and Mining Leases on a use-it-lose-it 
principle. Shift the detailed procedures and modalities to attendant MMA 
Regulations; 
2. Amend the MMA to cater for a hybrid FIFA (claims) and public tender system 
(“known” and “unknown” mineral resource terrains) and to cover back/forward 
linkages VA (%) milestones (e.g. at 5, 10, 15, 20y) and a corporate minimum 
spend on knowledge formation (HRD/R&D) of ≥5% of payroll; 
3. Build a mineral deposit public tender (auction) capacity in the MM&MD and 
ZMDC; 
4. Urgently locate funds to establish a functional MCIMS (national mineral 
cadastre); 
5. Rebuild the ASM support “golden triangle” (finance, marketing and technical 
support); 
6. Establish an ASM VCF with COMZ, donors, et al. 
7. Reconfigure ZGS as a state agency with the ability to re-attract requisite 
professionals;  
8. Resource ZGS to recommence systematic geo-mapping and to categorise 
the country into known, unknown and partly known mineral resource zones; 
9. Capacitate ZMDC and ZGS to develop mineral targets for public tender; 
10. Urgently resolve the national power crisis through fast-tracking the current 
rehabilitation and expansion projects as well as through imports. Power from 
Mozambique needs to be assessed, both from Cabora Bassa (and, in future, 
Mpande Nkuwa HEP) as well as from the planned thermal plants based on 
waste coal from the Tete coalfields (Vale and Rio Tinto). 
4.2 FISCAL LINKAGES 
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The current mineral fiscal regime neither effectively captures resource rents nor 
optimises the developmental impact of mineral extraction. Consideration should be 
given to the following proposals to maximise the capture of resource rents without 
sterilising resources and whilst still remaining attractive for FDI: 
4.2.1 FISCAL REVENUE INSTRUMENTS 
1. Corporate Income Tax (CIT): Currently at 25% except for SMLs at 15%. 
Standardise at 25% (national rate) for all mining;  
2. Royalties: Currently 1% - 15% (by mineral). Lower royalties to 1-2% for all 
minerals. Royalties sterilise resources and encourage high-grading (sub-
optimal extraction); 
3. Resource Rents Tax (RRT): Currently 0% except for an APT on SMLs at 42.5%. 
Increase to 50% above a return on investment (ROI) of the treasury long-bond 
rate plus 7% (ROI >20% until a long-bond is issued);  
4. RRT advance: Currently 0%. Consider a 30% RRT advance (against mining 
workplan) at e.g. MOODCAAA plus about 3%;  
4.2.2 ECONOMIC STRATEGY FISCAL INSTRUMENTS 
1. Impose a Mineral Export Tax of 1-5% on all unprocessed mineral exports where 
the next value addition step has been independently shown to be economically 
viable (real IRR >10%); 
2. Establish a ring-fenced Fiscal Stabilisation Fund  using 30% of the proceeds of the 
RRT (locked offshore fund) ; 
3. Establish a ring-fenced Minerals Development Fund  using remainder of the 
proceeds of the RRT, ex the RRT advance; 
4. Make a local minerals HRD/R&D spend of ≥5% of pay-roll a condition in all Mining 
Leases;   
5. Reduce the Withholding Tax on expatriated dividends to 15%, but increase to 30% 
for investors domiciled in tax havens;   
6. Abolish the practice of permitting the retention of mineral rights against the payment 
of Retention Fees (use-it-or-lose-it principle); 
7. Impose a requirement for a 5-yearly “Forensic Tax Self-Audit” in all Mining Leases 
with revenue exceeding $200mn/an. The audit should be undertaken by a reputable 
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audit company selected from a list of four supplied by Zimra and should be financed 
by the mine, but report to Zimra; 
8. Impose a Capital Gains Tax (CGT) of 50% on all Exploration License transfers  
(sale before mining commences) to discourage speculators; 
9. Clarify the Indigenisation Policy by making the targets 25% by year 10 and 51% by 
year 25 (i.e. any Mining Lease renewal (at 25 years) must be conditional on 51% 
beneficial ownership by indigenous Zimbabweans).  
4.3 BACKWARD LINKAGES: 
Building the seminal minerals backward (upstream) linkages activities is crucial to 
using the national mineral resource endowment to underpin wider industrialisation. In 
this regard the following proposed interventions should be assessed: 
1. Resolution of the power constraints through the rehab of existing capacity, the fast-
tracking of expansion projects, new projects and imports; 
2. Amend the MMA152 to include upstream value addition (backward linkages: local 
content) as a clear objective of the Act and strengthen the Minister’s power to 
include such conditions in the mining concession/lease. This could be done through 
the development of clear local content milestones (5, 10, 15 year targets) for all 
mining concession contracts (leases) in order to maximise local value addition. The 
concession contract (lease) should make it clear that failure to achieve the asset 
owner’s targets could result in a suspension of the contract and that, after a 
rectification period, the asset will be re-concessioned (auctioned against 
developmental criteria). Once a new MMA is in place all current licenses should be 
revisited to include such local content milestones (and the new Act should cater for 
this); 
3. Make local content commitments a bid variable with significant weighting for all new 
competitively tendered mineral concessions (auctions); 
4. Consideration could be given to expanding the Indigenisation Law to cover 
purchases from indigenous suppliers153, based on indigenous proportion of local 
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value added in the goods or services supplied, rather than the total value of the 
goods or services, to facilitate backward linkages; 
5. Task the Ministries of Industry and Commerce, of Economic Planning and 
Investment Promotion, of Mines and Mining Development and of Science and 
Technology with developing and implementing comprehensive industrial sub-
sectoral strategies to grow the mineral upstream sectors (capital goods, services, 
consumables) including the use of instruments such as import tariffs, investment 
incentives, innovation stimuli, market access, access to finance, competitive 
feedstocks, etc. 
6. Task the ZMDC with developing appropriate local mining capital goods, with the 
private sector and technology institutions, to overcome the technological 
challenges of the minerals sector and to improve health and safety of workers. 
7. Establish a Minerals Sector Knowledge Fund in partnership with the mining 
industry, through an obligatory spend of ≥5% of payroll on local HRD and R&D, to 
rebuild the backward linkages skills and technology development capacity. 
4.4 FORWARD (DOWNSTREAM) LINKAGES 
Minerals and mineral products constitute critical feedstocks into a wide range of 
downstream sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture and infrastructure. In this 
regard the following proposals warrant further consideration: 
1. Ensure competitive local prices (EPP) of strategic mineral feedstocks into 
manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, agriculture; 
2. Resolve the debilitating power constraint through investments into power 
generation and through imports, including the temporary permitting of direct imports 
by mineral beneficiators; 
3. Harmonise mineral production and industrial strategies through strong coordination 
of Ministries of Mines and of Industry, of Agriculture, etc. 
4. Introduce beneficiation milestones in mining leases at 5, 10, 15 and 20 years and 
make downstream value addition a bid variable for all new competitively tendered 
mineral concessions; 
5. Impose a small export tariff (<5%) on select raw mineral exports to encourage 
beneficiation (where independently shown to be viable).  
6. The viability of a PGM refinery should be independently assessed and, if positive, 
an export tax on unrefined PGMs should be considered; 
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7. The viability of a stainless steel slab plant should be independently assessed and, 
if positive, an export tax on ferrochrome and nickel exports should be considered; 
8. Establish new steel producers (Mwanesi?) to sell at EPP  in the domestic market; 
9. Investigate the viability of establishing a plant to produce  petrochemicals 
(particularly polymers) and fertilisers from coal/gas resources; 
10. Ban all scrap metal exports (reserve for domestic use); 
11. Producer Power- PGMs: Amend the Gold Trade Act to also require PGM 
Authorised Dealers and engage the government of South Africa on the feasibility 
of collaborating on the marketing of PGMs and growing downstream industries ;  
12. Enlarge the local market through equitable regional integration (SADC, SACU, 
CMA); 
13. Support beneficiation technology and skills development (Knowledge Fund). 
4.5 KNOWLEDGE LINKAGES 
Establishing the minerals knowledge linkages (skills and technology development) is 
critical to developing the back/forward linkages. In this regard the following proposals 
should be considered: 
1) The reinforcement of the National Migration Management and Diaspora Policy to 
include the location of skilled Zimbabweans in the diaspora and instruments to 
facilitate their return such as assisted relocation and remuneration subventions for 
critical scarce skills;  
2) Investigate the conversion of tertiary state training costs into notional loan to be 
worked off over 15 years by working in-country (coverts to real loan if graduate exits 
before year 15);  
3) The introduction of minimum minerals knowledge corporate spend of 5% of payroll 
to fund skills formation for the minerals sector and back/forward linkage industries, 
as well as local technology development. The South African Mining Charter154 
targets HRD expenditure of 5% of pay-roll by 2014. Including the 1% National Skills 
Levy, this comes to 6% of the company’s pay-roll; 
4) Rebuild mineral technology development institutions (IMR, GML, BSM, 
Universities, et al);  
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5) Use of a portion of the proposed RRT to fund: 
a) The training and remuneration of Maths and Science specialists to assist in 
Maths and Science Education in primary schools across the country where 
such need is identified. The precise mechanism for implementing this should 
be worked out in consultation with the Ministry of Education,  
b) Grants/loans for Engineering and Science students to be administered 
through the Universities. Tertiary training should be free in critical technical 
areas; 
c) Financial support to Engineering Faculties based on the number of 
undergraduate students graduating and registering with the Engineering 
Council of Zimbabwe (ECZ), as well as financial support to Engineering 
Faculties for post-graduate studies. 
d) Grants for Engineering and Technician learnerships. 
6) However, it may be advisable to first carry out a survey of the critical minerals 
technical skills needs and to then develop a HRD strategy with government. Such 
a plan might best be resourced by establishing a National Minerals Skills Fund, 
together with the GoZ and the mining industry, funded in part by the Mineral 
Knowledge Corporate Spend (5% of payroll).  
7) Investigate the establishment of a dedicated Minerals Technology Fund (MTF) as 
a PPP with the mining industry, pedagogical institutions and state enterprises 
(ZMDC) and institutions.  
4.6 SPATIAL LINKAGES 
Mineral endowments can have significant spatial linkages both through the 
development of local communities (LED) and the collateral use of mineral infrastructure 
(transport, power, water) by other sectors. In this regard the following interventions 
should be considered: 
1. Stipulate third party access at non-discriminatory prices to all mineral infrastructure, 
as well as obligatory reasonable over-capacity, to cater for other users; 
2. Make investment in excess infrastructure capacity a bidding criteria for all public 
tenders of mineral assets; 
3. Permit coal/gas extraction companies to establish IPPs (independent Power 
Producers) to supply ZESA at reasonable (cost plus) tariffs; 
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4. Oblige all Mining Lease holders to establish CSI (Corporate Social Investment) 
programmes in the surrounding communities and to report on them annually; 
5. Concession future mineral export rail corridors to the users for the minimum viable 
concession period, with third party access at non-discriminatory prices and 
minimum excess capacity for other users; 
6. Establish a Mwanesi SDI based on the huge Mwanesi iron ore resource, through 
the public tender of the resource that selects the investment partner that maximises 
the spatial (infrastructure) impacts as well as the other linkages. This should be 
done together with the government of Mozambique to give the Zimbabwean 
economy a low-cost logistics corridor to the coast and the global economy. 
7. Assess the viability of a second heavy-haul corridor for coal exports (possibly to 
Maputo-Matola-Techobanine) and the case for a second SDI with Mozambique. 
4.7 REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Zimbabwe is a founder member of the SADC (Southern African Development 
Community) which has a combined GDP of over one trillion US dollars (about 60% 
South Africa). This presents a substantial regional market for beneficiated products 
(forward linkages), mining and mineral processing inputs (backward linkages) and 
mineral sector skills and skills formation (knowledge linkages). As a landlocked 
country, Zimbabwe is inherently dependent on the region for its international trade 
infrastructure (spatial linkages) and the region could offer lower cost energy supply 
solutions through the SAPP (Southern African Power Pool) which are already being 
exploited (hydro-power from Mozambique- HCB155). Regional cooperation in mineral 
taxes configuration and collection could enhance the fiscal linkages. 
Consequently, the deepening of equitable regional integration should be a key element 
of a future Minerals Development Policy. In this regard the efficacy of joining the SACU 
(Southern African Customs Union) and the CMA (Common Monetary Area) should be 
assessed (the ZAR is already legal tender, together with the USD). 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
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Finally, Zimbabwe’s mineral endowment could not only underpin the rebuilding of the 
economy, but could also catalyse wider industrialisation, growth and sustainable 
development. However, this will not necessarily happen under the current “free-mining” 
mineral regime with limited mining lease conditions. The mineral regime needs to be 
substantially overhauled to facilitate the maximisation of the developmental impact of 
finite resources on this and future generations, through ensuring that all the attendant 
economic linkage opportunities are realised. In the short term the most important 
constraint facing the industry is the national power shortage which needs to be urgently 
resolved. 
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5. FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
This study has highlighted numerous areas/issues that require further investigation and 
assessment in order to provide policy makers with evidence-based analysis to guide 
policy reforms that will maximize the mining sector’s contribution to the economy. 
These include: 
5.1 ON MINERALS GOVERNANCE 
Project 0: Development of a new Minerals Development Policy: This is underway and 
public hearings on the draft were held in 2013. The DRAFT Minerals Development 
Policy is presented in Appendix 7.7 and covers, at a high level, most of the 
recommendations of this study156 
Project 1: Legal and mineral economics research to simplify the mineral legislation 
(rework the MMA) to legislate for four basic mineral rights (licenses or leases): (1) An 
Exploration License (2) A Small-scale Prospecting Licences, (3) A Small-scale Mining 
Lease (ASM) and (4) A Mining Lease. This research should also propose amendments 
to the MMA to cater for a hybrid FIFA (claims) and public tender system over “known” 
and “unknown” mineral resource terrains, respectively and amendments to facilitate 
greater backward and forward linkages value addition and a minimum lease-holder 
spend on local knowledge formation; 
Project 2: Research on best-practice in the public tender of state assets (PPPs) and 
the optimal location and configuration of such capacity within the state administration; 
Project 3: Research into global best-practices in supporting responsible artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM) and proposals on how to rebuild and expand the previous 
ASM support “golden triangle” (finance, marketing and technical support); 
Project 4: Financial Research on the optimum methods of resourcing and configuring 
an ASM venture capital fund (VCF), together with the COMZ, donors, et al, with a 
special window for female ASM; 
Project 5: Research on the reconfiguration of the Geological Survey (ZGS) as a state 
agency with the ability to re-attract requisite professionals, and methods of resourcing 
and organising the ZGS to undertake systematic geo-mapping, to categorise the 
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country into known, unknown and partly known mineral resource zones and to develop 
mineral targets, arising out of the geo-mapping, for public tender. Reconfiguration of 
IMR and Government Metallurgical Laboratory to support state capacity in knowledge 
generation, R&D; 
Project 6: Research on the role of the state mining company (ZIMDC) in facilitating 
both mining and mineral linkages, including proposals on its shareholder mandate, its 
reconfiguration to realise the mandate and the active role of the state in mineral 
extraction. 
5.2 ON MINERAL FISCAL ISSUES 
Project 1: Econometric research on the probable impacts of all the fiscal proposals 
contained in this report, particularly the forecast impact on fiscal revenues (for various 
price and production scenarios). This research should also cover proposals on the fine-
tuning of the recommended instruments and the building of the requisite state capacity 
to effectively administer the new mineral fiscal regime. 
Project 2: Research on global best-practice in establishing (configuring) and managing 
a Sovereign Wealth Fund, with dedicated windows for an Infrastructure Fund, Fiscal 
Stabilisation Fund and a Minerals Development Fund. It should include global 
experiences in successfully protecting the fund from being accessed for short-term 
contingencies. 
Project 3: Research on optimal revenue collection and management approaches 
including developing frameworks for optimal utilisation and management of community 
development funds 
Project 4: Research on the impact of international trade practices including tariff and 
non-tariff barriers (tariff escalation) on the exports of value-added mineral products  
5.3 ON BACKWARD LINKAGES: 
Project 1: Research on global experiences in developing the resources extraction and 
processing supplier clusters, including the best instruments for facilitating such 
development (both carrots and sticks) and an analysis of the minerals inputs supply-
chains. The research should identify critical missing links in such chains and 
recommend strategies for their establishment; 
5.4 ON FORWARD LINKAGES: 
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Project 1: Techno-economics research on global best practice in facilitation minerals 
value addition, including an assessment the most efficient instruments, such as 
judicious export taxes. The research should also assess the viability of establishing the 
following beneficiation plants: a PGM refinery, a coal/gas based petrochemicals plant 
and export-based iron/steel and stainless steel plants; 
Project 2: Research on producer bodies and their efficacy, including the possibility of 
creating a regional PGM marketing body together with South Africa to facilitate the 
location of downstream industries in the two states. Similar studies on diamonds could 
be undertaken especially with the advances which Botswana has made and 
Zimbabwe’s infant diamond industry could learn from that model 
5.5 ON KNOWLEDGE LINKAGES: 
Project 1: Research into global best-practice in rapidly upgrading the national technical 
skills pipeline (engineers, scientists and technicians/artisans), including the optimal 
interventions to effect such an expansion of the national technical skills complement; 
Project 2: Research onto the creation a robust Zimbabwean mining and mineral 
processing technology development capacity, including instruments and interventions 
to realise this; 
5.6 ON SPATIAL LINKAGES: 
Project 1: An assessment of the viability of both an iron ore (Mwanesi) based SDI and 
a coal resource based SDI, to the Mozambican coast, including all the possible 
collateral impacts on other sectors. 
Project 2: Assessment of options for the import of power from Mozambique, both 
HEP157  (from Cabora Bassa and, in future, Mpande Nkuwa) as well as from the 
planned thermal plants based on waste coal from the Tete coalfields (Vale and Rio 
Tinto), including the efficacy of Zesa partnering (JV) on the thermal plants (their waste 
coal supply costs are likely to be significantly lower than domestic plants resulting in 
lower electricity costs). 
                                            
 
157 HEP: Hydro-electric Power 
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Project 2: Research on sustainable socio-economic development strategies in mining 
areas, including the development of a template for CSR programmes, community 
involvement, resettlement approaches, compensation templates, etc. 
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7. APPENDICES 
7.1 APPENDIX 1: HISTORY OF MINING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA158 
Southern Africa is one of the only areas on earth that contains a complete history of 
mining, going back to pre Homo sapiens, and continuing with the first human workings 
through to the first underground mines, on 
to iron age mining and finally colonial 
commercial mining. 
 
It contains evidence of some of the very 
earliest use of minerals in the form of stone 
tools by pre-humans, Homo habilis, at for 
example Sterkfontein and Kromdraai (1.7 - 2 
million years BP)  
These are arguably represent the earliest 
recorded “quarrying” by hominids  
The first use of minerals by Homo Sapiens is probably the recent discovery at Pinnacle 
Point (Mossel Bay) of the heat treatment of rock (silcrete)  to harden it for the making 
of microlith (flake) tools (80 -150 000 years BP) 
constituting the first human heat treatment.  
An engraved plaque of ochre (hematite) was found at 
Blombos Cave (near George in SA), dated at 75 000 years BP and is the first evidence 
of human art or possibly writing, though the meaning of the striations is unknown. 
The first known underground mine is at 
Lion Cavern (Ngwenya) in Swaziland (20 
000 - 43 000 years BP) where the 
ancestors of the San people mine iron 
oxides for ochre for rock painting.  This 
deposit was later mined commercially by 
Anglo American in the 60s and 70s (Ngwenya Mine) and the iron ore was exported 
                                            
 
158 Compiled by author 
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from Maputo on the Goba railway line. The early San ("Bushman") hunter-gatherers 
did not possess smelting technology but did exploit fine grained, glassy, rocks such as 
obsidian and chalcedony for the manufacture of stone implements and weapons. 
Various iron oxide ochres were also used for painting. It was not until the arrival of the 
Bantu-speaking iron age cultures that the mining and smelting of iron began. Ancient 
smelting sites, usually identified by slag heaps and tuyer shards, are to be found right 
across Zimbabwe, the earliest of which has been dated as the 2nd Century. 
By the 11th Century these people had developed more elaborate forms of social 
organisation that also included a substantial mining and smelting industry based on 
other metals such as gold, copper and tin. In 922 an Arab traveller, al-Mas’udi of 
Baghdad, visited Sofala, on the Mozambican coast, and reported a large trade in gold 
and ivory coming from a kingdom in the interior (Zimbabwe) at that time already. From 
the 11th Century onwards, gold from Zimbabwe was carried by Arab and Swahili 
traders from the southern African coast to the Arab world and on to the Indian and 
Asian markets. 
The construction of the spectacular stone buildings of Great Zimbabwe, at the time the 
largest city in sub-Saharan Africa, which took place from the 13th to the 15th Centuries, 
could well have been related to the dramatic increase in wealth from the thriving gold 
mining industry at this time. It has been estimated that there exist about 4000 ancient 
gold workings and about 500 ancient copper workings in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and 
Botswana, mainly in Zimbabwe on the Achaean schistbelts, principally dating from this 
period. 
Under a Rozvi chief called Mutota, the Munhumutapa (meaning "pillager") Empire was 
built in the first half of the 15th Century and it split into two at the end of the 15th 
Century: the Munhumutapa in the north and the Changamire in the south. Both of these 
groupings controlled numerous shallow gold mines principally in the schistbelts 
(goldbelts) which occur right across the country. 
The rise of mercantile capitalism in Europe brought the Portuguese in the 16th Century, 
in search of gold, copper and slaves, who sought to replace the lucrative Arab-African 
trade that had been in existence since before the 10th Century. The Munhumutapa 
allowed their penetration in the north, but the Changamire refused them entry to the 
southern region. 
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In 1573 the Munhumutapa granted the Portuguese mining rights, for gold and other 
minerals, in northern Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In the late 1620's the Portuguese 
launched two military campaigns against the Munhumutapa state and installed a 
puppet Munhumutapa. At the end of the 17th Century the Changamires managed to 
throw the Portuguese and their puppet Munhumutapa off the Plateau and install a 
northern vassal kingdom. The Changamires dominated the gold mining industry and 
gold trade, via the Sabi/Save valley to the coast, until they were routed by the Nguni 
(Ndebele) invasion under Mzilikazi in the 1840's, fleeing the Boer expansion into the 
Transvaal. 
The 19th Century European explorers such as David Livingstone and Karl Mauch 
encountered wide evidence of the earlier thriving gold mining industry. In the 1880's 
the Cape diamond and gold mining magnate, Cecil John Rhodes, sent representatives 
to the Ndebele capital, Bulawayo, to obtain mineral concessions. In 1889 Rhodes 
floated the British South African Company (BSAC) and obtained a Royal Charter to 
install an administration over the Zambezi territories. This was done to contain the 
Boers south of the Limpopo and because the reputation of the Munhumutapa gold 
fields had led Rhodes to believe that present day Zimbabwe contained gold deposits 
to rival the Witwatersrand. 
Iron and copper mining and smelting appears 
from c. 200 AD and there are thousands of iron 
smelting sites across southern Africa!  
The photo depicts a Venda-type iron smelting 
furnace in1888. The manufacture of traditional 
iron products (axe heads, hoes, arrow heads, 
assegais, etc) continued up till the 1950’s. The 
numerous Hwedza hill iron furnaces in Zimbabwe were described by early colonists as 
the “Sheffield of Africa”.  
 
Some Ancient Base Metal Mining Sites in Zimbabwe and SA 
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Source: Hammel, White, Pfeiffer & Miller 2000, “Pre-colonial mining in southern Africa”, SAIMMJ, 
Jan/Feb 2000, 49. 
Gold trade via the eastern seaboard to the Middle East and Asia well- established by 
c. 900 AD and gold was an important commodity in the Mapungubwe (c. 1220 -1270) 
and Zimbabwe/Munhumutapa states where numerous gold artefacts have been found 
in numerous sites. 
 
Many of these sites also contain Asian trade goods and gold and ivory where traded 
with the east via the Dhow trade up the east coast of southern Africa to the Middle East 
and beyond. Items of Ming Dynasty ceramics have been found at Mapungubwe. The 
Mapungubwe state was probably a precursor of the ancient Zimbabwe (Munhumutapa) 
state with extensive gold mining. There are over 4000 ancient gold mines and workings 
Ming porcelain 
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in southern Africa159, predominantly in Zimbabwe and northern SA (Limpopo Province). 
Although Great Zimbabwe is not close to the local gold seam, its power derived from 
controlling the trade in gold. During this period mine shafts were sunk to a depth of 100 
feet and complex mining methods were used including ventilation shafts an fracturing 
the rock face with fires.  
Copper was mined at Phalaborwa and Mussina (on Zimbabwe-SA border) and “the 
earliest South African example of a shaft, gallery, or adit was found at Lolwe Hill, 
Phalaborwa, where ancient miners sought malachite and azurite (the site is now the 
location of a large open pit mine). A shaft 6 metres in depth with a 10 metres horizontal 
gallery was dated at AD 770”160. It is possible that these technologies were later applied 
in Zimbabwe, where similar mining methods were used at a later date. 
The Rooiberg tin mines (SA, Limpopo Province) operated from the 15th to the 17th 
Century and the Mussina copper deposits were probably mined from the 10th Century, 
but unfortunately the early workings were destroyed by the European miners at the 
start of the 20th Century161. 
With the rounding of the Cape by Barlowmeu Dias in 1488 and the subsequent sacking 
of the east coast island city-states (Kilwa, Mocambique, Zanzibar, etc.) by the 
Portuguese “conquistadores”, their attention turned to the main source of the gold- The 
Munhumutapa (Zimbabwe) state. After two unsuccessful campaigns the Portuguese 
finally managed to subjugate it and install a puppet Munhumutapa, but the fabled gold 
was is illusive, as it was spread over thousands of ancient workings in the Goldbelts 
(Greenstone Belts) and there is no record of substantial plunder accruing to the 
invaders.162 By the 18th Century the Portuguese had lost their grip on the ancient 
Zimbabwe state and the remnants survived as numerous chieftaincies and polities, 
with minor gold mining activities. 
                                            
 
159 Summers, R, “Ancient Mining in Rhodesia and Adjacent Areas”, National 
Museums of Rhodesia Memoir No 3. Salisbury, The Trustees of the National 
Museums of Rhodesia, 1969.  
160 Hammel, A. et al “Pre-colonial mining in southern Africa”, Journal of the SAIMM, 
Jan/Feb 2000, p52 
161 Herbert , E.W., “Red gold of Africa: copper in precolonial history and culture”. Univ 
of Wisconsin Press, 2003, p27 
162 Summers, 1969, op cit 
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The invasion of the Cape by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1652 heralded 
the start of the systematic dispossession of indigenous southern Africans of their land, 
minerals and liberty. However, in the hinterland, “...by the time the European settler 
community arrived in the region almost every gold-bearing quartz outcrop had already 
been worked, nearly every viable outcrop of copper-bearing rock had been exploited, 
and hardly a tin lode of any importance was left untouched” by the indigenous 
miners.163  
“European colonization was the ultimate constraint on these indigenous operations as 
imported goods rapidly undermined the value of traditionally produced goods and local 
mining declined dramatically. Although much of the evidence of pre-colonial mining 
has since been destroyed by modern mining operations, recent research has started 
to balance the colonial-oriented version of history with information regarding the 
achievements of indigenous miners and smelters—from whom, it seems, there is a lot 
to learn”164  
The European “discovery” of diamonds in Griqualand in the 1860s led to the first 
southern African diamond “rush” by European opportunists from all over the globe, but 
the local inhabitants were denied diamond claims and relegated to the role of labourers 
for the invaders. This was repeated for gold in the Barberton Mountain Lands and 
Sabie (Pilgrims Rest) in the 1870s and later, when the world’s largest gold formation, 
the reefs of Witwatersrand System, was exploited by the European plunderers. 
Unlike Sabie and Barberton, the European “discovery” of the Wits main reef gold 
conglomerate on Langlaagte Farm (near Johannesburg) in 1886 did not precipitate the 
usual “gold rush” of European fortune seekers, due to the massive capital requirement 
to develop deep underground gold mines. 
The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1871 had already generated substantial 
capital from British and European banks to finance the new diamond mining houses 
started by colonists Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Beit and Barney Barnato and others, who 
eventually came together to form De Beers. Diamond capital was consequently 
                                            
 
163 Hammel, et al “Pre-colonial mining in southern Africa”, Journal of the SAIMM, 
Jan/Feb 2000, p54 
164 Hammel, et al “Pre-colonial mining in southern Africa”, Journal of the SAIMM, 
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available to mine the Wits gold. However, Rhodes “...wants this wealth for a very 
specific purpose. It is needed to fulfil his dream of establishing British colonies north of 
the Transvaal, as the first step towards his ultimate grand vision - a continuous strip of 
British Empire from the Cape to the mouth of the Nile.”165 
Cecil Rhodes, was an unscrupulous British imperialist and founded Gold Fields of 
South Africa (GFSA) in 1887 and the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1889, 
through the merging of the Central Search Association and the Exploring Company 
Ltd., which received a royal charter from the British imperial government in 1889. 
“Modelling the BSAC on the British East India Company, Rhodes hoped it would 
enable colonisation and economic exploitation across much of south-central Africa, as 
part of the Scramble for Africa".  He “...bought the Rudd Concession from King 
Lobengula ostensibly for mining purposes, but he brought an army and settled at 
present day Harare in 1890. Thereafter, Rhodes declared war on Lobengula and 
overthrew him and named the country Rhodesia. As a British colony, Rhodesia was 
characterized by: 
1) A massive land grab exercise, which drove thousands of Africans, often at 
gunpoint, from 50% of the country into reservations, now called communal 
lands. Land was taken without compensation to the owner and given to 
Rhodesia’s soldiers, or later to veterans of the two world wars of the 20th 
century, or to any white settler, but not to black persons. This racial land 
division was consolidated by the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and the 
Land Tenure Act of 1969, which prohibited blacks to own land in white areas. 
2) The exclusion of Africans from the political process. Africans were denied 
the right to vote or stand for parliament, or to hold high office in the army, 
police or public service. 
3) Africans were excluded from the best schools, residential areas, and other 
amenities, which were reserved for whites only. Rhodesia was a mirror 
image of the apartheid policy, which then prevailed in South Africa.”166 
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The European settlers took control of Rhodesia in 1923 when it became a settler self-
governing British imperial crown colony. Subsequently European opportunists and 
adventurers poured in to exploit the country’s rich natural resources and cheap 
subjugated local labour and the mining sector boomed with the opening of numerous 
mines, mainly based on ancient workings. The non-African alien population rose 
rapidly from 32,000 in 1923 to 220,000 by 1953 when the settlers extended their 
resource base through the formation of the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). 
“The intended economic benefits materialized during the early years of the federation, 
helped by a world rise in copper prices, but this [was] not enough to stifle increasing 
political unrest - particularly as British colonies elsewhere in Africa win independence 
(beginning with Ghana in 1957). 
In the early 1960s African politicians in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland win 
increasing power in their legislative councils. The pressure grows to break up the 
federation. In March 1963, by which time all three colonies are demanding 
independence, the British government finally concedes. The Federation is formally 
dissolved on 31 December 1963.”167  
Immediately after the dissolution of the Federation a white supremacist party 
(Rhodesian Front) took control of the Rhodesian settler government and threw the 
nationalist leaders into detention. In 1965 it declared UDI (Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence) from the British Empire. Limited sanctions were applied but were 
generally ineffective due to support to the settler government by the apartheid regime 
in South Africa. 
The nationalist guerrilla war of liberation started in earnest in the early 70s, but did not 
have an appreciable impact on mineral output. By 1980 the white supremacist 
government capitulated and the country finally became an independent democracy. 
  
                                            
 
167 History World, op cit 
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Box: Geology & History 
“The Zimbabwe Geological Survey (1990) identifies more than 500 individual deposits of base metal 
and industrial minerals in Zimbabwe. It describes Zimbabwe as ’an important producer’ of gold, chrome, 
lithium asbestos and caesium, as well as high-quality emeralds. Modern mining began in 1892 and by 
1990 over 40 minerals were being exploited. Over the first 100 years of modern mining activity, the two 
most valuable products by far were gold and asbestos but this has changed with the emergence of 
nickel and ferrochrome as major exports and, very recently, the exploitation of platinum group metals – 
platinum, palladium and rhodium. 
Most mineral production is from the ancient Archaean core of the country where most deposits are 
concentrated in the greenstone belts that contain gold, copper, tungsten, antimony and arsenic. Nickel 
with its by-products of copper and cobalt is also mined in the greenstone belts, while asbestos deposits 
are found in the serpentized ultramaric intrusions. There are known huge resources of chromite and 
platinum along the Great Dyke that runs through the centre of the country from northeast to south-west. 
Initially mining in Zimbabwe centred on the exploration and exploitation of gold deposits almost all of 
which were known from ancient workings. 
Subsequently, world class deposits of chromite and chrysotile asbestos were developed, along with 
Hwange coal. The Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Co (ZISCO) (as it is now known) was built to produce iron, 
steel and coke, while two major ferrochrome projects were developed, Zimbabwe Alloys, producing low 
carbon ferrochrome and Zimasco, which manufactures high carbon ferrochrome. Subsequently, an 
ammonium nitrate plant was opened at Zisco to produce oxygen-refined steel, while a large open-cast 
coal mine was developed at Hwange for coking coal and for steam coal to fire the Hwange Thermal 
Power Station. 
Copper deposits were exploited by MTD Mangula and the Empress nickel deposit, discovered in 1956, 
was brought into production along with other nickel properties (Trojan, Shangani, Epoch and Madziwa 
in the 1960s and early 1970s). Two nickel deposits at Hunters Road and Damba-Silwane remain 
dormant. The Empress Nickel mine has closed but the refinery still operates for toll treatment of matte 
from the BCL mine in Botswana. Small open-cast mines were opened at Buchwa and Ripple Creek for 
iron ore, and at Dorowa for phosphate, along with a number of open-cast gold mines using extraction 
by heap-leaching. 
Since 2000 however, a number of mines have closed, including the copper producers at Mangula, 
Alaska and Sanyati and the Epoch and Madziwa nickel mines. The Railway Block high-grade chromite 
mine has closed as well as the Dalny-Venice-What Cheer group of gold producers and the smaller 
Gaika, Motapa and Royal Family gold mines. 
The original BHP Platinum mine at Selous, which opened in the late 1990s, was closed when the 
Australian mining company disinvested. The plant was subsequently restructured for the open-cast 
mining at Ngezi, while most recently diamond pipes at Murowa (the Rio Tinto group) and River Ranch 
have been mined on a small scale along with alluvial diamonds at Marange. 
All existing mines operate under constraints – most notably the exchange rate, which has decimated 
gold production, and shortages of power, skills, ore and low sulphur coal required by the ferrochrome 
sector. Major expansion potential exists in the platinum industry with new underground mines at Unki 
(Anglo American), Ngesi (Impala Platinum) and Mimosa. 
The Zimbabwe Geological Survey (1990) lists no fewer than 66 base and industrial mineral deposits 
found in Zimbabwe but in recent years production has become increasingly concentrated to the point 
where in 2006 seven products accounted for 98 percent of total value. In part, this growing concentration 
reflects price movements – the boom in gold and platinum prices – along with a shift in the composition 
of output towards higher value and value-added minerals, such as PGMs and ferrochrome. 
Geological assessments suggest that underinvestment in exploration and production, and not mineral 
potential, have been the main factors limiting mining development in Zimbabwe. This is not a new 
phenomenon and pre-dates the onset of the political and economic crisis at the end of the 1990s. As 
long ago as 1992, the World Bank identified Zimbabwe, along with the DRC and Namibia, as ‘Category 
A’ countries requiring the highest level of exploration investment amongst African states of US$100 
million over a five-year period ($20 million annually). In all three countries mining exploration had been 
constrained by political and economic uncertainty with mining houses reluctant to invest in a country 
with a track record of policy unpredictability, especially in terms of property rights and exchange-rate 
management.” 
Source: Hawkins T 2009, “The Mining Sector in Zimbabwe and its Potential Contribution to Recovery”, 
UNDP, Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, Working Paper #1. 
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7.2 APPENDIX 2: EXTRACT FROM STERP: MINING 
(Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) Getting Zimbabwe Moving 
Again, 2009, page 43) 
 
Mining  
136. The mining sector, a major earner of foreign currency, has been performing below 
its potential. Its recovery, taking account of the diverse mineral resource base, will be 
underpinned by various interventions over the coming year.  
137. Raising the capacity in mineral production, continuous exploration as well as 
beneficiation and value addition of minerals will benefit from joint venture strategic 
partners who have the necessary technology and foreign currency back-up.  
138. To ensure full exploitation of mineral resources, The Inclusive Government is 
reviewing the framework for mining rights, pricing of minerals and surrender 
requirements. The Mines and Minerals Act will also be amended to facilitate review of 
surface rentals, discourage hoarding and speculating in Exclusive Prospecting Orders.  
139. There are structural deficiencies in respect of the register of all known minerals in 
Zimbabwe and their stock thereof. This is largely due to the absence of a clear 
exploration policy and the related issue of extraction. Quite clearly, there is a legislative 
deficiency in the above areas, a situation that has created rampant abuse of our scarce 
resources.  
140. STERP will thus oversee the crafting of an Exploration, Registration and 
Extraction Mining Policy which will form the basis for a new comprehensive mining 
sector legislation. Under this overall Mining Policy, there will be separation of 
exploration from extraction policies and strategies.  
141. Furthermore, The Inclusive Government will explore the establishment of an 
institution responsible for exploration issues including collecting and building a 
comprehensive database on quantity and quality of the country’s mineral endowment.  
Pricing of Minerals  
142. A key component of STERP in reviving the mining sector will be to ensure that 
international commodity prices are levied and received by mining houses. In short, the 
pricing gap in respect of which domestic prices lagged behind international prices is a 
thing of the past.  
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143. Consistent with this policy, no more retention on commodity earnings will be made 
by any authority in Zimbabwe. However, as quid pro quo the Inclusive Government will 
review upwardly the taxation and royalty structures in line with international standards.  
144. Equally, there will be greater demand made on mining houses on protecting of 
the environment. Furthermore, while the STERP will be allowing flexibility in marketing 
of minerals, The Inclusive Government is imposing social development obligations on 
mining houses.  
Marketing of Minerals  
145. To enhance value, the marketing of all minerals other than Gold will be done 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development together with 
the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, a Board established through an Act 
of Parliament.  
146. In the case of Gold, the same will remain a strategic reserve asset, whose 
licensing and marketing will be in terms of the Gold Trade Act. However international 
prices will still have to be paid to producers and no amount will be retained by the 
Reserve Bank.  
147. Similarly, as in the case of other commodities, the Inclusive Government will 
review upwardly the taxation and royalty levels and structures.  
148. Special attention will also be given to the small to medium gold producers. In this 
regard, a special facility will be created for the provision of short term finance and 
assistance.  
149. To the extent that steel is not a mineral but an industrial product, STERP will take 
measures to ensure that its marketing thereof is done exclusively by the producer and 
not MMCZ.  
150. In respect of outstanding amounts owed by the Reserve Bank to mining houses, 
these will be assessed and evaluated to establish authenticity and to ensure that 
repayments are done by the same within a reasonable time.  
Amendment of the Mines & Minerals Act  
151. To ensure full exploitation of minerals resources, The Inclusive Government will 
expedite the amendment to the Mines and Minerals Act, which is already before 
Parliament. The Act seeks to review the framework for mining rights, with a view of 
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reviewing the mining title system, discourage hoarding of claims which are not being 
worked, and reforming the Mining Affairs Board.  
Minerals Value Addition  
152. The contribution of mining to the revival of the economy is limited by the low level 
of beneficiation and value addition to our mineral resources.  
153. Initiatives to increase beneficiation and value addition for all major minerals 
including gold, platinum, nickel, copper, coal, coke, and other various non-ferrous ores 
and concentrate are being undertaken.  
154. This will include penalties for the exportation of raw minerals where value addition 
options are readily available.  
Precious Metals  
155. Presently, virtually all diamonds, emeralds and semi-precious stones are exported 
in the raw form, whilst a small percentage of gold is manufactured into jewellery.  
156. Concerted efforts will therefore be made to promote beneficiation and value 
addition programmes in the precious metals sector.  
157. This process will take advantage of the existing local gold refinery and mature 
jewellery industry, which will make it immediately and commercially feasible to add 
value to our mineral resources.  
158. Platinum producers will be urged to enter into local tolling arrangements for 
smelting, converting and base metal refining so that the country fully benefits from its 
natural resources.  
Base Metals  
159. Zimbabwe has the world’s second largest chrome reserves. There is also great 
potential in expanding ferrochrome production in the country.  
160. The Inclusive Government will therefore take advantage of the existing 
beneficiation facilities to refine all important base metals which include chrome, copper, 
nickel and iron ore.  
161. The Lomagundi Copper Refinery will also be resuscitated to ensure maximum 
beneficiation of locally produced copper which is currently being exported in 
concentrate form. The Refinery will further be utilised as a toll Refinery for copper 
concentrates from Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and South 
Africa.  
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162. Furthermore, the ban on the exportation of all forms of scrap metal which has 
encouraged local value addition of base metals will be maintained.  
Industrial Minerals  
163. Capacity to beneficiate industrial minerals currently remains low. This requires 
more effort to increase beneficiation capacity in the medium to long term.  
164. In the interim, royalty payment levels on all industrial minerals currently being 
exported in raw form will be increased to encourage exporters to utilise suitable value 
addition technologies.  
Energy Minerals  
165. Coal presents the greatest potential for value addition in the energy sub-sector.  
166. In this regard, coal mining companies will be instructed to export coke, instead of 
the traditional coking coal. Punitive measures in the form of increased taxation levels 
will be imposed for non-compliance.  
167. Through availing adequate resources for the use of acquired technologies, the 
country stands to benefit from increased revenues derived from the by-products of 
producing coke which include various solvents, tar, and with further processes, petrol 
and diesel.  
168. The bulk of locally produced coal will be devoted to local thermal electricity power 
generation with the excess power being exported to the sub-region.  
169. Furthermore, projects to exploit coal bed methane resources will be pursued.  
Small Scale Mining Mechanisation  
170. The Programme also provides for mechanisation support for small and medium 
scale miners with potential to generate substantial mineral exports.  
171. The Scheme will be implemented in conjunction with the Mining Industry Loan 
Fund to assist miners with loans, access to machinery & equipment and technical 
services to boost production.  
172. This therefore entails the recapitalisation of the existing Mining Industry Loan 
Fund.  
173. In this regard, the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development is overseeing the 
finalisation of the necessary mechanisation strategies with the support of the mining 
industry.   
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7.3 APPENDIX 3: MINING & THE ECONOMY  
Compiled by Isaac Kwesu 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector plays an important role in the socio-economic development 
of the country. The sector’s contribution to the economy appears in several forms; 
inclusive of direct contribution to GDP, employment creation, foreign exchange 
generation, gross national investment, social infrastructure development and direct 
contribution to the government revenue. In addition, the sector has direct and indirect 
downstream (and upstream) multiplier effects to other economic activities. Facts on 
the ground reveal the mining sector currently constituting 13% of nominal GDP, 50% 
of the nation’s total exports, 12% of fiscal revenue, 45,000 employment jobs, more than 
50% of foreign direct investment, and corporate social investment in agriculture, health, 
education, housing, and infrastructure. 
1. Distribution of the Mining Sector Revenue  
Of the approximately USD2 billion revenue generated by the mining sector in 2011, 
36% was consumed by purchase of materials, 15% by salaries and wages, 21% by 
other operating expenditures. The government and the mining companies benefited 
17% and 11% respectively as shown in the pie chart below. 
 Distribution of the mining revenue 
 
Source: Deloitte Tax Study 2012, RBZ, COMZ 
The actual dollar distribution of the total mining sector revenue is shown in the abridged 
schedule below: 
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Distribution of Mining Revenue by Dollar Value in 2011($mn) 
 **Total revenue generated by the 
sector 
  2,000  
Total cost of production for the 
sector 
  
Total wages paid by the sector   300    
Total supplies and consumables  720    
Other operating expenditures 420    
   (1,440 ) 
       660  
Total payments to the 
government 
     (340 )  
***Total profit for the sector 
shareholders 
     220   
**The figure excludes diamonds; *** The figure is a sum total of the profit and loss making companies 
(i.e. net of loss making mining companies). Source: Deloitte Tax Study 2012, RBZ, COMZ 
2. Contribution to GDP 
From 1999 to 2008, mining sector contribution to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
has been averaging about 4%. The contribution grew up phenomenally to average 
11% between 2009 and 2011. In 2011 alone mining output is estimated to account 
13% of gross domestic product (GDP) directly, although the indirect multiplier effects 
take the contribution to about 18.4% of GDP in total. The indirect multipliers include 
backward linkages (e.g. transport, supplies, professional services, etc.), forward 
linkages (e.g. electricity generation) and the induced effect via mining generated 
incomes. 
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Mining contribution to GDP (1995-2015) 
 
 
Contribution to GDP: sectoral comparison 
 
Source: MOF, ZIMSTAT 
Regional comparisons: contribution of mining to GDP 
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Source: Various Country Statistics 
3. Contribution to Exports and Foreign Exchange 
In terms of foreign exchange earnings per unit of GDP, mining generates the most 
foreign exchange of the economy. The sector contribution to exports has increased 
significantly from 20% between 1993 and 2003 to 43% between 2004 and 2011. In 
2011 alone the sector contributed USD2.3billion to national exports, representing far 
above 50% of the country’s total merchandise exports and the country’s total foreign 
exchange earnings.  
Zimbabwe mining exports (1980-2012)  
 
Source: MOF, RBZ 
Sectoral contribution to total exports (1993-2003) 
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Sectoral contribution to total exports (2004-11) 
 
Source: MOF 
Mining contribution to exports: regional comparison 
 
Source: Various Country Statistics 
4. Contribution to Fiscal Revenue 
The growth of the sector has seen its contribution to fiscal revenue increasing from 
5.78% in 2009 to 7.2% and 12 % in 2010 and 2011 respectively 
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*Total  Tax Paid Directly by Mining sector to 
government* 
57,800  167,523.8 340,300  
Direct mining contribution to total government 
revenue % 
5.78% 7.2% 12% 
*The above figures exclude diamond payments; Source: Deloitte Tax Study 2012, 
COMZ 
 
In 2011 the total tax paid by the mining sector to the government is estimated around 
US$340 million representing about 12% of the revenue collected by government for 
the year (2011). If one incorporates alluvial diamond the contribution increases to 
around 18%. The contribution in various taxes include royalty, corporate income tax, 
VAT, customs duty, PAYE, Marketing Commissions (MMCZ), capital gains tax, local 
authority charges, EMA charges, licence fees/registration fees among other charges.  
Revenues to the State from mining companies in 2011 were disaggregated as follows: 
Fiscal Revenue from Mining  
Tax Total Revenue Revenue 
from Mines 
Per Cent 
contribution by 
mines 
PAYE   480 000 000  87 400 000        18% 
Corporate Tax   296 000 000  45 600 000       15% 
Royalties   83 400 000  83 400 000      100% 
Customs Duty   334 000 000  26 700 000        8% 
Other VAT, WHT, 
payment to local 
authorities etc 
  1 406 000 000   97 200 000*       7% 
Total 2 600 000 000 340 300 000      12% 
Source: Deloitte Tax Study 2012, COMZ 
While the absolute figure of $340million contributed by the mining sector to total fiscal 
revenue in 2011 may appear small relative to the total revenue (export receipts) it is 
important to note that the mining sector is still experiencing high cost of production, 
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chunking approximately 72% of the total revenue. This leaves about 28% to be shared 
between the government and the shareholder of which the government currently takes 
around 60% of that 28%.  Despite the current low capacity levels and high costs of 
production the sector’s contribution to the fiscal revenue is fairly comparable to the 
sub- region. In SA, Zambia, Tanzania and Swaziland the contribution are 12.2%, 13%, 
10% and 2% respectively.  
Contribution to Fiscal Revenue: Regional Comparisons 
 
Source: Various Country Statistics 
4.1 Fiscal challenges 
While the mining industry has great potential to grow and be many times its current 
size the current fiscal landscape continues weigh down the maximum output the sector 
can generate. The sector is vulnerable to a myriad of taxes which include:  
Mining Taxes 
Royalties
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Capital gains tax 15-20% 
Marketing Commissions (MMCZ) 0.875% 
EMA charges 2% of 
gross 
revenue 
Local authority charges Vary 
with 
local 
authorit
y 
Mining licence fees As per 
SI 11 of 
2012 
Source: ZIMRA, MOF 
The above taxes and fees currently constitute 17% of mining tax revenue and around 
60% of the mining sector profitability before tax. The major concerns about the current 
fiscal regime are the indiscriminate or fragmented approaches by different government 
departments in levying charges to mining companies, high royalty rates and the 
unpredictability of the mining tax regime. 
4.2 The prospects of the mining sector contribution to fiscal revenue 
The potential maximum contribution of the mining sector to revenue largely depends 
on the growth and development of the mineral sector. The mining industry (excluding 
diamonds) requires over US$5-7 Billion dollars in capital to optimize production over 
the next 5 years. A lot more is required is new ventures are included. Of the above 
figures Gold requires 33%, platinum 40%, diamonds 11%, coal 8%, Chrome 4%, nickel 
4%. If secured the minerals output for key sectors will grow phenomenally as shown 
below; 
Requisite Investments in Mining 
Mineral Minimum Funding 
Requirement (US$ Bil) 
   2011   
production 
Expected production 
by                   2016 
Gold 2.3 12,992kg 50 000kgs 
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PGMs 2.8 10,826kg 21000 kgs 
Ferrochrome 0.28 161,838 tons 262 000 tons 
Nickel 0.28 7,992 tons 25 000 tons 
Source: COMZ 
Given the above projected growth the contribution by the mining sector to revenue is 
expected to grow inexplicably to constitute between 20% and 25% of the total 
government revenue by 2016. The gold sector which was hard hit by the economic 
decline of the 2008 remains strategic to fiscal contribution if proper considerations are 
prioritized to the revival of the sector. If given the opportunity the sector will grow faster 
than the base metals. Apart from the capital challenges the gold sector is currently 
bleeding from the high and suboptimal royalty rates with the government having 
increased the royalty rates five times in the past three years. Royalty rates for gold and 
platinum have gone up by more than 100% and 200% respectively as shown below:  
Increases in Au and PGM Royalty Rates 
 2009 Mid 2010 2010 2011 2012 
Gold royalty 3% 3.5% 4% 4.5% 7% 
Platinum royalty 3% 3.5% 4% 5% 10% 
Source: MOF 
The platinum industry which has contributed more than 45% of the total sector output 
in the past 3 years is on an expansion phase and requires capital around 
$2,800,000,000.00 to increase its installed capacity. Despite being profitable the 
platinum producers in total are currently injecting capital more than double their 
earnings. With production levels expected to double in the next 3 years the role of the 
platinum will significantly prop up the sector’s contribution to the fiscus. It is against 
this background that the sector looks forward for a downward review in the current 
royalty rates to competitive levels in order quicken the recapitalization process by 
increasing the amount of earnings to be ploughed back as capital, as well as attracting 
new external capital. 
5. Contribution to employment 
The sector directly employed around 45 000 workers in 2011.  It is estimated that 
another 15,000 workers are employed in associated industries that either supply 
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products to, or use products from the mining industry. Over 500, 000 people are directly 
dependent for their daily subsistence on mining incomes.  
Contribution to employment 
 
Source COMZ 
6. Contribution to investments 
The sector continues to act as a magnet for investment in Zimbabwe. It directly 
accounted more than 50% of total fixed investment and more than 75% of the total 
private sector investment in 2011. If the multiplier effect is taken into account, mining 
helped generate about 80% of total investment in the economy. The reason for the rise 
in the contribution of mining is the encouraging recovery in real mining output with more 
than $5 billion required by the sector in the next 5 years. 
(IK- STILL COMPILING STATISTICS) 
7. Mining Sector and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The sector continues to support CSR development initiatives that include: 
- Primary and secondary schools  
- Hospitals and clinics 
- Community housing schemes 
- Road construction 
- Support for local income generating projects 
- Scholarship programmes 
- Local Procurement 
The sector has concluded some empowerment deals, which make the mineral 
resources sector the largest contributor to black economic empowerment.  
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7.4 APPENDIX 4: CHANGES IN MINERAL FEES (2011/2) & COMZ 
RECOMMENDED FEES 
PROVISION FEES AS AT 
DECEMBER 
2011 (SI 13 
OF 2011) 
US$ 
FEES AS 
AT 
JANUARY 
2012 (SI 11 
OF 2012) 
US$ 
COMZ 
RECOMMENDED 
FEES 
US$ 
COMMENTS 
PRESCRIBED FEES 
Application fee for 
registration as an 
Approved 
Prospector  
Application for 
renewal as an 
Approved 
Prospector  
Fee for Duplicate 
Certificate of 
registration as an 
Approved 
Prospector 
1500 
 
250 
 
1500 
5 000 
 
1 000 
 
 
3 000 
 
500 
 
1 500 
This is similar to a practicing 
certificate fee. Even at recommended 
levels is too high. 
Indigenous Zimbabwean are mainly 
involves, at this level barrier to entry 
is high. 
Fee for a 
Prospecting 
License 
Ordinary 
Special 
Fee for a 
duplicate 
Prospecting 
License 
 
100 
150 
150 
 
500 
1 000 
 
 
300 
450 
150 
These are instruments used by 
indigenous players in mining. 
If too high then goes against 
indigenisation programme 
Fee for application 
for registration of 
Precious metal or 
Precious stone 
block 
 
Fee for application 
of registration of a 
base mineral 
block 
Ordinary 
Special 
200 
 
 
 
 
300 
500 
100 000 
precious 
stones 
1 000 000 
diamond 
500 000 
platinum 
 
 
2 000 
4 000 
300 
 
 
 
 
300 
300 
At this stage in the development of 
projects no income is being 
generated.  
 
 
Based on principle of standardisation 
of fees. In line with proposal in Mines 
and Minerals Amendment Bill to have 
one type of title 
Registration fee 
for sites 
100  100  
Fees for duplicate 
certificates of 
registration 
300  300  
Application for 
revocation of 
forfeiture 
500 5 000 2 500 To reduce work for ministry and 
enforce prudency 
Fee for Special 
Grant application 
under Part XIX 
1000 10 000 5 000 Areas are reserved against 
prospecting or mining for a reason. 
Those with justifications to go against 
such reservations must pay a 
premium 
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Annual fee for 
renewal Special 
Grant under Part 
XIX US$ per Ha 
per year 
20 100 20 Fee for renewal of SG are a cost 
when no income is being generated. 
Fees already too high 
     
INSPECTION FEES 
Fee for inspection 
by declaration of 
work 
Registered blocks 
First Inspection   
US$ per 5 claims 
Subsequent 
inspections  US$ 
per 5 claims 
Mining lease 
First Inspection   
US$ per 5 Ha 
Subsequent 
inspections  US$ 
per 5 Ha 
 
 
 
5 
10 
 
 
5 
10 
 
 
 
1 000 
1 000 
 
 
1 000 
1 000 
 
 
 
10 
20 
 
 
10 
20 
These fees appear small in absolute 
numbers. However, because of the 
number of claims that are held that 
run into thousands for one to make 
commercially acceptable returns, the 
effect of high charges increase 
rapidly. Suggest that  we maintain 
fees at 2011 levels   
Inspection by 
production 
Precious metal 
blocks  US$ per 5 
claims 
Base mineral 
blocks 
 
Chrome   tonnes 
for every 5 claims 
Iron Ore   tonnes 
for every 5 claims 
Limestone  tonnes 
for every 5 claims 
 
ZW$2 000 
 
 
24 tons 
60 tons 
60 tons 
 
1 000 
 
 
 
1000 
 
 
24 tons 
60 tons 
60 tons 
 
This is the value of minerals 
production necessary to inspect every 
5 claims 
These tonnages are deemed 
sufficient as minimum work 
requirements 
Fee for inspection 
by survey  US$ for 
every 5 claims 
10 1 000 20 Note 1. The principle regulations state 
these shall be as per section17 which 
are recommended at US$20 
Fee for inspection 
of precious metal 
block without 
development work 
US$ per 5 claims 
or part thereof 
10 1 000 20 Note 1 
Unit of 
expenditure 
equivalent to 10m 
of development 
work   US$ 
ZW$300 
 
 100 Note 2 
Fee for inspection 
of base mineral 
blocks by 
payment   US$ 
per 5 claims 
20 2 000 20 Note 1 
Protection fee for 
claims   US$ for 
each period of 2 
10 1 000 20 
 
10 
Note 3 
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months for a 
certificate 
Fee for protection   
US$ per 5 claims 
Annual fee for 
Precious stone 
blocks   US$ for 
every 5 claims 
Mining leases   
US$ for every Ha 
 
10 
 
10 
 
1 000 
 
1 000 
 
20 
 
20 
Note 1 
Fee for inspection 
of mining leases 
by production   
As for the 
blocks above 
   
Fee for inspection 
of mining leases 
by making up 
deficient work by 
payment 
US$ per 5 Ha 
10 1 000 20 Note 1 
Annual fee for 
alluvial, alluvial, 
rubble or dump 
precious metal 
claims   US$ per 5 
claims 
10 1 000 20 Note 1 
Inspection of 
mining lease by 
production 
Precious metal 
blocks  US$ per 
5Ha 
Base mineral 
blocks 
Chrome   tonnes 
for every 5 claims 
Iron Ore   tonnes 
for every 5 claims 
Limestone   
tonnes for every 5 
claims 
 
 
 
 
24 tons 
60 tons 
60 tons 
  
 
100 
 
24 tons 
60 tons 
60 tons 
Provided for under section 26 of the 
principal regulations RGN 247/1977 
   
 
  
OTHER FEES AND CHARGES 
Search fees:  US$ 
per hour 
4  5  
Certificate of 
ownership:  US$ 
per block of 
claims 
15 with a 
minimum 
charge of 30 
 5  
Copies of 
agreement:   US$ 
per application 
30 when 
prepared by 
an official 
30 when 
prepared by 
applicant 
 30 
 
30 
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7.5 NEW FEES THAT ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR IN THE MINES AND 
MINERALS ACT 
PROVISION FEES AS AT 
JANUARY 2012 (SI 
11 OF 2012 
US$ 
COMZ 
RECOMMENDED 
FEES US$ 
COMMENTS 
PRESCRIBED FEES 
Fee for a 
Prospecting 
License 
Ordinary for 
whole country 
Special for 
whole country 
 
1000 
3000 
 
300 
450 
These licenses will breed confusion in the 
registration of mining title. 
Registration 
fees 
1 000 000 
diamonds 
1 000 000 diamond 
2 500 000 platinum 
500 000 coal 
2 000 Chrome 
5 000 Chrome 
Special PL 
300 
 
 
 
300 
300 
The law recognises Application fees for 
registration. The split of these fees into 
Application Fees and Registration fees 
makes the applicant pay double for a permit 
or license 
Ground Rentals 3 000 per Ha\year 
for daimonds 
100 per Ha\yr for 
Coal, CBM, 
Minerals Oils, 
Energy Minerals 
1 000 per Ha/yr 
Platinum 
300 per ordinary 
block 
3 000 per Special 
block 
100 Ground rentals are the same as fees for 
inspection of mining titles or mineral 
exploration 
Providing for inspection fees and ground 
rentals is charging twice for the same 
activity. 
Source: Kewsu I 2012, COMZ 
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7.6 APPENDIX 5: MINERAL RESOURCE RENT TAX (RRT) 
LEGISLATION 
(Generic wording adapted from Liberian Revenue Code) 
a) Purpose. This Clause applies to determine whether a project is sufficiently high-
yield to be subject to a RRT (surtax) and, if so, the amount of tax. 
b) Definition of High-Yield. A project is considered high-yield and thus 
subject to surtax when the project’s pre-tax rate of return on total 
investment is greater than (Treasury Bond rate +7?) percent, the threshold 
rate of return for application of this Clause. The Treasury Bond rate that 
has maturity nearest to 10 years at the end of the fiscal year, plus 700? 
basis points. If no Treasury Bond Rate is available, then the applicable 
threshold rate of return shall be 20?, percent until a Treasury Bond is 
issued. 
c) Method to Calculate Yield. A project’s accumulated negative net cash flow shall 
be determined by applying an annual accumulation factor of 1.(above 
threshold rate over 100) to negative net cash flow carried forward from a prior 
tax period. At the close of each tax period, accumulated negative net cash flow 
carried forward from the prior period shall be increased by current negative net 
cash flow or offset by current positive net cash flow. A project is not high-yield 
and subject to surtax unless it’s accumulated net cash flow at the close of a 
period is positive. 
d) Surtax Rate. Positive net accumulated cash flow at the close of a tax period is 
taxable at a rate of (rate=50?) percent and the amount of this liability is 
deductible from gross income for the tax period. 
e) Re-Set Accumulation to Zero. Following a tax period for which tax is due under 
this section, a project’s accumulated negative cash flow is re-set to zero and the 
method of subsection (d) is re-applied using zero as the starting point for the 
succeeding tax period. 
f) Steps to Calculate Yield. Beginning with the first tax period in which a project 
has begun construction, the following steps are used to calculate yield in 
accordance with subsection (d). 
(1) Cost. State the expenditures, as specified below, for the tax period. This is 
the project’s cost through the close of the period. Go to Step 2. 
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(2) Revenues. State the project’s revenues, as specified below, for the tax 
period, including revenues, if any, from the exploration period. This amount 
is the project’s revenues through the close of the period. Go to Step 3. 
(3) Test Net Cash Flow.   
(A) Determine net cash flow. Subtract from revenues the amount of 
cost to arrive at net cash flow (R – C = NCF). 
(B) Net cash flow zero or negative. If net cash flow is zero or 
negative, the project is not yet a high-yield project and the surtax 
does not apply. Multiply the negative net cash flow by 1.(above 
threshold rate over 100) to arrive at the project’s accumulated 
negative net cash flow to be carried to the next tax period. Go to 
Step 4. 
(C) Net is positive. If net cash flow is positive, tax is determined under 
subsection (e), and this amount is deductible in determining taxable 
income (below). Accumulated negative net cash flow is re-set to 
zero in accordance with subsection (f). Go to Step 4. 
(4) Reprise. Re-apply steps (1) through (3) for each succeeding tax period, 
beginning with the period after the one tested under Step 3— 
(A) Add costs incurred in the succeeding period to any accumulated 
negative net cash flow carried from the prior period (zero if re-set) 
as under Step 1. Go to (B). 
(B) State revenues for the succeeding period as under Step 2. Go to 
(C). 
(C) Test net cash flow as under Step 3. 
Determination of Expenditures for RRT Purposes  
(a) Expenditures Counted. For the purposes of determining cost under Section 
(f)(1), a project’s expenditures for a tax period is the sum of the following amounts 
incurred during the period, and does not include the amount of any income tax paid: 
(1) Expenses deductible in computing taxable income, but not the allowance for 
depreciation or interest and finance charges; 
(2) Capital expenditures to acquire or construct a tangible or intangible asset for 
use in mining operations; and 
(3) Exploration, development, and capital goods expenditures as defined in (the 
nation’s)  Tax Law. For a project’s first tax period, include expenditures for prior 
Wits MSC 
 
233  
exploration, development, and capital goods attributable to the project under 
(the nation’s) Tax Law. 
(b) Transfer of Interest. Consideration paid for transfer of an interest in the project is 
disregarded in determining the project’s total expenditures. 
(c) Only Production Expenditures. If an amount referred to in subsection (a) is attributable 
to commercial production and some other non-production activity of the project, only the 
amount attributable to commercial production is included in determining the project’s total 
expenditures. 
Determination of Total Revenues for RRT Purposes  
(a) Revenues Counted. For purposes of the RRT clause, a project’s total revenues 
for a tax period is the sum of the following amounts: 
(1) The project’s gross income for income tax purposes for the tax period, including amounts 
from hiring or leasing-out property or the granting of rights to use property (but not including 
interest income); 
(2) The project’s consideration received for the tax period for the disposal, destruction, or 
loss of any property (including materials, equipment, plant, facilities, and intellectual 
property or rights) used in mining operations if the expenditure incurred in acquiring the 
property was deducted in computing the project’s net cash flow for any tax period;  
(3) Any amount received for the tax period for provision of information or data obtained from 
any survey, appraisal, or study relating to mining operations, if the expenditure incurred in 
undertaking the survey, appraisal, or study was previously deducted in computing the 
project’s net cash flow for any tax period;  
(4) Any other amount received for the tax period that is a reimbursement, refund, or other 
recoupment of an amount previously deducted in computing the net cash flow of the project 
for any tax period; and 
(5) If property used in mining operations has been destroyed or lost, any compensation, 
indemnity, or damages the project received in respect of the property under an insurance 
policy, indemnity agreement, settlement, condemnation action, or judicial decision.  
(b) Transfer of Interest. Consideration received for transfer of an interest in the 
project is not included in a project’s total revenues. 
(c) Only Production Revenues. If an amount referred to in subsection (a) is 
attributable to commercial production and some other non-production activity of the 
project, only the amount attributable to commercial production is included in 
determining the project’s total revenues. 
Wits MSC 
 
234  
 
Wits MSC 
 
235  
Changing structure of the Mining Industry: 1994 & 2011 
Mineral Company Main Owner 1994 Main Owner 2011 Operations 1994 Capacity 
‘94 
Asbestos  Shabanie and Mashaba Mines 
(Pvt.) Ltd.  
African Associated Mines Pvt. Ltd., 
100%  
Local Shabanie Mine, Zvishavane; Gaths and King 
Mines,  
300 
Coal  Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd.  Private investors 60%, Government 
40%  
Govt 60% Hwange  5,000 
Cobalt tons  Bindura Nickel Corp.  Anglo American Corp., 100%  Mwana Africa Shangani, Madziwa, Trojan, Bindura & Epoch 
Mines  
150 
Copper  Mhangura Copper Mines Ltd.  MCM ZMDC 54.56%  ZMDC (shut) Mhangura Mine 16 
Copper  Lomagundi Smelting & Mining 
(ZMDC) 
ZMDC  ZMDC (shut) Alaska Smelter & Refinery 35 
Diamond ct  Auridam Zimbabwe Ltd.  Auridam Consolidated, 50%; 
Redaurum Red Lake Mines 50%  
Local investors River Ranch Mine,  50,000 
Diamond ct  (Murowa) NA Rio Tinto Plc, 78%, & RioZim Ltd., 
22% 
Murowa NA 
Diamond ct  (River Ranch) NA Local investors River Ranch NA 
Diamond ct  (Marange) NA Canadile Miners (Core Mining Ltd. 
& Marange Resources Pvt Ltd.) 
Marange NA 
Diamond ct  (Marange) NA Mbada Mining (Grandwell Holdings 
Ltd. & Marange Resources Pvt 
Ltd.) 
Marange NA 
Gold kg  Rio Tinto Zimbabwe Ltd.  RTZ Corp. plc., 56%  RioZim local Renco, Patchway, Brompton Mines, Cam-Motor 
dump 
2,800 
Gold kg  Cluff Resources Zimbabwe Ltd.  Cluff Resources plc, 82.4% Mwana Africa Freda Rebecca Mine 2,500 
Gold kg  Independence Mining Pvt. Ltd.  Lonhro plc, 100% Metallon Plc How, Athens, Tiger Reef, Redwing & Shamva 
Mines,  
3,300 
Gold kg  Falcon Gold Zimbabwe Ltd.  Falcon Investments S.A., 71.7%  New Dawn 80% Dalny Mine, Venice Mine, Golden Quarry Mines 2,000 
Gold kg  Corsyn Consolidated Mines Pvt. 
Ltd.  
Lonrho plc, 100% Metallon Plc Anzac, Arcturus, Mazowe, Muriel Mine, 1,500 
Gold kg  ZMDC  Government, 100%  Government, 100%  Sabi Mine, Elvington Mine,  800 
Gold kg  Jena Mines Ltd.  ZMDC 50% Trillion Resources, 50% ZMDC Jena Group,  400 
Gold kg  Masasa Mines  Delta Gold NL, 100%  ? Giant tailings dump,  100 
Iron and steel Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Co. Zisco Government, 92%  Zisco – Essar? Redcliff,  1,000 
Iron ore  Buchwa Iron Mining Co Bimco Zisco, 100%  Zisco – Essar? Buchwa West Mine, Ripple Creek Mine,  1,400 
Ferroalloys: HC 
FeCr 
Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Co. 
Pvt Ltd. Zimasco  
Union Carbide Zimbabwe, 100%  Zimasco Consolidated Enterprises 
Ltd. (ZCE) Sinosteel 86%, CAD 
Funf 14% 
Peak Mine, Railway Block Mine, Smelter at 
Kwekwe  
178 
LC FeCr Zimbabwe Alloys Ltd. Zimalloys Anglo American Corp., 100%  Benscore Investments local Smelter at Gweru  35 
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FeCrSi Zimbabwe Alloys Ltd. Zimalloys Anglo American Corp., 100%  Benscore Investments local Smelter at Gweru  28 
Lithium  Bikita Minerals Pvt. Ltd.  Private, 100%  Local Bikita Mine,  33 
Nickel  Trojan Nickel Mines  Bindura Nickel Corp., 100%  Mwana Africa Shangani, Madziwa, Trojan, and Epoch Mines  17 
Nickel BSR Ltd.  Bindura Nickel Corp., 100%  Mwana Africa Smelter & refinery at Bindura  16 
Nickel  Rio Tinto Zimbabwe Ltd.  Rio Tinto Plc 100% RioZim Empress Nickel Refinery,  7 
Phosphate  Dorowa Minerals Pvt. Ltd.  Chemplex Corp. Ltd., 100%: AAC  Chemplex Dorowa Mine,  155 
PGMs (Ngezi)  NA Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 
86.9% 
Ngezi Mine NA 
PGMs (Mimosa)  Union Carbide Aquarius Pt Ltd  50%, Zimplats 
50% 
Mimosa Mine NA 
PGMs (Unki) NA Anglo Platinum (Anglo American 
Plc) 
Unki Mine NA 
Tin  Kamativi Tin Mines Ltd.  ZMDC, 91%, private, 9%  ZMDC (shut) Kamativi Mine  1 
Vermiculite  Shawa Vermiculite Pvt. Ltd.  Private, 100%  Shawa Vermiculite Pvt Ltd. Shawa Mine,  39 
Vermiculite  Dinidza Vermiculite Mining Co. Pvt. 
Ltd. 
Private, 100%  Dinidza Vermiculite Mining Co.  Dinidza Mine  10 
Sources: RMG 2012, USGS 2012 & Media 
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7.7 APPENDIX 6: ZIMBABWE- GOLD PRODUCTION BY MINE & COMPANY 
Gold Mines t Status 1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 Controlling company M1 M2 EBIT 2010* 
Arcturus Gold Mine O 0.690 0.580 0.580 0.600 1.098 1.100   ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Athens Gold Mine S   ..      ..    0.330 0.400  ---    ---    ---    ---   African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Attica Mines Pvt Ltd A 0.600 0.600   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Blanket Gold Mine O 0.690 0.540 0.640 0.803 1.075 0.700 0.500 1.114 Caledonia Au   2.497 
Cam & Motor Gold Mine O 0.100 0.140 0.280 0.503 0.263   ..      ..      ..    RioZim Au   -0.569 
Connemara Gold Mine C   ..      ..      ..      ..    0.323   ..      ..      ..    First Quantum Au   986.000 
Dalny Gold Mine O 1.200 1.490 0.980 1.200 0.556 0.200   ..      ..    New Dawn Au   1.303 
Elvington Gold Mine O  ---    ---    ---   0.536 0.500 0.200   ..      ..    State of Zimbabwe Au   0.000 
Eureka Gold Mine O   ..      ..      ..      ..    0.664  ---    ---    ---   Mmakau Au   0.000 
Forbes & Thompson Pvt Ltd A 0.500 0.800  ---    ---    ---    ---    ---    ---     Au   0.000 
Freda Gold Mine S   ..      ..    0.140 0.450   ..      ..      ..      ..    Forbes & Thompso Au   0.000 
Freda Rebecca Gold Mine O, E/C  ---    ---   2.120 2.500 3.489 0.300 0.730 1.308 Mwana Africa Au   -14.470 
Golden Kopje Mine C  ---   0.220 0.260 0.511 0.300  ---    ---    ---   Caledonia Au   2.497 
Golden Quarry Gold Mine O   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    0.200   ..      ..    New Dawn Au   1.303 
How Gold Mine O   ..      ..    0.900 1.200 1.050 1.500   ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Indarama Gold Mine S   ..      ..      ..    0.500   ..      ..      ..      ..    Yamana Au   583.480 
Inez Gold Mine S   ..      ..      ..    0.120   ..      ..      ..      ..    Mwana Africa Au   -14.470 
Jena Gold Mine O  ---    ---    ---   0.414 0.400   ..      ..      ..    State of Zimbabwe Au   0.000 
Maligreen oxide Gold Mine C  ---    ---    ---    ---   0.100   ..      ..      ..    Cluff Gold, Pan African  Au   -0.976 
Mazowe Gold Mine S 0.770 0.370 0.420 0.600 0.455 0.250   ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Metallon Gold Zimbabwe Ltd A 2.000 3.300  ---    ---    ---    ---    ---    ---   African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Mhangura Copper Mines Ltd A 0.300 0.200 0.270   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    State of Zimbabwe Cu   0.000 
Mimosa Platinum Mine O   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    0.303 0.426 0.447 Aquarius, Implats Pt Pd 58.429 
Muriel Gold Mine S 0.690 0.590 0.490 0.450 0.208  ---     ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Ngezi PGM Mine O  ---    ---    ---    ---    ---   0.300 0.800 0.700 Implats Pt Pd 7225.000 
Norman Levin Gold Mines Pvt Ltd A 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.700   ..      ..      ..      ..      Au   0.000 
Old Nic Gold Mine O   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    0.200   ..      ..    New Dawn Au   1.303 
Olympus Gold Mines Ltd A 0.300   ..    0.210   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    New Dawn Au   1.303 
Patchway/Brompton Gold Mine S 0.390 0.490 0.530 0.683 0.479   ..      ..      ..      Au   0.000 
Redwing Gold Mine O   ..      ..    0.970 0.700 1.020 0.500   ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
Reedbuck Gold Pvt Ltd A   ..      ..    0.350   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      Au   0.000 
Renco Gold Mine O 0.500 1.930 1.320 1.478 1.448 0.750 0.554 0.600 RioZim Au   -0.569 
Royal Family Gold Mine C   ..      ..    0.200  ---    ---    ---    ---    ---     Au   0.000 
Sabi Consolidated Gold Mines Pvt Ltd A   ..    0.430 0.600   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    State of Zimbabwe     0.000 
Sabi Gold Mine O  ---    ---    ---   0.311 0.414   ..      ..      ..    State of Zimbabwe Au   0.000 
Shamwa Gold Mine O   ..      ..    0.610 0.750 1.117 0.600   ..      ..    African Pioneer Au   0.000 
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Tiger Reef Gold Mine O   ..      ..    0.270 0.150 0.354   ..      ..      ..    BioMet Au   0.000 
Turk Gold Mine O   ..      ..      ..      ..      ..    0.450 0.420 0.485 New Dawn Au   1.303 
Unki PGM Mine O  ---    ---    ---    ---    ---    ---    ---   0.150 Anglo American Pt Pd 10928.000 
Venice Gold Mine C 0.400 0.570 0.700 0.700   ..     ---     ..      ..    New Dawn Au   1.303 
Vubachikwe Gold Mine O   ..      ..    0.180 0.350  ---     ..      ..      ..    Forbes & Thompson Au   0.000 
= total, identified by producer in country   9.630 12.750 13.950 16.609 15.313 7.553 3.430 4.804       0.000 
= total national production   11.000 14.690 16.900 24.290 22.000 14.023 9.619 12.994       0.000 
*for main controlling company Source: RMG database RMD 2012. 
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7.8 APPENDIX 7: DRAFT ZIMBABWE MINERALS DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY 
From the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development (www.mines.zw) 
 
Background To Minerals Development Policy Formulation Process 
A first draft of this policy was compiled by the MMMD with assistance from a 
consultant. The Draft Policy was then extensively discussed within the Ministry. 
Thereafter the Ministry organised public hearings in all of the main mining areas 
to obtain feedback and comments from all stakeholders. Public hearings were held 
in Kadoma, Gweru, Bulawayo, Masvingo, Mutare and Harare and the participation 
was strong, vibrant and pertinent, particularly from the ASM fraternity. In addition, 
a bilateral with the Chamber of Mines was held, and the Presidency organised a 
successful intra-governmental workshop on the Draft Policy to obtain input from 
other state organisations and entities. The numerous comments, edits and 
suggestions from the stakeholders were collected by the Ministry rapporteurs and 
were assessed for relevance and applicability in a Ministerial workshop. The bulk 
of the pertinent proposals coming from the citizenry were then incorporated into 
this draft, either in part or in full. 
TOWARDS A ZIMBABWEAN MINING VISION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
This Vision is based on the African Union’s “Africa Mining Vision” adopted by the 
Heads of State in 2009. 
Vision Statement168 
“Equitable and optimal exploitation of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources to underpin 
broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development” 
The shared vision will aim to achieve: 
 A knowledge-driven mining sector that catalyses and contributes to the 
broad-based growth and development of, and is fully integrated into, an 
African market through: 
                                            
 
168 These replicate the African Union’s “Mining Vision” of 2009 
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o Down-stream linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing; 
o Up-stream linkages into mining capital goods, consumables and 
services industries; 
o Side-stream linkages into infrastructure (power, logistics, 
communications, water) and skills and technology development 
(HRD and R&D); 
o Mutually beneficial partnerships between the state, the private 
sector, civil society, local communities and other stakeholders;  
o A vibrant, environmentally friendly and socially sustainable artisanal 
and small-scale mining sector; 
o A comprehensive knowledge of its mineral endowment.  
 A sustainable and well-governed mining sector that effectively garners and 
deploys resource rents and that is safe, healthy, gender and ethnically 
inclusive, environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by 
surrounding communities; 
 A mining sector that has become a key component of a diversified, vibrant 
and globally competitive industrialising Zimbabwean and African economy; 
 A mining sector that has helped establish a competitive Zimbabwean and 
African infrastructure platform, through the maximisation of its propulsive 
local and regional economic linkages; 
 A mining sector that optimises and conserves Zimbabwe’s finite mineral 
resource endowments and that is diversified, incorporating both high value 
metals and lower value industrial minerals at both commercial and small-
scale levels; and 
 A mining sector that is a major player in vibrant and competitive national, 
continental and international capital and commodity markets. 
Introduction 
“Countries with non-renewable natural resource wealth face special opportunities 
and special challenges. Used well, these resources can create greater prosperity 
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for current and future generations; used poorly, they can cause economic 
instability, social conflict, and lasting environmental damage.”169 
The effective and efficient management of Zimbabwe’s natural resources is a 
critical element of the Government’s economic development programme 
(STERP 170 ) and will entail “the crafting of an Exploration, Registration and 
Extraction Mining Policy which will form the basis for new comprehensive mining 
sector legislation.” 171  Furthermore, “To ensure full exploitation of mineral 
resources, [the government] is reviewing the framework for mining rights, pricing 
of minerals and surrender requirements. The Mines and Minerals Act will also be 
amended to facilitate review of surface rentals, discourage hoarding and 
speculating in Exclusive Prospecting Orders.”172 
This Minerals Development Policy document seeks to provide a framework for a 
minerals regime for the sustainable management of the country’s mineral 
resources and to guide interventions by government institutions as well as other 
stakeholders. It sets out the expectations for the sector to contribute not only to 
the revitalisation of Zimbabwe’s economy but more broadly to the development of 
its peoples, including future generations. 
Mining in itself is clearly not sustainable, as it depletes finite national assets. 
However, mineral extraction can indirectly become sustainable in so far as it 
catalyses sustainable economic activity in other, sustainable, sectors, through 
maximising the economic “linkages” whilst the resource is still extant. Strategies 
to develop these complex and diverse linkages are seminal to this Minerals 
Development Policy. 
A Zimbabwean Minerals Development Policy, to guide strategies, legislation and 
decision making, is all the more opportune and pertinent at the current global 
juncture of rapid and sustained growth in Asia, particularly China and India, that 
has dramatically increased mineral demand and prices. Given that the population 
                                            
 
169 Natural Resources Charter (NRC), www.naturalresourcecharter.org 
170 STERP 2009 “Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again” 
171 STERP 2009, # 140 
172 STERP 2009, #138 
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of developing Asia is more than three times that of the industrialised (OECD) 
countries, it can be expected that this high mineral demand cycle could continue 
for some time yet. This provides a unique a window of opportunity for Zimbabwe 
to use its mineral resource endowment wisely, to underpin integrated and 
diversified national growth and development, and to avoid the pit-falls of the 
“resource curse”. Many resource-rich African states have failed to realise the 
earlier expectations of rapid development due to the negative impacts of resource 
booms, such as the strengthening of the national currency, the diversion of capital 
and skilled labour into the resource sectors, rendering other sectors uncompetitive, 
the subversion of resource rents by the political elites, and a low rate of 
reinvestment into economic growth due to colonial mining laws that permit the 
expatriation of the bulk of the resource rents. 
Mineral deposits embody a massive variation in resource rents (returns above 
those necessary to attract the investment, = average return on investment: ROI), 
much greater than any other sector except for hydrocarbons (oil and gas). These 
“resource rents” are combination of “differential rents” (deposit “richness” = grade, 
yield, etc.) and “scarcity rents” (limited global resources). Consequently it is difficult 
to design a one-size-fits-all minerals regime with generic fiscal (tax) and linkage 
conditions (local content, beneficiation, skills formation, et al, milestones) that will 
efficiently maximise the potential development impacts of all deposits over time 
(changing supply/demand periods). In general, any mineral regime will set 
minimum linkage development obligations in order to make investments into 
marginal deposits attractive.  
Consequently the best way to flush out the maximum development impacts 
(linkages development) that any specific mineral deposit, embodying specific 
resource rents, could support, would be to get a market response through the 
public tender of the property against linkages development commitments (a form 
of developmental “price discovery”). However not all prospective properties are at 
a resource confidence level that would allow for viable competitive leasing (public 
tender).  
This policy document seeks to give adequate indications to the investment 
community (both national and foreign) of a competitive mineral regime that is 
informed by African and international trends, is grounded in local conditions and is 
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accountable to national common interests. Further, this policy focuses on 
advancing the interests of both present and future generations of Zimbabweans 
(inter-generational equity) in the context of attracting private investment to facilitate 
the development of mineral resources, but in an optimal manner that husbands the 
resource and maximises the economic linkages for sustainable local and national 
growth and development. 
3. Mineral Development Policy Principles 
Alignment with the new Constitution of Zimbabwe 
The Minerals Development Policy must embrace and be aligned with the new 
Constitution of Zimbabwe, including issues of gender equality and equity, 
affirmative action for women and indigenous Zimbabweans, benefits to mining 
communities (CSR: corporate social responsibility) and rights of the 
youth/children, women, the elderly, people with disabilities and veterans of the 
liberation struggle (Section 3. (2) (i)173). 
The founding values and principles of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe cover 
“…the principles of good governance, which bind the State and all institutions and 
agencies of government at every level [and] include… (j) the equitable sharing 
of national resources”174. Furthermore, the new Constitution affirms the principle 
of “…equitable access by all Zimbabweans to the country’s natural resources”.175 
Mineral resources are vested in the President on behalf of the nation in the Mines 
and Minerals Act of 1960: “The dominium in and the right of searching and mining 
for and disposing of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gases, notwithstanding 
the dominium or right which any person may possess in and to the soil on or under 
which such minerals, mineral oils and natural gases are found or situated, is vested 
in the President.”176 
In terms of procurement and other government contracts, including mineral leases, 
the new Constitution stipulates that:  
                                            
 
173 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Final draft, January 2013 
174 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Final draft, January 2013 
175 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Final draft, January 2013, #289 
176 Mines and Minerals Act, [Chapter 21:05]. #2 
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(1)  “An Act of Parliament must prescribe procedures for the procurement of 
goods and services by the State and all institutions and agencies of 
government at every level, so that procurement is effected in a manner that 
is transparent, fair, honest, cost effective and competitive. 
(2) An Act of Parliament must provide for the negotiation and performance of 
the following State contracts- 
a) joint-venture contracts; 
b) contracts for the construction and operation of infrastructure and 
facilities; and 
c) concessions of mineral and other rights; 
to ensure transparency, honesty, cost-effectiveness and competitiveness.”177 
Consequently this Mineral Policy is governed by the constitutional requirement for 
the transparent, fair, honest, cost effective and competitive acquisition of 
exploration services, through the issuing of exploration licenses, and the leasing 
of mining properties, through the issuing of mining leases by the State. 
Whilst recognising that mineral resources in the ground belong to the Nation, 
mineral operations will inevitably also comprise of elements of private property, 
such as surface facilities. Section 71 of the new Constitution states that “…every 
person has the right, in any part of Zimbabwe, to acquire, hold, occupy, use, 
transfer, hypothecate, lease or dispose of all forms of property, either individually 
or in association with others” and if deprived of their property, requires the 
acquiring authority “to pay fair and adequate compensation before acquiring 
property or within a reasonable time after the acquisition”. 
The new Constitution further states that “…every person has a right to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being to have the 
environment protected for the present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that- 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting economic and social development.”178 
Consequently this Mineral Policy seeks to balance economic and social 
development with ecologically sustainable minerals development. 
Other mineral policy principles contained in “Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again”179 
include: 
1. The facilitation greater exploration to identify and develop new national 
mineral assets, both by the state and the private sector; 
2. The elimination of resources hoarding and speculation, and the efficient 
extraction of resources; 
3. The maximisation of value addition in Zimbabwe, both through increased 
beneficiation and local content; 
4. The implementation of a mineral fiscal regime that optimises returns to the 
asset owner (the state) whilst still remaining attractive for investments by 
the operators; 
5. The facilitation of small and medium scale mining, including support for 
mechanisation. 
Zimbabwe has a rich and diverse minerals resource base that should be an 
important contributor to sustainable growth and development. The sector has 
rebounded dramatically from the hyperinflation economic crisis and with 
“dollarisation”, the value of mineral production has increased several-fold. 
However, if this increased mining activity is to ultimately result in more than just 
“holes-in-the-ground”, the crucial mineral economic linkages need to be realised 
whilst the resources are still extant. 
Developing with Broad Participation 
The Government of Zimbabwe policy shall encourage broad and more direct 
participation of all stakeholders which shall promote critical social acceptance of 
mineral projects. Thus both project sponsors and Government have 
                                            
 
178 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Final draft, January 2013, #73 
179 STERP 2009 “Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again”, section on “Mining”, p43 
DRAFT: Not for circulation or citation 
 
246 
 
responsibilities for developing and disseminating procedures to enhance effective 
consultation and participation. The facilitation of local equity participation in mining 
ventures could also help in enhancing acceptance. 
4. Mineral Endowment 
Zimbabwe has a long and illustrious mining history: There are over 4000 ancient 
gold mines and workings in southern Africa 180 , predominantly in Zimbabwe. 
Although Great Zimbabwe is not close to the local gold seam, its power derived 
from controlling the trade in gold. In the 1,200 years preceding European 
colonisation, it is estimated that about 4000 ancient mines produced between 600 
and 800 tonnes of gold "...with a normal production during their heyday of about 
20,000 oz. a year"181 and "the gold trade was directly responsible for the rise of the 
Zimbabwe state"182. During this period mine shafts were sunk to a depth of 100 
feet and complex mining methods were used including ventilation shafts and 
fracturing the rock face with fires. 
Zimbabwe is endowed with a wide variety of mineral resources, which are mainly 
found in the following geological formations and bodies: 
 The Greenstone Belts: Gold and silver, as well as considerable resources 
of iron ore, nickel, copper, cobalt and podiform chromite, also chrysotile  
asbestos (Mashaba Igneous Complex), limestone, pyrite and antimony; 
 The Great Dyke: PGMs183 and gold with associated copper, nickel and 
cobalt. Also, chromium (chromite seams), as well as minor asbestos and 
magnesite; 
 The Magondi Supergroup: Copper and silver (Dewera Group); 
 The Karoo Basins: Considerable bituminous coal, coking coal, anthracite, 
coal-bed methane (CBM) and shale gas resources; 
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 The Carbonatite Igneous Complexes:, phosphate (Dorowa, Showa); 
 Kimberlite pipes: diamonds (Morowa, River Ranch); 
 Pegmatites: Lithium minerals, columbite-tantalite, cassiterite, et al; 
 Recent alluvial and placer deposits: Gold and diamonds (possibly from 
reworked Umkondo conglomerates). 
The Government is committed to attracting and enabling private sector 
investments for the development of mineral deposits and to promote new 
investments in exploration and development of mineral deposits. Geological 
information and mineral data will be made readily and widely accessible to both 
small and large scale prospective investors through a user-friendly minerals 
cadastre information management system (MCIMS). 
In order to enhance the attractiveness of the minerals sector the Government will 
rebuild its capacity (Geological Survey of Zimbabwe) to undertake modern 
geological mapping and will dramatically increase funding for geo-survey activities. 
The viability of reinvesting a portion of mineral revenues into systematic geo-
survey will be explored in conjunction with tax incentives for private sector 
exploration. The long term future of the Zimbabwean minerals sector and its 
linkage industries is fundamentally dependent on on-going investments into geo-
survey and exploration today.  
5. Mineral-Based Development 
In order to optimise the economic linkages the current “colonial” minerals 
governance regime (“free mining”), based on a “free entry” claim, needs to be 
fundamentally overhauled to both encourage the discovery of new mineral 
deposits and to maximise the developmental impact of known mineral assets 
through transparent and competitive public tender against developmental 
outcomes. 
Zimbabwe will use its finite mineral resources endowment to catalyse wider 
national economic growth and development through the maximisation of the 
seminal mineral economic linkages. These include: 
1) Fiscal linkages- mineral resource rents will be captured, through the 
introduction of a resource rent tax on returns in excess of the return 
required to attract investment (average national return of investment).  
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These revenues will be reinvested into building long-term physical and 
human (knowledge) infrastructure, to underpin future national 
competitiveness, and into minerals development (exploration and 
technology development) to prolong the life of mineral resources. Taxes, 
tariffs and fees that add to the cost of mining will be minimised, with a 
lower schedule for ASM184,to encourage the optimal extraction of the 
resource and to discourage “high-grading”. RDC fees/levies should 
comply with a national formula to standardise the ad hoc and variable 
application of such fees/levies. 
2) Backward linkages – the minerals inputs sectors (capital goods, 
consumables, services) need to be grown, to take advantage of the 
expanding local demand, through measures to optimise the local 
content of mining purchases. The realisation of the backward linkages 
opportunities could seed wider national industrialisation (capital goods). 
3) Forward linkages – minerals could provide critical feedstocks for other 
job-creating sectors provided that they are beneficiated into appropriate 
intermediate products such as iron/steel, polymers and base metals for 
manufacturing; nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilisers for agriculture; 
cement, steel and copper for infrastructure and fossil fuels for power. 
However, mineral beneficiation may require state facilitation through 
incentives and disincentives, such as a small export tax if the next value 
addition step is clearly viable. The use of producer power, together with 
other countries, will be explored to facilitate local value addition, where 
viable. 
4) Knowledge linkages – the maximisation of human resource 
development (HRD) and R&D opportunities is essential for realising full 
benefit from the backward and forward linkages. No resource-based 
state has industrialised without significant investment in human and 
technology development. Joint strategies with the private sector will be 
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pursued (through PPPs), including the reinvestment of resource rents 
into knowledge development.  
5) Spatial linkages – high rent minerals are often able to finance major 
infrastructure (transport, power and water) which could underpin the 
development of other sectors such as agriculture, forestry and 
manufacturing, provided that the mineral leases provide for excess 
capacity and third party access at non-discriminatory prices. The huge 
Mwanesi iron ore resource could possibly underpin a low-cost logistics 
corridor to the coast which could substantially reduce the cost of trade 
(imports/exports) for the national economy. 
6) Scale: All of the linkages would be greatly enhanced through access to 
larger markets and in this regard configurations for equitable regional 
integration will be investigated and pursued (e.g. COMESA, SADC and 
SACU). 
Through these channels, Zimbabwe’s minerals endowment could catalyse wider 
economic development and industrialisation, but only if the minerals regime is 
overhauled and effectively administered to maximise all of the developmental 
opportunities associated with mineral extraction and processing. 
6. Minerals Governance.  
The current “free-mining” (FIFA185) colonial mineral regime based on claims is 
inappropriate for using national mineral assets to underpin wider development and 
industrialisation. A new minerals regime will be configured to: 
1) Establish an internationally competitive, stable and conducive business climate 
to attract and sustain foreign and local investment, whilst ensuring equitable 
distribution of benefits from mining activities to meet both current and future 
needs; 
2) Encompass a mineral fiscal regime that  assures the country of fair value from 
the depletion of its resources, whilst offering equitable rewards to private 
investors; 
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3) Ensure to optimal mining at the feasible lowest cut-off grade of the nation’s 
mineral deposits and the ensure that mineral leases allocate resources 
commensurate with the lessee’s mining work plan over the maximum lease 
period of 25 years; 
4)  Ensure “use-it-or-lose-it”  conditions on all types of mineral rights to minimise 
the sterilisation of national mineral assets; 
5) Incorporate instruments to ensure the realisation of the mineral linkages, 
recognising that FDI, in serving foreign shareholders, is less likely to develop 
these without the requisite incentives and disincentives; 
6) Establish mechanisms for the arbitration of competing land use options; 
7) Enhance the participation of indigenous Zimbabweans in mining and related 
linkage industries and facilitate equitable access to the sector by all 
Zimbabweans with the requisite capabilities, irrespective of gender or ethnicity;  
8) Minimise adverse social conditions and environmental degradation due to 
mining activities and enhance the health and safety regime for workers in this 
intrinsically dangerous activity; 
9) Support and enable sustainable artisanal and small scale mining activities to 
create employment, generate income and help reduce poverty in the rural 
areas; 
10) Ensure consultation of all stakeholders and affected people, from exploration 
through mining and post- mine closure; 
11) Establish an effective administration and management of the mineral sector;   
The new Constitution commits Zimbabwe to maximise the returns from the lease 
of mineral assets through transparent, fair, honest, cost effective and competitive 
concessions/contracts. Consequently, all known deposits and all lapsed or 
abandoned properties will be publically tendered to optimise the development 
impact through maximum linkages development. A developmental Mineral Policy 
will cater for the varying levels of resource confidence of potential mineral 
properties by only permitting exploration (prospecting) licenses over areas that 
have no known mineral occurrences, by auctioning all known properties and by 
reserving partially known deposits for further exploration by state agencies. The 
detailed parameters of the mineral assets auctioning process will be promulgated 
in the Regulations attendant to the new Law. 
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The following actions on the administration of national mineral assets will be 
progressed: 
 The development of a new Minerals Development Act (MDA) to cater for a 
hybrid of FIFA (claims) and a public tender system, for “unknown” and “known” 
mineral resource terrains, respectively, and to include viable backward (local 
content) and forward linkages (beneficiation) milestones and a minimum 
corporate spend on knowledge formation (skills formation and technology 
development); 
 The new law will cater for exploration licenses and ASM (Artisanal and Small-
scale Mining) prospecting licences, ASM leases, and Mining Leases on a use-
it-lose-it principle. The detailed procedures and modalities will be promulgated 
in the attendant Regulations; 
 The establishment of a functional and user-friendly national mineral cadastre 
information management system (MCIMS); 
 The rebuilding the ASM support “golden triangle” of finance, marketing and 
technical support; 
 The new law will also cater for a resourced and representative Minerals 
Development Board to advise the Minister on minerals development issues and 
to assist in mineral related disputes resolution. 
This policy will also ensure that mineral sector development takes advantage of 
initiatives and collaboration at regional, continental and international levels to 
assure best practices and good governance for accelerated growth and 
development. 
7. Regulatory Framework 
The Government of Zimbabwe is committed to the creation of a stable and 
conducive business climate. In the context of the legal and regulatory framework 
for the mineral sector, this involves: 
 an open, transparent and competitive auction procedure for known mineral 
deposits, 
 a predictable, time-limited, exploration licensing system for terrains with 
unknown deposits,  
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 a secure mining licence (lease) term (max 25 years) against CRIRSCO186 
compliant reserves commensurate with the work-plan,  
 clear procedures on the granting of an amended licence if further reserves 
are delineated, 
 clearly defined rules and regulations that: 
o Set out simple and transparent procedures for the allocation of 
rights,  
o Stipulate the conduct of exploration activities,  
o Define the transition from exploration to mining rights and the 
transfer of these rights, 
o Regulate the conduct of mining, 
o Define local content and value-addition obligations. 
o Stipulate local skilling and technology development commitments. 
o Guarantee security of tenure and the orderly carrying out of 
business, and 
o Ensure exclusivity of specified mineral rights over licensed areas.  
Government has resolved to overhaul the Mines and Minerals Act and introduce a 
new state-of-the-art Minerals Development law that will maximise the impact of 
mineral assets on growth and development, whilst remaining attractive for private 
sector investment. The mineral title system will encourage active mineral 
exploration and exploitation but discourage sterilisation for speculative and/or 
other purposes, but a retention license to allow the operator to retain an unworked 
right through periods of exceptionally low mineral prices will be configured. 
Disputes relating to mineral rights will be addressed in a timely and fair manner by 
government and, if no settlement is reached, the courts of Zimbabwe. 
An accessible web-based mining cadastre information management system will 
be established that will enhance transparency in the award and monitoring of 
mineral rights. The principle of First-In-First-Assessed (FIFA) will form the basis 
for conferring mineral exploration rights over areas where there are no known state 
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mineral assets and a transparent and competitive auction system will be used to 
concession all known mineral deposits, in accordance with the new Constitution. 
To ensure coherence in decision-making, the new Minerals Development Law will 
be harmonised with other statutes administered by other institutions that directly 
or indirectly affect the development of the mineral sector. 
The allocation of resources to strengthen the institutions with oversight 
responsibilities is a critical part of Government’s development program. The 
relevant institutions will be encouraged to consult and develop understanding 
between them as to their respective roles in and contributions to decision-making 
that impacts on the minerals sector.  
The Government of Zimbabwe recognises the need for special procedures to 
regulate mining of construction materials and to this end will develop mechanisms 
to ensure sustainable mining of minerals for construction and traditional purposes.  
8. Equitable and Competitive Mineral Fiscal Regime 
The fact that minerals constitute a non-renewable resource makes it necessary for 
the country to maximise the economic linkages, particularly the fiscal linkages, 
through the collection of economic rents in compensation for the forgone benefit. 
Unlike other concessions where the state asset is returned at the end of the lease 
with an enhanced value, mineral assets are depleted by the concessionaire and 
the state is left with a hole in the ground. The substantial impacts that mineral 
operations can have on the environment, society and future generations warrant 
that appropriate policy prescriptions be developed by the government to provide a 
mechanism for compensation as well as incentives to encourage sustainable 
development of its mineral resources, through the facilitation of sustainable 
ancillary economic activities. 
The substantial contributions to growth and development that can be realised by 
mineral resources require significant investments. Discovering a commercial 
mineral deposit and developing it into a mine is a risky business, as there is no 
guarantee of finding a deposit that can be mined profitably. There is often a long 
lead-time between expenditure on exploration and development and revenue 
generation from mining. In addition, the fact that major mineral deposits often occur 
in remote areas with poor social and physical infrastructure raises the capital costs 
of the project, but could also increase the positive collateral impact. There are 
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currently limited skills and financial resources and services available within the 
country, necessitating the attraction of foreign capital and skills in the short to 
medium term. 
The Government of Zimbabwe recognises the need to devise a fiscal regime that 
assures the country of fair value for its resources while offering sufficient incentives 
that will ensure fair and reasonable return to private investors. Such a regime 
should allow the investor to recover exploration and development outlays in a 
timely manner, to achieve an acceptable rate of return commensurate with risk 
and to meet financial obligations to creditors and suppliers.  The government will 
institute a well-designed fiscal regime that encourages investment, optimises 
economic linkages, exemplifies transparency, and captures reasonable and 
sustained revenue for the Zimbabwean people, within the confines of achieving 
national fiscal and regulatory economic uniformity.  
Mineral deposits often embody significant “resource rents” which are profits in 
excess of the normal rate of return, arising from the particular above average 
nature of the deposit (grade, yield, location, etc.) or scarcity of the mineral/s. Such 
excess windfall rents need to be equitably shared between the asset owner 
(Zimbabwe) and the asset exploiter. An equitable Resource Rent Tax (RRT) will 
be introduced that will replace the current Additional Profits Tax (APT). Other taxes 
that add to the cost of mining, such as royalties and fees, will be reviewed in the 
light of the RRT, recognising that these raise the mining cut-off grades and 
consequently sterilise national mineral resources. 
The longer term, the bulk of RRT receipts will be placed in a SWF187 and the SWF’s 
real earnings will be used to enhance national sustainable development (inter-
generational) through the consideration of the following possible disbursement 
windows: 
1. A Minerals Development Fund to finance accelerated geological mapping 
(ZGS) and co-finance indigenous private sector exploration, to ensure a 
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pipeline of new mineral developments as old mines are depleted or 
exhausted; 
2. A Fiscal Stabilisation Fund to protect the nation against external fiscal 
shocks (falls in revenue collection due to global crises causing mineral 
prices downturns); 
3. A Knowledge Fund to finance STEM 188  skills and local technology 
development, to increase national competiveness and thereby compensate 
for mineral assets depletion; 
4. An Infrastructure Fund to increase national economic competiveness, to 
compensate for mineral assets depletion. 
Mining companies with annual revenues above a threshold (to be determined) will 
be required to carry out a periodic tax self-audit, using recognised independent 
auditors, to assist the state in combatting transfer pricing and other forms of tax 
avoidance. The efficacy of permitting investments from tax havens will be 
reviewed, given the inherent strong incentive for these companies to shift profit 
from Zimbabwe to such jurisdictions through transfer pricing. 
All revenues from Zimbabwean mineral operations must be primarily banked in 
Zimbabwe before any externalisation for foreign costs or disbursements. 
The goal is to establish a fiscal regime which:  
(1) optimises the inherent value of the nation’s mineral resources; 
(2) regulates the rate of extraction and domestic pricing of critical 
strategic mineral feedstocks for economic growth and development; 
(3) minimises instruments that add to the cost of production and thereby 
sterilise resources; 
(4) is efficient in encouraging optimal extraction and avoids selective 
mining of high grade ore; 
(5) garners an equitable share of the resource rents for the nation and 
the developer; 
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(6) allows for reasonable stabilisation of specific taxes for defined 
periods (debt repayment); 
(7) uses internationally best-practice instruments;   
(8) is coherent and simple to administer,  
(9) minimises non-standard instruments for specific rights holders, and  
provides mechanisms to ensure the establishment of the seminal 
economic linkages, including: 
(a) local processing (value addition),  
(b) the development of local supplier industries (local content),  
(c) increased training and employment of locals,  
(d) local technology development (R&D) and  
(e) the integration of mining with other economic sectors. 
9. Mineral Fiscal Leakages 
It is recognized that the strategy of promoting FDI (foreign direct investment) 
carries several risks including a potential greater incentive and scope for state 
revenue leakages through transfer pricing. The TNC’s (trans-national 
corporations) multi-state operations enable them to exploit tax rate differentials, by 
deflating profits in higher-tax jurisdictions and declaring profits in lower-tax 
jurisdictions by: 
• Sale of minerals below market prices to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions. 
Many minerals do not have terminal markets (metal exchanges) especially 
ores and concentrates, which are difficult for the state to value: All minerals 
should be sold through authorised dealers or the MMCZ which should be 
resourced to ensure that fair value is achieved for all mineral exports;  
• Complex price hedging mechanisms between related parties : Taxes due 
should be calculated on income at market prices thereby shifting all hedging 
risks to the producer or, alternatively, hedging should be limited to a 
maximum portion of production, with open tender for the hedging 
instrument;  
• Debt finance provided by related parties at above-market interest rates:  A 
possible remedy could be to limit debt interest rate to a function of a 
recognised international corporate debt rate and to limit allowable debt 
ratios (gearing);  
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• Related party excessive management fees, technical services, or HQ costs. 
These costs should be capped at a maximum percentage of costs; 
• High leasing fees for capital goods and machinery from related parties: All 
leasing from foreign entities should be through open and transparent 
tender; 
While transfer pricing of production/exports will be contained through a capacitated 
MMCZ the containment of transfer pricing of inputs (including finance/debt) is more 
complex and will require the assessment of diverse interventions as outlined 
above. The efficacy of discouragement of FDI from recognised tax havens and 
forensic tax self-audits, for larger turnover operations, will also be assessed.  As 
developed countries are also victims of this abuse, assistance from select 
developed states and organisations will be sought in this regard. 
10.  Investing for the Future (Sustainable Investment) 
Mining resources are finite. The wealth generated from mineral resources has to 
be harnessed to provide a platform for development and growth well after they are 
exhausted. Revenue accrued from the nation’s mineral resources shall also be 
invested in other forms of capital, especially human and social infrastructure, as 
well as social assets. It calls for prudence in investment decisions, fiscal discipline 
and the effective monitoring of disbursements and expenditure. We must build the 
capacity to predict and manage our revenues even as they fluctuate because of 
commodity price changes. In this regard the advisability of ring-fencing of RRT 
revenues will be investigated with a view to establishing a fiscal stabilisation fund 
as a key component of a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to contribute to 
intergenerational equity, through investments into long-term physical and human 
infrastructure. Furthermore, we need to ensure that mineral extraction creates the 
maximum local economic linkages whilst this temporal window of opportunity is 
still open, as these linkage industries can continue post-mining. 
All mining companies need to develop CSI (Corporate Social Investment) plans 
that promote economic development in their area of operation that will outlive the 
life of the mine. 
11.  Transparent Benefits from Mining 
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The Government of Zimbabwe is committed to transparency through the provision 
information on revenue flows and other benefits obtained from mining. To this end, 
it will rigorously assess the efficacy of the possible accession of Zimbabwe to the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the principles and 
procedures of the EITI Standard and EITI Rules.  
The Government of Zimbabwe will ensure that communities that are or could be 
adversely affected by mining operations derive regular and significant benefits 
from those operations. A predictable matrix will be configured to determine such 
benefits, which will include but not be limited to equity/revenue allocation (including 
Community Trusts), access to employment, the provision of infrastructure for local 
use and resources for local education and skills formation. Mining companies will 
be encouraged to develop local supply chains for their purchases, thereby 
integrating themselves into the local economy.  
The Government of Zimbabwe will also strive to maximise the wider benefits from 
mining on the regional and national economies, in a transparent and equitable 
manner. 
12.  Strategic Minerals 
Government recognises that certain minerals are “strategic” for national growth 
and development. The new Minerals Development Act will set up clear and 
transparent guidelines for the designation of select “strategic minerals” that are 
critical feedstocks into other sectors of the economy, including: 
 manufacturing - iron/steel (ferrous ores and scrap), polymers (fossil fuels) 
and base metals/scrap;  
 agriculture - fertilisers (NPK189) and conditioners; 
 infrastructure – cement (limestone), steel and copper; 
 power - fossil fuels. 
Where appropriate, the State will regulate the extraction rates of these strategic 
minerals to ensure long-term availability for domestic supply and will, if necessary, 
regulate the pricing of these minerals and secondary metal supply (scrap metals) 
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into the domestic economy. Such pricing will reflect a reasonable rate of return to 
private investors. In addition, in this regard the ZMDC will be tasked with 
developing such critical mineral feedstocks to be supplied into the domestic 
economy at developmental prices (utility returns) to facilitate downstream 
economic activity.  
The designation of “strategic minerals” will be assessed by an inclusive Minerals 
Development Board that will motivate any such designation in a fair, objective and 
transparent manner, within the legal guidelines as contained in the new Minerals 
Development Law.  
13.  Disputes Resolution and Advisory Capacity 
The proposed Minerals Development Law will build on the Mining Affairs Board in 
the current Act to cater for a Minerals Development Board, comprised of 
representatives from government, industry labour and universities, as well as 
select appropriate experts. The key functions of the proposed Minerals 
Development Board will include: 
 Advising the Minister on the allocation of exploration and mining 
licenses/leases; 
 Advising the Minister on reasonable value addition, local content, skilling 
and technology development targets (milestones); 
 Advising the Minister on the designation of select “strategic minerals”; 
 Determining appropriate extraction rates and domestic pricing of such 
“strategic minerals”; 
 Advising the Minister on the suspension and/or cancellation of mineral 
rights that fail to comply with the national minerals regime and/or their 
license/lease conditions; 
 Dispute resolution on competing mineral property rights and domestic 
mineral pricing; 
 Developing medium to long-term national minerals development strategies; 
and 
 Advising the Minister on improvements to the Mineral Regime including 
amendments to the prevailing legislation; 
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The Minerals Development Board will be suitably resourced to carry out its duties 
through the national budget and/or a judicious mining levy with a minimal impact 
on the cost of production. Time-frames for dispute resolution will be promulgated. 
14.  Minerals Marketing 
The State of Zimbabwe reserves the right to market the people’s mineral assets, 
but undertakes to recompense the miner at fair and transparent market prices for 
mineral exports. This will be undertaken in compliance with the Minerals 
Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 21:04] of 1982 for all minerals 
except for precious metals. Gold and the platinum group metals (PGMs) will be 
marketed through an Authorised Dealer, designated by the Ministry of Finance 
under the Gold Trade Act [Chapter 21:03 12] of 2006, which will be amended to 
include the PGMs. 
Government will ensure that miners get fair value for the minerals produced and 
that marketing commissions are internationally competitive. In this regard 
Government will undertake a review of the MMCZ 0.875% commission to ensure 
that it is cost reflective and does not prejudice the minerals sector. 
15.  State Minerals Development Company 
The Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) was established by The 
Zimbabwe Mining Development Act” [Chapter 21:08] of 1982. Its mandate is to: 
invest in the mining industry in Zimbabwe on behalf of the State; to plan, coordinate 
and implement mining development projects on behalf of the State;  to engage in 
prospecting, exploration, mining and mineral beneficiation programmes; to render 
assistance to persons engaged in and about to engage in mining; to advise the 
Minister on all matters connected with corporate investments in the mining industry 
and make recommendations for the proper coordination of all investment 
programmes; to review the general economic conditions and  prospects of the 
mining industry and make recommendations for the proper co-ordination of all 
investment programmes. 
Government undertakes to review this mandate in the light of this Minerals 
Development Policy, with a view to it becoming a key state institution for facilitating 
both strategic minerals development and the development of the crucial mineral 
economic linkages. Government will also assess the efficacy of giving the ZMDC 
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a three month first-sight window on all new state financed geological data (geo-
survey maps and data), to enable it to reserve potential deposits of designated 
strategic minerals. 
16.  Indigenisation 
Prior to the European colonial invasions minerals were generally extracted by 
Zimbabweans for Zimbabwe, but during the 20th Century Zimbabwe’s minerals 
were predominantly mined by Europeans for Europe and its offshoots. The 
medium to long term goal of the Government of Zimbabwe is that the nation’s 
natural resources will be predominantly be exploited by indigenous Zimbabweans. 
Many successful mining countries reserved mineral exploitation for their citizens, 
such as some European states (in the past) and several Asian states (currently).  
However, given the current capital, skills and technology constraints facing the 
sector, the Government of Zimbabwe seeks to encourage equitable partnerships 
between local and foreign investors that overcome these impediments and to 
progressively build local capital, skills and technological prowess. Nevertheless, 
ASM mineral rights should be reserved for Zimbabwean citizens. 
In this regard a custom time-line for indigenisation for new FDI in mining will be 
assessed, where the 10 year target could be 20% ownership and the 25 year target 
(i.e. on License renewal) could be 51%. This is likely to have a minimal impact on 
new FDI in mining. 
Whilst, local communities must be protected from, and/or compensated for, the 
negative impacts of mining, the establishment of Community Trusts as an element 
of indigenous equity, should be applied uniformly and judiciously so as not to 
create affluent mining communities surrounded by poor communities. 
The Ministry on Indigenisation and Empowerment will be engaged to assess the 
viability of strengthening a VCF for indigenous mining entrepreneurs and suppliers, 
through the transfer of a portion of equity (indigenization commitments) to the VCF, 
to increase its capital base and efficacy. The fund should be managed as a PPP 
with the Chamber to reduce risk. 
Local content obligations will be configured to privilege indigenous suppliers and 
the Chamber of Mines will be encouraged to participate in the Venture Capital 
Fund (VCF), in partnership with Government, to support indigenous enterprises to 
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effectively supply the mining industry with the requisite quality and quantity of 
goods and services. 
All listed mining companies, that derive more than half of their income from 
Zimbabwe, will be obliged to have their primary listing in Zimbabwe,.  
17.  Competing Land Rights and Land Use Options 
Mining involves intensive use of land and can adversely affect other uses. The 
Government of Zimbabwe shall establish a framework for the evaluation and 
management of competing land use options with a view to maximising the 
sustainable developmental potential for the nation and future generations, whilst 
recognising that mineral resources are national assets This will involve recognition 
of the rights of other land users, the development of procedures for identifying and 
consulting potentially affected communities and persons as well as appropriate 
compensation principles, including criteria for considering resettlement options. 
Adequate administrative mechanisms and procedures shall be put in place to 
mitigate conflicts arising from competing land use. 
18.  Minerals Knowledge Formation  
Minerals Knowledge Formation (STEM skills and technology development) is 
critical to growing and indigenising the minerals sector as well for developing the 
seminal minerals economic linkages, particularly the backward (inputs) and 
forward (beneficiation) linkages. In this regard Government will: 
 Commission a survey to identify the critical minerals technical skills needs 
and develop of a national minerals (and linkage industries) HRD strategy;  
 Develop a strategy to re-attract skills from the diaspora through 
interventions to locate skilled Zimbabweans, to assist in their relocation and 
on remuneration for critical scarce skills;  
 Introduce a minimum knowledge corporate spending target of a percentage 
of payroll to fund local STEM skills formation and technology development 
for the minerals sector and for the back/forward linkage industries; 
 Assess the efficacy of converting tertiary state tertiary technical training 
costs into notional student loans to be worked off over 15 years by working 
in-country, which will convert into a pro rata commercial loan if the graduate 
exits Zimbabwe before 15 years;  
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 Rebuild mineral technology development institutions (Institute for Mining 
Research, Government Metallurgical Laboratory, Bulawayo School of 
Mines); 
 Use of a portion of the proposed RRT to fund knowledge formation, in 
partnership with the industry, for the training and remuneration of Maths 
and Science teachers to upgrade school education, to fund free engineering 
and science tertiary education at state intuitions, to support Engineering 
and Science Faculties, including post-grad programmes; and to fund grants 
for engineering and technician/artisan learnerships. 
 Configure the establishment of a dedicated Minerals Technology Fund 
(MTF) and a Minerals Skills Fund (MSF), as a Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) with the mining industry, pedagogical institutions and state 
enterprises (ZMDC) and institutions.  
 Configure the establishment of targeted skilling programmes and 
opportunities for the youth, women and other marginalized groups 
19.  Environmental Stewardship and Social Responsibility 
Among the key principles set out in Zimbabwe’s environmental policy are that 
development should be based on sustainable natural resource use and sound 
management and also that full environmental and social costs or benefits foregone 
should form part of public and private sector planning. The policy will also develop 
an integrated and multi-sectoral systems approach to resource and environmental 
planning. The application of this approach and these principles to decision-making 
relating to and the conduct and supervision of mineral operations requires 
compliance with the environmental protection laws of Zimbabwe and international 
best practices in the sustainable use of the natural resources. The Environmental 
Management Act [Chapter 20:27] of 2002 and the Environmental Management 
Agency (EMA) are central to the formulation and implementation of relevant 
principles and guidelines and in this regard customised environmental protection 
guidelines for mineral exploration and exploitation will be formulated jointly by the 
EMA and the Ministry of Mines. In addition, the efficacy of joint EMA-MOM 
inspections will be assessed. 
No significant mineral operation will be permitted without an environment and 
social impact assessment having been conducted, evaluated and approved by the 
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Zimbabwe Government. Plans for managing environmental and social impacts 
must be incorporated into the assessment reports. These must, right from the 
inception of the operation, include plans for redressing physical impacts upon 
closure of the mine as well as for sustaining community livelihoods thereafter. The 
conduct of impact assessments must involve early consultation with the potentially 
affected public and open hearings will generally constitute a part of the evaluation. 
For Designated ASM Zones (DASMZs), the MMMD and EMA could carry out an 
SEA and then build the requisite mining modalities into all ASM Licenses issued 
within the area. 
20.  An Integrated Mining Sector 
Whilst the development of Zimbabwe’s mineral resources will in the short term 
generate revenue and provide materials for reconstruction,  in the longer term 
mining must be fully integrated into the national economy in order to maximise the 
multiplier effects. In this regard, opportunities for fostering up- down- and side-
stream value addition will be pursued. As industrial minerals sometimes have a 
greater potential for linkages with other sectors of the economy, attention will be 
paid to encouraging their development, particularly by indigenous entrepreneurs. 
The development of local small, micro and medium-scale enterprises (SMMEs), 
especially in the procurement of goods and services, will be encouraged. 
The concept of Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs, also known as 
“Development Corridors”) was developed in southern Africa and is based on using 
high-rent resource exploitation projects as anchors for the development of 
infrastructure that can then underpin the development of other sustainable 
economic potential such as agriculture (and agro-processing), forestry (and 
processing), tourism, manufacturing, etc. and other related and ancillary industries 
in the area. The promotion of such integrated Spatial Development Initiatives, to 
unleash the full growth and development potential, will form an important feature 
of Zimbabwe’s resources development policy.   
The government will encourage greater infrastructure linkages -considering that 
many mining projects require substantial infrastructure from mine to port and 
consume large amounts of electricity and water. The government will ensure that 
infrastructure needs of large-scale mines are integrated into national and regional 
economic planning with an appropriate regulatory framework to ensure open 
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access at non-discriminatory prices, for the infrastructure to benefit as many 
people and sectors as possible. These linkages will be optimised through 
integrated spatial planning and the formulation of appropriate economic incentives 
and disincentives that will encourage the mining companies to deepen their 
economic footprint within Zimbabwe. 
The Government of Zimbabwe will look for possibilities for promoting forward 
linkages (beneficiation). Studies will be undertaken to explore the potential for such 
forward linkages in the ferrous, base and precious metal sectors, amongst others. 
Judicious export taxes will be imposed on crude mineral exports where the next 
beneficiation step has been independently shown to be commercially viable. 
Mining licenses for the export of crude ores, concentrates, alloys or minerals will 
be conditional on a feasibility study being undertaken by an independent agency 
within a stipulated time period. If the feasibility indicates that the beneficiation 
project is viable (gives a reasonable return on investment), then the Government 
will reserve the right to impose an equitable export tax on exports of the crude 
form. 
Government will also facilitate and encourage strong linkages into the local 
knowledge infrastructure (skilling, technology transfer and development, 
universities, colleges, etc.) through a judicious basket of incentives and 
disincentives. In this regard the rapid development of STEM 190  skills will be 
prioritised through a minimum corporate spend on skilling, to be set at a 
reasonable percentage of pay-roll. 
Government will work with the private sector and other agencies in locating skilled 
Zimbabweans abroad in the diaspora, and develop strategies to attract this 
valuable resource back to the country.  
To pursue viable policies for integration, there is a need to take account of not only 
the Zimbabwean economy but more broadly the economies of the SACU, SADC, 
COMESA and the African Union. In order to achieve viable markets and critical 
                                            
 
190 STEM: science, technology, engineering & mathematics 
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economies of scale Zimbabwe will progressively integrate into the larger African 
markets, on an equitable basis, in terms of both mineral inputs and outputs.  
Furthermore, the Zimbabwean mining industry is critically constrained by power 
supply. In this regard regional power strategies will be evaluated with a view to 
sourcing low-cost clean energy from the region, in tandem with rehabilitating and 
expanding national power capacity. 
21.  Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) 
The artisanal and small-scale mining (“ASM”) sector has the potential to create 
employment, generate income and help to reduce poverty in rural areas and to 
stem migration from the rural areas to urban areas and should accordingly be 
reserved for Zimbabweans. However, it also has the potential for significant 
environmental degradation, negative social and health and life-threatening 
pollution of bio systems (e.g. mercury from ASM gold recovery). 
ASM should be clearly defined and legalised to be eligible for targeted support and 
facilitation. An ASM definition of an operation or working extracting less than 15 
thousand tonnes of ore per month (180ktpa) will be assessed for applicability. 
An integrated approach is required in addressing ASM issues. Since ASM is 
largely a rural activity, any programme for it needs to be linked with rural 
development plans and designed based on a clear profile of who are engaged in 
the activity, when they mine and what else they do. 
Whilst fees/levies which add to mining costs should be kept as low as possible, 
such fees/levies for ASM should be should be lower than those applied to larger 
operations, in order to stimulate the sector. 
The pre-existing ASM support system of extension services (DMC191, regional 
geologist, GML 192 ), finance (DMC equipment hire-purchase pound), and 
marketing/quality (GML and MMCZ) will be rebuilt and reinforced. Government will 
encourage the creation of an ASM Venture Capital Fund (VCF) as a PPP between 
                                            
 
191 DMC: District Mining Commissioner.  
192 GML: Government Metallurgical Laboratory 
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the state, the Chamber of Mines, DFIs193 and donors. These three components – 
extension services, financing, and marketing/quality assistance – constitute the 
institutional “Golden Triangle” for successful ASM development. To enable 
artisanal and small-scale miners to obtain financial facilities, consideration will be 
given to enhancing their creditworthiness, including the form of license tenure and 
to expanding the MILF (Mining Industry Loan Fund). Consideration will be given to 
rebuilding the regional ASM Service Centers, with minerals purchasing agents, as 
resources become available. 
Given the historical role of women in ASM, support systems to facilitate the entry 
of female entrepreneurs into this sector will be configured, such as a special 
window in the ASM VCF and customised short training courses under the 
Bulawayo School of Mines. 
The artisanal and small-scale mining sector could be strengthened by the miners 
organising themselves into associations, syndicates and, in some instances, 
cooperatives, in order to improve economies of scale, of creditworthiness and 
opportunities for mechanisation. 
At a more general level, the Ministry in collaboration with the EMA will develop 
environmental compliance handbooks/manuals to assist ASM in adopting more 
environmentally friendly mining and processing methods and technologies and 
government will endeavour to have joint ASM inspections of the Ministry of Mines, 
EMA and other government agencies to ensure coordination and to minimise 
disruption.  In addition, special training programmes, including environmental 
compliance, will be established for small scale miners in the main ASM regions, 
as resource become available. 
The MMCZ and the GML will develop programmes to assist ASM in producing 
mineral products (concentrates) of marketable quality and aid them in realising fair 
value for their products. A graduated EIA payment system for consultants will be 
investigated for ASM operations. The EMA will be engaged on the efficacy of 
                                            
 
193 DFI: Development Finance Institution (e.g. the AfDB, the IFC, the IDC) 
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having conditions in ASM mining licenses that would replace the need for ASM 
EIAs  
The relationship between large-scale mining enterprises and the ASM sector need 
not necessarily be an antagonistic one. The smaller-scale miners can benefit from 
technical inputs and advice from the large-scale operators who could provide 
markets for further processing (the “out-grower” concept). Such forms of 
cooperation could help the large scale miners reduce policing costs and gain 
acceptance and credibility in the community. 
In order to marry necessary environmental compliance with the limited resources 
of ASMs, the concept of creating Designated ASM Zones (DASMZ) will be 
investigated with a view to the State undertaking detailed geological mapping and 
Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) of ASM over such zones to identify 
potential environmental threats from ASM activities and then to include conditions 
in the ASM licenses in DASMZs to eliminate or mitigate such threats. Failure to 
comply with such conditions would then lead to a possible suspension of the ASM 
license.  
Potential targets for ASM operations identified in detailed geological surveys of 
ASM zones, will be disposed of in a transparent, fair, honest, cost effective and 
competitive manner, as per the Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
The Ministry will strengthen the ASM capacity to develop and implement strategies 
to promote a strong and responsible ASM sector. 
22. Building Capable Institutions 
Successful mineral-based development will require policy coherence across 
several government Ministries, tiers and entities (such as Mines, Industry, Water, 
Environment, Technology, Education, Energy, EMA, RDCs, ZRP, ZIA,, etc.). 
Accordingly government will endeavour to achieve close coordination and intra-
governmental cooperation on strategy formulation, to ensure overarching 
alignment and clarity of roles.  
The Government of Zimbabwe shall allocate a portion of revenue derived from 
mineral resources to strengthen the capacity of relevant state monitoring and 
promotion institutions, particularly geological survey department.  In addition the 
Government of Zimbabwe will seek to facilitate the establishment and growth of 
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private sector entities to underpin a vibrant mining sector in areas such as finance, 
services, training/skilling, suppliers to and consumers of minerals. 
23.  Expected Outcomes 
In addition to growth in mineral sector and its linkage sectors, the overall goals can 
be expressed in terms of broad-based inclusive development, growth and poverty 
reduction and significant improvement in the governance capabilities of the 
country. The impact of the minerals sector on the broad national development 
goals will be regularly assessed in terms of its contribution to: 
(1) national revenue and foreign exchange earnings,  
(2) gross fixed capital investment, 
(3) the creation of inclusive sustainable indigenous employment,  
(4) the provision of raw materials for downstream industries and national 
reconstruction,  
(5) the provision of markets for local supplier industries (local content), 
(6) the improvement in social and physical infrastructure,  
(7) the stimulation of new economic activity through the provision of the 
requisite infrastructure; 
(8) the development of indigenous capital and entrepreneurship, 
(9) positive impacts on the environment and local communities; 
(10) the development of sustainable ASM operations and communities,  
(11) the improvement of mining health and safety indices, and 
(12) the improvement in national knowledge infrastructure (STEM skills 
formation and technology transfer and development).  
A scorecard will be configured with appropriate indices to enable government to 
monitor these contributions.  
 
 
 
 
 
